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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claimant!Appellate, Francisco Serrano is a framer who worked
employee

oth

the Defendant as an

of September 2001 until February 2008. Defendants were subject to

Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. Claimant was injured in mid January 2004 when he

off

a roof and landed on his right side injuring his right shoulder, back and fracturing his pelvis,
resulting in a herniated disk as reflected in the St Alphonsus records by Sandra Thompson on the
Claimant aggravated the above 2004 injury on the 28 th of January 2008 while

28 th
employed

Four Season Framing when he slipped on ice.
claimed workers compensation benefits for the two industrial accidents

described above.
Claimants

The Industrial Commission denied both claims on the grounds that the
arose from a pre-existing condition and Claimant therefore failed to prove

his condition was caused by the accidents. The Claimant!Appellant seeks review of the Idaho
Industrial Commission ("the Commission") orders. The Commission had jurisdiction to hear the
case pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506. This Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the
Commission's order pursuant to Article V, § 9 of the Idaho Constitution,

§ 72-724 and § 72-

1368(9), and Idaho Appellate Rules 4 and 14(b). The Claimant!Appellant timely tiled his notice
Commission's decisions. See I.A.R 14(b) (The Claimant has an appeal as a

of appeal
matter

by

a notice of appeal with the Commission within 42 days

an order of the

Commission).

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

1

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL BY APPELLANT
1. DID THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE

THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THE CLAIMANT WAS REFUSED A PROTECTIVE
ORDER UNDER HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AS
OUTLINED IN HIS MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER AND MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER AND DENIED SUCH ON THE
23 RD OF FEBRUARY 2010, THE 24TH OF FEBRUARY 2011 AND ON THE 21 ST OF
DECEMBER 2011?
II. DID
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE
THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THE CLAIMANT WAS ORDERED TO WAIVE HIS
AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT OR BE
DENIED
BENEFITS UNDER IDAHO WORKERS COMPENSATION LAWS
SIGNED ON THE 7TH OF SEPTEMBER 201O?
III.

I'

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE
DISCRETION WHEN THEY OVERRULED CLAIMANT-APPELLANT'S
OBJECTIONS REGARDING THE TESTIMONY AND DEPOSITION OF DR.
TIMOTHY DOERR IN THE ORDER DATED THE 5TH
AUGUST 2011 AND
GRANTING THE SECOND EXTENSION ON THE 7TH OF NOVEMBER 2011?

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAVE SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT
IV. DID
EVIDENCE AND ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE THEIR DISCRETION
WHEN THEY DETERMINED THE CLAIMANT-APPELLANT WAS NOT
ENTITLED TO THE MEDICAL BENEFITS (PALLIATIVE, CURATIVE, AND
OTHERWISE), WHETHER INCURRED AND NOT PAID OR WHETHER NOT
INCURRED AND IMPAIRMENT RATING PURSUANT TO I.e. 72-432(1, ~,
TEMPORARY DISABILITY AND ATTORNEY FEES AS ORDERED ON THE 20 H
OF MARCH 2013?
V.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE
DISCRETION WHEN THEY DENIED THE ITEMS REQUESTED IN
CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION AND MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD FILED
ON THE 18 TH OF JUNE 2013?
ARGUMENT

I.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSED
DISCRETION WHEN THE CLAIMANT WAS REFUSED A PROTECTIVE
ORDER UNDER HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AS

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
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IN HIS MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER AND MOTIONS FOR
ON
23 RD OF
RECONSIDERATION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER
FEBRUARY 2010, THE 24TH OF FEBRUARY 2011
ON THE 21 sT OF
DECEMBER 2011.
'~H~UA'.H

incorporates and includes herein the arguments, case

citations made

the

pleadings and part of the record.

1. Controlling Authority from the Ninth Circuit Indicates that Immigration Status is
not a Relevant Issue in a Workers Compensation Claim.
Central to

issues in this case is the Industrial Commissions holding in Diaz v. Franklin
(Industrial Commission Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and

Building

Recommendation, 2006-507999) In Diaz, the Commission held that undocumented workers did
not qualify

permanent disability benefits because there exists no legal labor market for them.
Commission indicated that immigration status is relevant to determinations

This holding by

of permanent and partial disability in workers compensation claims and conflicts with relevant
case

from

Ninth Circuit.

The appellate decision Rivera et ai., v. Nibco, Inc., considered
discover ________ ' ' _

right of an employer to

status and held "By revealing their immigration status, any plaintiffs found

to be undocumented might face criminal prosecution and deportation." 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir.
2004) (cert. Denied)(Mar. 7, 2005)

relevant

found

The court in Rivera held that immigration status is not

protective order granted by the lower court was justified because

the

grave "chilling effect that the disclosure of plaintiffs' immigration status could have on their
ability to effectuate their rights." Further, "[W]hile documented workers face

possibility of

retaliatory discharge for an assertion of their labor and civil rights, undocumented workers

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
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confront

reality that, in addition to possible discharge,

employer will likely

report them to the INS and they will be subjected to deportation proceedings or criminal
prosecution." 1£1 at 1064. The Supreme Court declined to review the decision upholding an
order iimiting employers' inquiries into plaintiffs' immigration status. Additionally, compelled
disclosure of immigration status hurts documented workers:
Even documented workers may be chilled by the type of discovery at issue here.
workers may fear that their immigration status would be changed, or
status would reveal the immigration problems their family or friends;
similarly, new legal residents or citizens may feel intimidated by
prospect of
having their immigration history examined in a public proceeding. Any of these
individuals, failing to understand the relationship between
litigation and
immigration status, might choose to forego civil rights litigation.
Rivera v.

Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2004)

The National Labor Relations Board expressed identical concerns when, in connection
with

unfair labor practices, the employer's counsel inquired into employees'

length of

the United States, places of education, previous employment, and also

subpoenaed their passports, "green cards," and employment authorization cards. In finding that
this "intimidation

witnesses" constituted an unfair labor practice,

Board concluded that:

The
excuse which counsel could proffer [for the subpoenas] was that he
wanted to test the credibility of all those witnesses by calling into question
whether they signed their proper names on their pretrial affidavits . . .
offered
no other evidence tending to show that anyone of them, other than Figueroa, was
working or testifying under an assumed name. His pretext for seeking these
documents
this purpose was a transparent fiction .
. . . [T]he effect upon the General Counsel's witnesses of this wholly irrelevant
probe
their immigration status which [the administrative
judge] observed
at the hearing ranged from unsettling to devastating and certainly affected their
ability to testify.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
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, the Board's

Boat Works., Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 844 (1

consequent cease and desist order enjoined the employer from "[t]hreatening employees with
into question their immigration status in order to discourage them from

deportation or

giving testimony under the Act." Id The critical importance of minimizing

potential for

adverse consequences to employees who might invoke their statutory workplace rights is, of
course, well established:
Plainiv. effective enforcement [of the FLSA] could thus only be expected if
employees
free to approach officials with their grievances .... [I]t needs no
argument to show that fear of economic retaliation might
operate to induce
aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard conditions.
Mitchell v. Robert

the
the entitlement

Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288,292 (1960).

Circuit and the courts of the Eastern District

consistently found that

plaintiffs to monetary relief for employment claims is unaffected by their

immigration or employment authorization status. See, e.g., Local 512, Warehouse & Office
Workers'

v. NLRB (Felbro), 795 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986) (granting

petition for

enforcement containing back pay award); Bevies Co., Inc. v. Teamsters Local 986, 791 F.2d
1391 (9th
employees);

1986) (upholding arbitration awards granting
v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504 (9th

to undocumented
1989) (following Felbro

regarding

pay availability); EEOC v. Tortilleria "La Mejor. "758 .Supp. 585 (E.D. Cal.

1991) (scope

Title VII not diminished by passage ofIRCA).

Respondents· inquiries into these areas have no legitimate purpose. Indeed, questions
implicating

of birth may be highly sensitive inasmuch as -- in conjunction with information

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
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birthplace and citizenship status -- they could lead to adverse inferences about an

about

individual's immigration status or work authorization. See, e.g., Chau v. LVS, 247 F.3d 026 (9th
Cir. 2001) (evidence of foreign birth gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of alienage, shifting
respondent or deportee to prove citizenship); Murphy v. INS, 54 F.3d 605,608-

the burden to

09 (9th Cir. 995) (same).
The courts reasoning in the cases above in the areas of discrimination and unfair labor
practices are especially applicable to the field of workers compensation. "Proceedings under the
Workmen's Compensation Law are designed to afford employees a speedy, summary and simple
remedy for

recovery of compensation for injuries sustained

industrial accidents ... "

Duggan v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 92 Idaho 262, 263-64 (1968) see Brooks v. Duncan, 96 Idaho
579 (1975), also see Hogaboom v. Econ. Mattress, 107 Idaho 13

984). The humane purposes

which it serves leave no room for narrow, technical construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho
87,88,910 P.2d 759, 760

996). The provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law are

to be liberally construed in favor of the employee. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho
955,956, (1990).
undocumented workers know that they cannot receIve workers compensation
permanent disability benefits, employers are free to sidestep the humane purposes of workers
compensation law when hiring them. The above issues are reoccurring themes for this office and
many others

the legal community working in the field of workers compensation. Because of

the expenses of litigation and the current practice of the Industrial Commission to deny the
possibility of disability benefits to undocumented workers, access to the legal system for non-
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affluent undocumented Hispanic workers has been severely limited.

Many workers

compensation claims simply are not cost efficient for attorneys to take on
permanent

~.~~~"u

the issue of

is automatically removed.

2. Neither Idaho Law nor Legislative Intent Support the Holding in Diaz which also
Runs Counter to Established Public Policy.
Despite the various interpretations of the basis for the arguments
end result is
immigrants.

or against Diaz, the

Idaho does not provide for workers compensation disability

undocumented

holding is in contract Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609 ( 986). In Sanchez the

Idaho Supreme Court clarified it would be against public policy to allow the employer to take
advantage of

cheap labor of an illegal alien without assuming the corresponding burden of

his disability ifhe became injured on the job.

Diaz also failed to account for the Idaho Legislature that clarified that benefits are available
even

there is not a legal labor market for employees. Such argument that no benefits should be

paid

there is no legal market contradicts the express assertion

204(2) as

legislature in Idaho Code 72-

is no "labor market" for minors, but benefits are not denied therein.

Idaho Code 72-204(2) states as follows:
The following shall constitute employees in private employment and their
employers subject to the provisions of this law:
(2) A person, including a minor, whether lawfully or unlawfully
employed, in the service of an employer....
Under I.C. § 72-204, undocumented aliens, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, are
considered employees in private employment and their employers are subject to all provisions of
the worker's compensation act.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
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Legislature's intent not to deny any benefits to illegal immigrants may also be
inferred from comparing Idaho Code Title 72 Chapter 13 (Employment Security Law) with
Idaho Code Title 72 Chapters 1 through 8

(Workers Compensation).

Idaho's Workers

Compensation Act defines the term "Alien" within the Workers Compensation Act:
"Alien" means a person who is not a citizen, a national or a resident of the United
States or Canada. Any person not a citizen or national of the United States who
relinquishes or is about to relinquish his residence in the United States shall be
regarded as an alien.
Idaho Code §72-102(1). Idaho Code §72-1366 prohibits "aliens" from obtaining unemployment
benefits.

contrast, Idaho Code Title 72 Chapters 1 through 8 dealing with Workers

Compensation benefits makes no such distinction between those who are eligible for benefits or
the benefits that may be awarded. Nothing in Idaho Code Title 72 Chapters 1 through 8 suggests
that "aliens" are entitled to any less benefits than United States citizens

legal immigrants.

Where statutes are ambiguous, Courts employ relevant rules of statutory construction,
beginning

the literal words of statute, giving the language of the statute its plain, obvious,

and rational meanings. Driver v. S1 Corp. 139 Idaho 423, 429 (2003) " ... [i]t is a fundamental
law of statutory construction that statutes that are in pari materia are to be construed together, to
the end that the legislative intent will be given effect." [Citations omitted]." Rogers v. Household
Life Ins. Co. 2011 WL 924034, 2 (Idaho, 2011). Statutes must

intent, and
necessity

interpreted according to their

intent is not clear it is to be collected from the context, from the occasion and
law, from the mischief felt, and the remedy in view; and the intention is to be

taken or presumed according to what is consonant with reason and good discretion. Noble v.
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Glenns

Bank, Limited 91 Idaho 364, 367, (Idaho 1966). Reading

pari

it is evident that it is the intent of the Idaho Legislature to prohibit aliens from

Code Title 72 in

obtaining unemployment benefits, but not Worker's Compensation benefits.
Obviously,

intent of the legislature in favor not only of coverage but of the right to

benefits is beyond caviL
The welfare of the state depends upon its industries and even more upon the
welfare of its wageworkers.... and sure and certain relief for injured workmen
and their families and dependents is hereby provided ....
Idaho Code §§72-20 - Declaration of Police Power. The plain meaning of a statute therefore
will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to
absurd results. Gillihan v. Gump, 140 Idaho 264, 266, 92 P.3d 514, 516 (2004). St. Luke's

Regional

Center, Ltd v. Board ofCom'rs of Ada

683, 685 (Idaho,2009).
statutes

County~

146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d

There is no ambiguity with respect to the meaning of the pertinent

Code Title 72 relating to Workers Compensation benefits, because they do not

make any exceptions to the rights to benefits based upon immigration status. To hold that a
Claimant cannot obtain disability benefits because he is not a legal resident, but that his last legal
residence in
distinction
Code

own country cannot be considered, is simply a back door means of avoiding the

rlpr<X'P?'n

Idaho Code Title 72 Chapter 13 (Employment Security Law) and Idaho

72 Chapters 1 through 8 (Workers Compensation).
It would be against public policy to allow Defendants, after an industriai accident has

occurred, to investigate Claimant's immigration status a second time, especially where they
cannot demonstrate their reason to now question his immigration status. The Idaho Legislature,
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In

policy behind the Worker's Compensation Act and

declaration of

police

power. makes no distinction between employees on the basis of nationality, race or immigration
Code §72-20l, §72 - 102 (12). It is evident

status.

the fact that the Workers

Compensation Act covers "unlawful" employment and the fact

it does not

reference to alienage, that illegal immigrants are subject to

employee

an

entitled to benefits

under the act -- no doubt because employers desired to have the act's exclusivity provisions
extend to

including the thousands of farm workers exposed to hazardous machinery.

Furthermore, and most importantly from a public policy perspective, allowing employers
to evade

for disability benefits of illegal aliens further reduces the cost of
immigrants as against legal immigrants and citizens,

employing

one assumes that the

Workers Compensation sureties account for the anticipated reduced payout in disability benefits.
In other words,

present stance of the Idaho Industrial Commission encourages employers to

turn a blind eye to immigration status, and then to attack the Claimant's immigration status as a
defense to

Claimant's right to benefits. Presuming, as any reasonable person would, that

employers have some general knowledge of the prevalence of illegal immigrants in Idaho, and in
Canyon County in particular, this creates an incentive for employers to exercise minimal
diligence

determining the immigration status of employees. As a practical matter, then, the

Commission's

sInce

stance encourages employers to hire Hispanics rather

probability is higher that Hispanics may be illegal and

benefits the case

other races,

have to be paid less in

an injury_
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hiring the Claimant, the Defendant employer was required to verify the
Act

Claimant's immigration status by The Immigration Reform and

986.

The

Defendant presumably performed this investigation with due diligence and accepted the
Claimant's immigration status without problems. After the hire, the Defendant received the
benefits
Industrial
determined

the Claimant's diligent and laborious services. Now,

light of the recent Idaho

decision in Diaz, Defendants seek to disprove
- the legal immigration status of the Claimant. Nothing in

previously
record reflects that

the Defendants have any basis for doing this other than Claimant's race and nationality.
However,

of Diaz.

Defendants obviously have concluded that "it is worth a shot"

whether or not to permit discovery of immigration status in civil and
administrative proceedings involves important considerations of public policy affecting not only
illegal immigrants, but legal immigrants, employers and sureties. The facts to be weighed in
considering whether or not to permit discovery of immigration status are complex. Many of
those factors are lucidly discussed in the dissent in Diaz.

3. Compelling Discovery Of Immigration Status Places Employers
.........,," Prosecution

Danger Of

Claimant respectfully suggests that the Industrial Commission may want to consider the
potential criminal liability of employers that may be evidenced by information discovered during
immigration status "fishing expeditions." In at least some cases, this may

a

of discovery

that an employer \vould strongly prefer to avoid. "In light of the IRCA prohibitions and the 1-9
certification, an employer

the person who executed the form) might find it prudent to invoke
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the

UH'V,""HH'~HC

discovery request.

privilege against self-incrimination in response to a pointedly framed

court might decide to avoid this controversy entirely simply by barring all

immigration-related discovery." Schnapper, Righting Wrongs Against Immigrant Workers, Trial,
March 2003, at 54. Most significantly, it is a Federal offense to "shelter" an illegal immigrant as
discussed below.
turning their heads while employing illegal immigrants face potential
prosecution

violation of INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 324(a)(1 )(A)(iii). Employment

constitutes harboring where employer knew or recklessly disregarded person's illegal status and
her remain in employment undetected by INS. US. v. Sanchez, 927 F.2d 376

took steps to
(8th Cir. 1
substantially

Gonzalez, 674

1).

Approving a jury charge defining harboring as "any conduct tending to
an alien's remaining in the United

1067, 1073 (Fifth Cir. 1982). The term "harbor" was

conduct tending substantially to facilitate an alien's "remaining in

us.

illegally."

us.

v. Rubio-

to encompass

United States illegally.

Lopez 521 F.2d 437,440 -441 (C.A.N.Y. 1975).
Aiding and abetting harboring is also a crime that the government may prove by

establishing

(l) the alien entered or remained in the U. S.

of law; (2) the

defendant concealed. harbored or sheltered the alien in the U.S.; (3) the defendant knew or
recklessly disregarded that the alien entered or remained in the U.S. in violation of law; and (4)
the defendant's conduct tended to substantially facilitate the alien remaining

the Us. v. De

Jesus-Batre,)', 10 F.3d 154, 60 (FifthCir. 2005).
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Criminal liability for employers also can be based on the simple act of "encouraging" an
alien to stay

the United States, "regardless of whether such

has received prior official

authorization to come to, emer, or reside in the United States and regardless of any future official
action which may

taken with respect to such alien" or simply aiding or abetting anyone else

who encourages an alien to reside in the United States. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324(a)(1)(A). Although
employment alone may not be sufficient to evidence a criminal violation, the United States
successfully used defendant's employment of undocumented workers to establish that he
facilitated their abilitv., to remain in U.S. as an element necessarv.,

a conviction for harboring,

concealing or shielding undocumented workers. Us. v. Shum, 496 F.3d 390 (FifthCir. 2007).
While INS regulatory comments suggest that the criminal provisions of INA
§274(a)(

will not be applied to cases involving only employment, at least one court ignored

the regulatory comments and found that employment does constitute harboring. Us. v. Kim,. 193
F.3d 567, 572-74 (2d Cir.

999). Another court found that it was not reversible error for a

district judge to refuse to give a "mere employment" jury instruction to harboring and smuggling
charges. Any person is subject to a potential 10-year sentence for knowingly aiding or assisting a
person to enter the

.S., if that person is inadmissible on criminal or security grounds. Knowing

that the inadmissible person has a prior felony conviction is not an element of the crime that the
United States must prove. INA §277, 8 U.S.C. §1327. The government need only prove that the
defendant knew the person was inadmissible. US v. Flores-Garcia, 198 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.
2000).

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

13

immigration status carries with it the virtual
discovered

certainty

information

evidences illegal status must be reported to the INS or Department of Homeland

Security. "Any person who ... encourages or induces an alien to ... reside ... knowing or in
reckless disregard of the fact that such ... residence is ... in violation of law, shall be punished
as provided. . for each alien in respect to whom such a violation occurs ... fined under title 18
. . . imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both." Section 274 felonies under the Federal
Immigration

Nationality Act, INA 27 4A( a) (1 )(A). A person (including a group of persons,

business, organization, or local government) commits a federal felony when she or he assists an
alien slhe

reasonably know is illegally in the U.S. or who lacks employment

authorization, by transporting, sheltering, or assisting him or her to obtain employment, or,
encourages

alien to remain in the U.S. by referring him or her to an employer or by acting as

employer or agent

an employer in any way. Arguably once employers, sureties or members

of the Commission or its staff discover that a Claimant is illegal, they must report that fact to the
appropriate

agency. Permitting discovery of immigration status

slippery slope for employers.

Claimants creates a

Obviously, if the employer and surety are entitled to conduct

discovery regarding the Claimant's immigration status, the Claimant will have

same right to

disclosure of similar information from the employer, if only to allow them to create a

reqUlre
record on

they can assert estoppel arguments:

Schnapper, Righting Wrongs Against Immigrant Workers, 39 Trial 46, 54
(2003) (explaining that if the employer asserted a defense under Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, an employee "would be entitled to engage discovery regarding the
employer's prior knowledge of his or her immigration status. Proof of an
employer's general practices and knowledge regarding other immigrant workers
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relevant evidence."
Rev. at 415 Emphasis supplied. Given the number of illegal immigrants

Cimini. 61 Stan.

working in Idaho, it is likely, if not certain, that at least some employers will "wink" at hiring
employees

to be illegal immigrants. Many more will likely maintain shoddy practices

with respect to the hiring of immigrants. The IRCA requires employers to verify that all newlyhired employees present "facially valid" documentation verifying the employee's identity and his
or her legal authorization to accept employment in the United States. The employer is faced with
a Hobson's Choice.

The employer must verify that employees present "facially valid"

documentation prior to hiring, yet an employer who knowingly acceplS fraudulent documentation
can also be

prosecuted under other immigration laws.

can face stiff penalties for IRCA violations that include substantial
debarment from government contracts. Penalties can
imposed for
unauthorized workers as well as simply for committing paperwork
violations even if all workers are authorized to work. Fines for hiring
workers will amount to anywhere from $250 to $5,500 per worker
Y'-'f-,"'U"'Uc'A on the prior history of violation. Employers can also be barred from
competing
government contracts for a year if they knowingly hire or continue
to
unauthorized aliens. Paperwork violations can also result in significant
penalty up to
fines. Each mistake or missing item on a form can result in a $1
$1
each form. A missing form would automatically be assessed at $1000.
for example, that had 100 employees and did not complete 1-9
might face a $100,000 fine. IRCA investigators have considerable
assessing fines and will look at factors like
of the company,
seriousness of the violations, whether the employer was trying to comply in
good
the pattern of past violations.
should also be cautioned that knowingly accepting fraudulent
documents from employees is a different kind of violation that can be criminaliy
prosecuted under other immigration laws.

ABCs

of Immigration:

1-9
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http://w-..;vw.visalaw.com/07jan1l2janl07.htm!.
The burden on the employer has been made clear by the United States Department of Justice:
INS can impose civil fines on an employer for three types of activity prohibited in
the employer sanctions provisions of IRCA: 1) knowingly hiring unauthorized
aliens; 2) knowingly continuing to employ unauthorized aliens; and 3) hiring any
without verifying identity and authorization to work. 3 Verification
violations occur when an employer's records are filled out incorrectly, do not
exist, or are not produced for inspection. Civil fines
knowingly hiring and
knowingly continuing to employ range from $250 to $10,000 per alien. Civil fines
only
verification violations range from $100 to $1,000 per employee.
criminal violation of the employer sanctions provisions is for a pattern or practice
knowingly hiring or knowingly continuing to employ. This misdemeanor is
purlishable
a criminal fine of $3,000 per alien and imprisonment
up to 6
months for
entire pattern or practice.
United States Department of Justice, Immigration And Naturalization Service Efforts To
Combat Harboring And Employing Illegal Aliens In Sweatshops, May 1996 Report Number 1-

96-08. Emphasis supplied. "Knowing" means:
)
term knowing includes not only actual knowledge but also knowledge
which may fairly be inferred through notice of certain facts and circumstances
which wouid lead a person, through the exercise of reasonable care, to k.'10W
about a certain condition. Constructive knowledge may include, but is not limited
to, situations where an employer:
(i)
to complete or improperly completes the Employment Eligibility
Verification Form, 1-9;
Has information available to it that would indicate that the alien is not
authorized to work, such as Labor Certification and/or an Application for
Prospective Employer; or
Acts with reckless and wanton disregard for the legal consequences of
permitting another individual to introduce an unauthorized alien into its work
force or to act on its behalf.
(2) Knowledge that an employee is unauthorized may not be inferred from an
employee's foreign appearance or accent. Nothing in this definition should be
interpreted as permitting an employer to request more or different documents than
are required under section 274(b) of the Act or to refuse to honor documents
T"'''',r1'''"r;~r1 that on their face reasonably appear to be genuine and to relate to the
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PART 274a-CONTROL OF EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS, Subpart A-Employer
Requirements" § 27 4a.l Detinitions.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security imputes knowledge of immigration status to
employers based on "constructive knowledge:
Constructive Knowledge
Knowingly hiring or continuing to employ unauthorized aliens is a serious
violation that subjects the employer to civil and, where there is a pattern or
practice of such violations, criminal penalties. In this context, the term knowing
includes not only actual knowledge but also knowledge which may fairly be
inferred through notice of certain facts and circumstances which would lead a
person, through the exercise of reasonable care, to know about a certain condition.
Constructive knowledge may include, but is not limited to, situations where an
employer: (1) fails to complete or improperly completes the Form I-9; (2) has
information available to it that would indicate that the alien is not authorized to
work, such as Labor Certification and/or an Application for Prospective
Employer; or (3) acts with reckless and wanton disregard for
legal
consequences of permitting another individual to introduce an unauthorized alien
into its work force or to act on its behalf.
U.S. Department Of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship And Immigration Services, Employer
Information Bulletin 103.1-9 Document Review, March 16,2005.

Employer Sanctions Enforcement
INS classifies employer sanctions cases into two main categories, lead-driven
cases
General Administrative Plan (GAP) cases. Lead-driven cases are based
on leads received from calls and letters, or on referrals from other agencies such
as
and state and local officials. INS' lead-driven cases have generated most
of its employer sanctions fines .... In FY 1995, 86 percent the total 4,760 INS
employer sanctions cases investigated were lead-driven. INS intends to increase
percentage of lead-driven cases worked in FY 1996....
Based on its GAP cases, INS estimates an 89 percent compliance rate among all
U.S. employers. 43 It is important to note that this favorable compliance rate
should not imply a low rate of employment of illegal aliens. The compliance rate
only indicates that an estimated 89 percent of employers have complied with the
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rernellltS of the employer sanctions provisions ....
INS recognizes that there is a prolific trade in fraudulent doclL'11ents. Counterfeit
employment authorization documents are easily and cheaply obtained. A
counterfeit "green card" or a social security card can be purchased
the Los
Angeles area for as little as $20. The abundance of fraudulent documents makes it
difficult for employers to ensure that they employ only citizens and authorized
aliens ....
DOL's Wage and Hour Division inspectors conduct inspections of employers for
compliance with wage and hour laws. During these inspections, they also review
employers' 1-9 forms. DOL records the results of its employer sanctions
on ESA-91 forms and forwards all of these forms to INS. Since 1988,
DOL has forwarded 266,000 ESA-91 forms to INS. INS selected 5,024
these
ESA-9 forms for investigation ....
Hi,:>,'-'''vUVli0

Office of the Inspector General, United States Department

Justice, Inspections Division,

Report Of inspection Of The Immigration And Naturalization Service's (EVS) Efforts To Combat
Harboring and Employing Illegal Aliens In Sweatshops, gov/oig/reports/INS/e9608/i9608pl.htm
To

matters worse for employers, pursuant to the anti-discrimination provisions of

the IRCA, employers may not request more or different documents

are required to verify

employment eligibility, reject reasonably genuine-looking documents, or specify certain
documents over others with the purpose or intent of discriminating on the basis of citizenship
status or national origin. Significantly, in Diaz the employer required one specific document, an
INS card.

"Franklin inspects the prospective employee's original INS card and evaluates

whether it appears authentic and unaltered. Franklin retains a photocopy of the card. '" Franklin
does not otherwise conduct any type of investigation, believing

to look further into an

applicant's legal documents when they appear genuine could be deemed discriminatory." Diaz,
Finding of
being accused

3. Obviously, such a verification scheme puts employers at extreme risk for
discriminatory intent, since it is likely that INS cards are only or principally
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required of

job applicants.

Before Idaho's employers

Hallelujah Chorus over the decision in Diaz, they would be wise to

sureties break into the
VH.HU'~'

its implications.

Finally, consideration should be given to whether employers or sureties can avail
themselves of Fifth Amendment protections where they are exchanging information during the
course of claims handling and litigation and share a common counsel. Whether or not statements
made to adjusters by employers are covered by the Fifth Amendment when employers are asked
what statements they have made to a Workers Compensation surety
sureties

the claims process,

not be able to invoke the Fifth Amendment on behalf of the employer. Once an

employer has made a statement relevant to "knowledge" or "constructive knowledge" of
illegality to an adjuster, the "horse is out of the bam." Similarly, disclosure by an employer to an
adjuster

eligibility verification methods would pose

same risk to the employer

and may create an obligation on the part ofthe surety to report its knowledge to
Department

United States

Homeland Security.

a. The Number Of Employers Affected By Permitting Inquirv Into Immigration Status Is
Likely To Be Huge.
One would have to tum a blind eye to deny the fact that much of Idaho's agricultural
workforce is comprised of illegal immigrants. In the monograph entitled "Illegal Immigration in
Idaho" author Idaho State Sen. Michael Jorgensen states "According to the Pew Hispanic
Research Center, Idaho was home to 25,000-45,000 illegal aliens in 2005 .... Over half

the

illegal aliens

the state live in this Idaho County." Idaho State Sen. Michael Jorgensen, Illegal

Immigration

Idaho, page 1. Attached hereto as Addendum 1. The report of a study conducted
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by

Center, released in January of 2011, reported

the number of illegal

immigrants

labor force was approximately 8 million, representing 5%

workers

the

US. Addendum 2. See, also, Estimates o/the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in

the United Slates: January 2009 published by the United States Department of Homeland
Security, Addendum 3.
Approximately 176,000 Hispanics live in Idaho. One would hope that employers would
conduct their

diligence" on the front end. However, it is obviously to their benefit, not to

conduct true "due diligence" on the front end, but to wait until an injured worker makes a
Workers Compensation claim and then to run from responsibility
immigration status. The idea that employers, such as the one
the

attacking an Hispanic's

this case, carefully investigate

status of employees is absurd, given the number

Idaho. Under Diaz, employers have the best of both worlds - they are able to
capitalizing on
overall, and

aliens in

working

fact that illegal immigrants work for less and bring down

cheap labor,
cost

labor

an injury occurs, they get to deny benefits based upon immigration status.

The conduct of the employers and their sureties is reminiscent of a famous scene from the
movie Casablanca. The French Police Chief overseeing Morocco under the Vichy government is
required by

Nazis to shut down a casino. The proprietor asks the Police Chief what basis he

has for shutting down the casino. The Police Chief exclaims,

ful1

shocked, shocked and

dismayed to learn that there is gambling going on here." At that moment the croupier taps the
Police Chief on [he shoulder and says, "Your winnings sir," which the hypocritical Police Chief
happily collects. Given the size of the illegal immigrant work force in Idaho's economy, that
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scene pretty
employment
ascertaining

SIzes up where many of Idaho's employers are at
illegal immigrants.

To allow employers to exerCIse

respect to the
diligence" in

immigration status of an injured worker through the discovery process puts the

state in the position

fostering hypocrisy with a vengeance.

b. The Administrative Resources Required To Be Expended Bv The Commission In
Having To Determine Immigration Status Can Be Obviated Bv EmQlovers Utilizing New
Resources For Verifying Status On The Front End
Obviously. Diaz is going to involve the Commission
disputes

task of resolving endless

immigration status -- not only discovery disputes, but hearings on the

immigration status issue that will embroil it in the consideration of collateral Federal criminal
and [1p'~r"'1"",n

proceedings. This is particularly true since the very documents

the Claimant

offered and 'vvere accepted by the employer to prove citizenship are now under attack. What is
the Commission to do when a Claimant simply offers those same documents to it as evidence of
her

HHHH,O,U'"""'H

status? Is this really a good use of the Commission's scarce resources?

The good news is, and the news that should cause this Commission to retreat from Diaz,
employers can now avoid hiring illegal immigrants on the front

relevant ease.

The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services "E-Verify" program

recently been

IS

instituted to streamline immigration status and reduce the possibility of employing illegal
immigrants.

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services £- Verify Homepage -

http://v.'Vvw.uscis.gov/ponal/site/uscis/menuitem.ebld4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6dlal?vgnexto
id=75bce2e26 405 1OV gnV CM 1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=7 5bce2e26140511 OV
gnVCMI000004718 90aRCRD See Addendum 4.
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is an Internet-based system that compares information from an employee's Form
1-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, to data from U.S Department of Homeland Security
and Social Security Administration records to confirm employment eligibility.
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the E-Verify program is impressive to say the least. EVerify works by comparing information entered from an employee's Form I-9 to: 455 million
Social Security Administration (SSA) records and 80 million U.S. Department of Homeland
Security records.

.S. Department of Homeland Security databases contain records about

employment based visas, immigration and naturalization status, and U.S. passport issuance,
which allow employers to E-Verify to compare information against a wide variety of sources.
•

•
III

..
1\1

•
1\1

o

Most employees are automatically confirmed as work authorized. 98.3
percent of employees are automatically confirmed as authorized to work ("
work authorized" ) either instantly or within 24 hours, requiring no
employee or employer action. Emphasis supplied.
1.7% of employees receive initial system mismatches.
Of
1.7% of employees who receive initial system mismatches:
0.3 percent are later confirmed as work authorized after contesting and
resolving the mismatch.
1.43 percent are not found work authorized.
Of the 1.43% of employees not found to be work authorized:
1.3 percent of employees who receive initial mismatches do not contest
the mismatch either because they do not choose to or are unaware of the
opportunity to contest and as a result are not found work authorized. The
E-Verify program closely monitors uncontested mismatches and actively
reaches out to employers to ensure that they are aware of their
responsibiiity to inform employees of the right to contest.
O. 4 percent of employees with initial mismatches are unresolved because
the employer closed the cases as "self-terminated" or as requiring further
action by either the employer or employee at the end ofFYlO.
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u.s. Citizen and Immigration Services, Statistics and Reports. Addendum 4.
Though it is the desire of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services that the
E-Verify program be made mandatory by states, Idaho has not passed legislation requiring
compliance with the prograill by employers. Whether participation in the E-Verify program is
required by Idaho or not, it is obvious that in the future employers are not going to be able to get
by with turning a blind eye to the legitimacy of migrant workers. Do Idaho's employers really
want to open up this can worms and subject themselves to having to disclose potential criminal
activity?

And, of course, if Claimants cannot assert the Fifth Amendment with respect to

immigration status, neither can Employers!

4. Requiring Disclosure of Evidence of Immigration Status Implicates the
Underwriting Practices of Sureties and Will Lead to Lawsuits Against It by Policy
Holders
Claimants are intended third party benefi ciaries of Workers Compensation insurance
policies.
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The Workers' Compensation Act sets forth a compensation scheme that is based
on a three-party agreement entered into by the employer,
employee, and the
compensation carrier. ... As between the compensation carrier and the employee,
there is a promise for a promise: the carrier agrees to compensate the employee
for injuries sustained in the course of employment, and the employee agrees to
relinquish
common law rights against his employer. The employee is thus a
party to
contract and therefore entitled to recover in that capacity. Aranda,
748 S.W.2d at 212 (citations omitted.); Franks v. United States Fidelity and Guar.
Co., 149 Ariz. 291, 718 P.2d 193, 197 (Ct.App.l985) (" A claim by an injured
employee against the workers' compensation carrier is a first-party claim." ). See
also
v. First Ins. Co. of Hawai 'i, Ltd., 77 Hawai'i 117, 128 n. 12,883 P.2d
38, 49 n. 2 (recognizing non-contracting parties' rights as third party
beneficiaries of an insurance contract), reconsideration denied, 77 Hawai'i 489,
889 P.2d 66 (1994); Hunt v. First Ins. Co. of Hawai 'i, Ltd., 82 Hawai'i 363, 367,
922 P.2d 976,980 (App.1996) (same), cert. dismissed, 83 Hawai'i 204, 925 P.2d
374 (1996).
Hough v. Pac?fic Ins. Co., Ltd. 83 Hawai'i 457, 468-469, 927 P.2d 858, 869 - 870

(Hawai'i,1996).
is no evidence that immigration status was a factor in the determination of the rates
charged to the employer and the premiums collected by the surety in this case, or for that matter
any other "Forker's Compensation surety of which Claimant's counsel is aware.
demonstrated

is well documented that Idaho employs large numbers (in the thousands) of

illegal immigrants.
charged

As

Idaho's Workers Compensation sureties are well aware of this, and are

knowledge of this fact because the statistics are a matter of public record.

Absent evidence that Workers Compensation sureties underwriting practices take into
account the fact that illegal immigrants are not entitled to recover disability benefits beyond
impairment
as a defense.

setting premium rates, they should be estopped from asserting immigration status
Otherwise, the sureties will be rewarded for setting premiums based on the
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assumption that
knowing

workers in a business are entitled to disability

when injured,

well that they intend to assert immigration status as a defense to the payment of

those benefits. At a minimum, this exposes Idaho's Workers Compensation sureties to potential
class action suits based upon the equitable theory of unjust enrichment.

5. The Conclusion that there is no Labor Market in Idaho for Undocumented
Employees is Simply Incorrect.
The idea that undocumented employees are prohibited from receiving workers
compensation disability benefits because they will never be able to work again
labor

is simply fantasy. Senator Craig has specifically reported that

labor workers in Idaho are undocumented in 2006.

the geographic
to 85% of farm

See http://craig.senate.gov/i agjobs.cfm

(December 2 ,2006) Prominent and regular news reports, including the PewResearchCenter,
report that unauthorized immigrants living in the United States grew during the last decade from
8.4 million

2000 to 11.1 million in 2011. http://www.pewhispanic.org/201

1I29/a-nation-

of-immigrants/ (July 30, 2013).
Diaz was decided incorrectly as there is a significant labor market

workers in Idaho.

undocumented

hold otherwise is to ignore the facts and as the Commission did in Diaz, to

allocate vital legal rights based on what must be recognized as a fantasy. For the Diaz majority,
since there should

their view be no labor market for illegal workers, there is no such market.

This is flawed and circular reasoning at its most blatfu'1t and such precludes the Claimant herein
from providing evidence to the contrary. For the Diaz majority, lack of a legal labor market
equates directly to lack of an actual labor market. The following are examples of evidence that
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the Commission, as well as vocational experts, can consider regarding the labor market for
undocumented immi grants:
1. Immigrants made up 7.2 percent of Idaho's workforce
2008, and of that 3.1
percent were illegal immigrants. Idaho Business Review,
31, No. 41
(August 2,2010).
2.
undocumented immigrants were removed from Idaho, the State would lose
nearly $430 million in economic activity. Id.
3. The Pew Hispanic Center, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics and the United States
Census Bureau all track and maintain demographics on foreign-born,
unauthorized works in the United States Labor Force. See, Bureau of Labor
Statistics (2010, March 19), Foreign-born Workers: Labor Force
Characteristics; Passel, J (2006), Size & Characteristics of the Unauthorized
AJigrant Population in the Us., Pew Hispanic Center; The Labor Force Status of
Short-Term Unauthorized Workers, Id.; U.S. Census Bureau (2009, December
97). United States Foreign-Born Population.
4.
Pew Hispanic Center and U.S. Census Bureau estimate
of the workforce is comprised of undocumented workers.
Pew Hispanic
estimates that undocumented works make up 9 percent of the service
industry.
5. The
Census Bureau estimates that the unauthorized migrant population in
Idaho is between 25,000 and 45,000 individuals. Id.
6. The number and percentage of migrant workers in Idaho is increasing at a high
rate. Federation for Immigration Reform, (2010, June 1), 6fD4.
That much of Idaho's agricultural workforce is comprised of illegal immigrants

IS

virtually undisputable. Claimant, whether he is documented or not, still has access under the law
as an independent contractor, which does not require a social security number, and such was not
accounted for in the Diaz.

Finally, termination of employment

the Defendant does not

preclude benefits under the eggshell skull theory and Nelson v. Pan/mess-Warren Jdgas Enterprises,
26 Idaho 129 (1994) and or I.C. 72-406 as the accident and loss of employment aggravated a pre
existing condition.
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6.
Claimant's Immigration Status is not only Irrelevant
a Workers
Compensation Proceeding, but Requiring a Claimant to Testify as to his
Immigration Status Violates his Fifth Amendment
Against SelfIncrimination.
s testimony regarding immigration status in

A

the privilege
otherw~ise

self-incrimination. No person shall be held to answer

the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service

or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

deprived of
taken

a capital, or

infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in

cases ansmg

of

States is protected by

time of War

twice put in jeopardy
himself, nor be

libe11y, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be

public use. without just compensation. United States Constitution, Amendment 5.
basic purposes that lie behind the privilege against self-incrimination do
not relate to protecting the innocent from conviction, but rather to preserving the
of a judicial system in which even the guilty are not to be convicted
prosecution 'shoulder the entire load.' "The privilege afforded not only
to answers that would in themselves support a conviction ... but likewise
embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute .... [1]f the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove
hazard ... he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the
is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only
evident
implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a
answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered
dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.

HofJinan v.

States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 -87 (1951). See also Emspak v. United States, 349

U.S. 90 ( 955); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332
(1951
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The

States Supreme Court ruled in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408

(1976), that compelling the plaintiff to answer questions or provide documents about
immigration status would require the Plaintiff to make an incriminating statement about him or
violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment Privilege is available to

herself,

everyone, regardless of immigration status. Matthews v. Diaz, 426

.S. 67, 77 (1976).

The

United States Supreme Court has spoken clearly on the exercise of privilege against selfincrimination rising under the Fifth Amendment.

Kasligar
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), we recently reaffinned the
principle that the privilege against self-incrimination can be asserted 'in any
proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or
adjudicatory.' Id., at 444, 92 S.Ct. at 1656; Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77,
94 S.Ct. 316, 322, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52, 94. 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1611, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964) (White, J., concurring);
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40, 45 S.Ct. 16, 17, 69 L.Ed. 158 924);
United States v. Saline Bank, 1 Pet. 100, 7 L.Ed. 69 (1828); cf. Gardner v.
Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 88 S.Ct. 19l3, 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968).
Maness v.

419 U.S. 449, 464-65, 95 S. Ct. 584, 594, 42

2d 574 (1975). Emphasis

supplied.
The Idaho Appellate Court in 1987 held that Idaho also recognizes the United States
Supreme Court's position that the Claimant's Fifth Amendment rights and protections also
extend to

cases; McPherson v. McPherson, 112 Idaho 402

987).

Citing Baxter v.

Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975); and Garrity v. New
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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case before the Court the Industrial Commission held

the Claimant could not

of the Fifth Amendment for the reason that there is no real possibility of

invoke
criminal prosecution:

We
the hazard of self-incrimination is not real and appreciable, and that
the Claimant does not have cause to fear criminal prosecution from a direct
answer to the questions posed to him by Defendants in their discovery request. It
strikes
Commission that the principal risk Claimant faces ifhe is indeed in this
country illegally, is deportation which, as we have noted, is a civil, not a criminal,
proceeding.
(R Vol. 1. p. 39 L 6-10) In support of this finding the Commission cites language from Idaho

State Tax Com'n

v.

Peterson 107 Idaho 260, 261 (1984). Respectfully, the Commission has read

Peterson far too broadly.
Missing

the Commission's decision is that which was implicit in Peterson.

Peterson's citation w Neffimplicitly incorporates the United States Supreme Court's recognition
of the narrowness of the exception to the limitation of the state's power to override the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination:
Moreover, he must have "reasonable cause to apprehend (such) danger from a
direct answer" to questions posed to him. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479,
486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). The inlormation that would be
revealed by direct answer need not be such as would itself support a criminal
conviction, however, but must simply "furnish a link
the chain of evidence
needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime." Id. See also Hashagen v.
States, 283 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1960). Indeed, it is enough if the
responses would merely "provide a lead or clue" to evidence having a
tendency to incriminate. Id. at 348. [emphasis added]

us. v. Neff615

1235,1239 (C.A.Cal., 1980). In fact, the basis of the holding in Neffis that

tax returns, unlike questions about immigration status, are neutral on
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Questions on income tax returns, in contrast, are "neutral on their
and
directed at the public at large .... " rd. See also California v. Byers,402 .S.424,
429, 91 S.Ct. 1535, 1538, 29 L.Ed.2d 9 (1971); Marchetti v. United States, 390
.S. 39, 57, 88 S.Ct. 697,707, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (l9681-Grosso v. United States,
390 U.S. 62, 64, 88 S.Ct. 709, 711, 19 L.Ed.2d 906 (1968).

u.s.

v.

6 5 F.2d 1235, 1239 (C.A.Cal., 1980) Emphasis supplied. Neff recognized that

when an inquiry is not neutral on its face, it does not lend itself to so facile an analysis. Neff
accurately characterizes the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by citation to Hashagen v.

u.s.

283 F.2d

345 (C.A.9 1960):
The 'guarantee against testimonial compulsion embodied in the Fifth i\rnendment
to the United States Constitution must be liberally construed and broadly applied
in order to sustain fully the basic right it was designed to protect. It is not merely
an admission of guilt of a federal crime, or of a probative fact which, with others,
may aid in establishing guilt, that may be withheld; the privilege to remain silent
may also be validly asserted where the answer to a question would be likely to
provide a lead or clue to a source of evidence of such crime, and thus furnish
a means of securing one or some of the 'links in the chain of evidence'
required for federal prosecution of the witness. Counselman v. Hitchcock,
1892,142 U.S. 547,12 S.Ct. 195,35 L.Ed. 1110; Alexander v. United States, 9
Cir., 1950, 81 F.2d 480. The emulous conflict between
government's right to
information, including the consequent duty of the citizen to testify, and the
witness' right not to incriminate himself must be balanced
favor of the
constitutional privilege. If at times this results in closing and locking the doors of
discovery to the government, that is but a calculated and foreseen consequence of
recognizing this basic right in a free society.
Emphasis supplied.

A more accurate summation of Fifth Amendment case law than the

Commissions summary is:
Generally the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination can be
invoked "whenever information sufficiently relevant to civil liability to be
discoverable provides even a clue that might point a hypothetical government
investigator toward evidence of criminal conduct.
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Robert Heidt The Conjurer's Circle-The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 YALE
LJ. 1062, 1065 (1982) Emphasis supplied.
Appellant provided law to demonstrate that answering the discovery,

undocumented,

would lead to Appellant providing testimony and evidence against himself that can lead to
numerous CRIMINAL charges in his filings, including:
... Federal 1-9 form reflecting that the 1-9 must be signed by the employee under
penalty of perjury; also, the I-9 gives the notice to employees which is placed
immediately above where the employee is required to sign the 1-9:
I am aware that federal law provides for imprisonment and/or fines
for false statements or use of false documents in connection with
the completion of this form.
Any admission by Claimant that he is not a United States Citizen, that he is not
present lawfully in the United States of America, that he did or does not have
ability to work in the United States of America, would give rise to the
immediate conclusion that Claimant committed Perjury, that
committed
document fraud, that he committed Social Security Fraud, identity fraud, identity
theft, being deported and either not leaving or returning unlawfully etc, would
provide direct evidence that would lead to numerous CRIMINAL charges,
including, but not limited to the list below:
a. 48 USC 408. Federal criminal penalties for fines and
incarceration for up to 5 years for false use of a Social Security
Number.
b.
Us.c. § 1621: Federal criminal penalties
fines and
incarceration for perjury by knowingly making a false statement
taking an oath to tell the truth during a proceeding or on
any document signed under penalty ofpeIjury.
c. 18 USC 1546. Federal criminal penalties for fines and
incarceration for up to 25 years for document fraud relating to
gaining employment or border crossing.
d.
USC 1028. Federal criminal penalties for fines and
incarceration for up to 15 years for identity fraud.
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e. 18 U.S.C. § lOOI(a): Federal criminal penalties
and
incarceration for make any false statement or make or use any
false document.
f.
Us. C.
911. Federal criminal penalties for false
representation of self as a U.S. citizen.
g. 8 USC 1253. Federal criminal penalties for failure to depart the
U.S. within 90 days of an order of deportation.
h. 8 USC 1325. Federal criminal penalties for fines and
incarceration for illegal or attempted illegal entry into
US.
1. 8 USC 1326. Federal criminal penalties for fines and
incarceration for illegal re-entry after being deported or denied
admission.
J. Ie 18-3007. State criminal penalties for false impersonation for
fines and incarceration up to 2 years.
Claimant does not bear the burden to show that he
be charged if the
information is provide, he only needs to show that
information requested
" ... could furnish a link in a chain of evidence leading to prosecution."
~McPhcrson v. McPherson, 112 Idaho 402, 404; Maness v. A1eyers, 419 US 449
(1975).
(R VoL X.

X.L X) Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration Regarding Order Dated

Sept 7, 2009, filed July 20lO; Claimant's citation of Additional Authority, filed December of
2009.
See also the following list of items that would be protected under the Fifth Amendment in
the Stanford

Review Article by Christine N. Cimini (see also the federal statutes attached to

the footnotes below and in Addendum 1):
Undocumented workers can be criminally liable for a number of different
actions which, for ease of analysis, can be grouped into two broad categories:
those related to entry and continued presence in the United States; and those
related to obtaining and maintaining employment. In terms of those criminal
activities related to entry and presence in the country, while mere presence in the
United States
States is not currently a crime,31 entry and presence in
after a deportation order has been entered is a criminal offense. 32 Additionally,
entering the country without inspection or entering by use
false or misleading
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representations33 and willful failure to register as an alien
possess, or
crimes.34 Further, it is a crime to knowingly forge, alter,
accept
immigration documents for entry into or as evidence a lawful stay
or employment in the United States.35 In terms of criminal or fraudulent activity
related to work, using a false Social Security number for the purpose of obtaining
any
or any other benefit is a felony.36 It is not currently a crime to work
without any legal documents, but it is grounds for remova1.3 7
Of those acts that constitute a criminal offense, are any of them considered
"continuing crimes"? If so, the ongoing nature of the offense might impact the
analysis of whether or not a lawyer's work on employment-related civil litigation
could
construed as "assisting" the client in a crime or fraud. Courts have found
entering without inspection or entering with false documents and using a false
Social
number to obtain a benefit are not "continuing
" 38 The
crime entering by eluding examination or immigration officers has been held to
be "consummated at the time an alien gains entry through an unlawful point and
does not submit to these examinations."39 Based upon this analysis, once an
misdemeanor of
reaches a place of repose within the country,
improper entry is concluded. Similarly, using a false Social Security number in
order to obtain a benefit has been held to be completed when the false
representation is made and is not considered a continuing crimeAO However,
there could be numerous separate crimes if an individual were to make numerous
representations utilizing a false Social Security number.
contrast, willful failure to register as an alien after thirty days and entry
p<~'0~'"<V~ in the United States after a deportation order have been found to be
crimesA Additionally, while there is no specific case analyzing
all, or part, of 18 U.S.C. § 1546 amounts to a "continuing crime," related
case law supports an interpretation that at least some acts under § 1546 could be
construed as continuing crimes. Section 1546 makes it a crime to knowingly
forge, counterfeit, alter or falsely make immigration documents for entry or as
evidence of authorized stay or employment in the U.S. and to
use, attempt to
use, possess, obtain, accept, or receive such immigration documents for entry or
as evidence authorized stay or employment in the United StatesA2 Employing
analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Toussie v. United States, the
doctrine
continuing offenses should be applied In only limited
circumstancesA3 Toussie requires that, in order to constitute a continuing offense,
the explicit language of the substantive criminal statutes must compel such a
conclusion or the nature of the crime must be such that Congress intended that it
be treated as a continuing crimeA4 Of all of the acts prohibited by this statute,
other actions such
possession is the only one that implies an ongoing activity.
as uttering, obtaining, using or accepting appear more likely to be construed as
completed upon the act constituting the crime. There are many cases involving
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"possession" offenses and no matter the divergent circumstances, each court
found that possession is a "continuing offense."45 Thus,
addition to willful
failure to register after thirty days and entry and presence after a deportation
order, it also appears that possession of immigration documents for the purposes
in the statute might be construed as a continuing crime .

Ask. Don't

. Ethical Issues Surrounding Undocumented Workers' Status in Employment

Litigation, Christine N. Cimini, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 355,415 (2008). Attached as Addendum 5.
Thus, a judge who would deny a claim of the privilege must be "'perfectly clear, from a
careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that
the answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency' to incriminate." Hoffman v. United States,
341 U.S. 479, 488 (quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 898 (1881)).

While the

Commission correctly asserts that deportation proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is not
the only consequence a claimant may face. It cannot be said that requiring the Claimant

the

instant case to answer questions under oath regarding his immigration status "cannot possibly
have such tendency to incriminate" Id.
Because the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion by declaring
immigration status relevant to claims of permanent impairment and failed to recognize the real
danger of criminal consequences inherent in forcing claimants

employers to testify under

oath regarding immigration status, Claimant asks this Court to reverse the holding of the
Commission denying his Motion for Protective Order and the Order for Reconsideration.
II.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSED
THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THE CLAIMANT WAS ORDERED TO WAIVE HIS
AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT OR BE
DENIED
BENEFITS UNDER IDAHO WORKERS COMPENSATION LAWS
SIGNED ON THE 7TH OF SEPTEMBER 2010.
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its Order dated September 7th , 2010 the Industrial Commission, after examining at length
how Constitutional Fifth Amendment protections apply (or rather do not apply) to workers
compensation proceedings, the Commission "ordered that the Claimant's claim for PPD benefits
shall be omitted as an issue on the claim currently before the Commission." (Order p. 9).
1. Dismissal

Claimant's Disability Claim is a Costly and Unlawful Penalty in
Violation of his Fifth Amendment Constitutional Rights to Remain SHent.
The Fifth Amendment protection is against "compulsory" incrimination. The compUlsion

need not be imprisonment; it can as well be termination of public employment, Garrity v. New
493 (1967); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Uniformed Sanitation

Jersey, 385

Men Ass'n v. Commissioner a/Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968). See also Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70 ( 973), (holding unconstitutional state statutes requiring the disqualification for five
years of contractors doing business with the State if at any time they refused to waive immunity
and answer questions respecting their transactions with the State.) See also Lefkowitz v.

Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801
mqmnes,

only

977). (The State can require employees or contractors to respond to

it offers them immunity sufficient to supplant the privilege against self-

incrimination). The State is unable to disbar a lawyer as a legal consequence of a refusal to
make incriminating admissions. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511

967).

Also, penalties of

contempt for advising a client to refuse to produce material in discovery on the good faith belief
the material may tend to incriminate his client was a Fifth Amendment violation. Maness v.

Meyers, 419 U.S.

(1975).

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

35

the Court has treated within the clause only those compulsions, which arise
from legally enforceable obligations, culminating in imprisonment for refusal to testify or to
produce documents. E.g., lvfarchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (criminal penalties
attached to failure to register and make incriminating admissions); lvialloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964) (contempt citation on refusal to testify). See also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553
(1983)

compulsion in introducing evidence of suspect's refusal to submit to blood alcohol

test, since state could have forced suspect to take test and need not have offered him a choice);

SeieClive Service System v. l\1innesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984) (no
coercIOn

requirement that applicants for federal financial assistance for higher education

reveal whether they have registered for draft).
extending the concept of coercion, however, the Court has not developed a clear
doctrinal explanation to identify the differences between permissible and impermissible
coercion. As a general rule, it may be said that all of these cases involve the ordering of some
feature of a trial in such a way that a defendant must choose between or among rights, with one
choice being to

or to submit to self-incriminating disclosures

his actions as the

Defendants are requesting in this case. The Idaho Appellate Court, while referring to Citing

Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Maness v. l\1eyers, 419
v.

.S. 449 (1975); and Garrity

385 U.S. 493 (1967), held that not only is the Fifth Amendment protection

applicable in the civil cases, but that "The individual may remain silent without suffering a
sanction or penalty that would make assertion of the privilege "costly.""

McPherson v.

McPherson, 112 Idaho 402, 404 (1987).
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Amendment privilege

Commission's sanction against Claimant for asserting
was costly

it severely reduced the value of the underlying claim. Claimant asks this Court

to find that

Commission's sanction constituted a violation of the Claimant's rights against

self incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and to either reverse
remand

Commission's holding or

case back to the Commission for reconsideration.
The Industrial Commission failed to address the case law

the letter provided to

th

the Commission on the 19 of August 2010 for the proper remedy in light of a party invoking his
Constitutional Fifth Amendment Rights to remain silent.

While "costly" penalties are not
dra~n

from the silence

of an individual pleading the Fifth Amendment. see Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425

.S. 308 (1976)

permitted,

Supreme Court has held that an adverse inference can be

(emphasis added); see also Alderson v. Bonner, 142 Idaho 733,

32 P.3d 1261 (Idaho App.

adverse inference allows a fact-finder to draw a presumption that

2006).

refused question would have been adverse to the individual's position in

response to a

litigation and allows

a fact-finder to draw a presumption that the response to a refused question would have been
adverse to the individual's position in the litigation. Id; 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses 121 (1992);
see also United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975) ('Failure to contest an assertion.. .is
considered evidence of acquiescence .. .if it would have been natural under
object to
Also,

circumstances to

assertion in question.")

Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) the Supreme Court held that an individual

asserting their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination could not be penalized. See also

Garrity v.

Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) and McPherson v. l\lfcPherson, 112 Idaho 402,
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(Idaho

987). The Spevack Court went on to clarify that any practice is unconstitutional

that makes the exercise of the privilege "costly" or that have sanctions with substantial economic
consequences, such as the loss of employment or state contracts. A state statute that forces an
officer of a political party to waive his Fifth Amendment right or forfeit his office is
unconstitutional. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 807-09 (1977). The 9th Circuit
recently stated

Jane Doe v. Glazer, 232 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2000) the following:

However.
Supreme Court has made it clear that certain sanctions stemming
from a party's refusal to answer a question on Fifth Amendment grounds are too
costly. For example, a state statute that forces an officer of a political party to
waive
Fifth Amendment right or forfeit his office is unconstitutional. See
Lefkowitz v. Cunnigham, 431 U.S. 801, 807-09 (1977). Similarly, individuals
cannot be forced to waive their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination
by threats that their employment will be terminated. See Turley, 414 U.S. at 8385. Moreover, the Rules of Civil Procedure recognize an appropriate role for the
exercise of this privilege, and a refusal to respond to discovery
such
invocation cannot justify the imposition of penalties. See Fed. R. Crim.
26(b)(5); Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1087 (FifthCir.
1979).
As discussed previously Claimant's PPD claim is the predominate issue and value of
Claimant's claim and a preclusion of Claimant's right to claim his PPD benefits could remove
any and all net benefits of the litigation due to costs, fees, expert fees, etc. Also, the solution
proposed by the Claimant

the letter was appropriate as the Claimant may relocate prior to

hearing and has retained experts to establish that even if the Claimant were undocumented, there
still remains a labor market for him. The law is clear that the waiving of the PPD claim due to
Claimant's exercise of his Constitutional Rights is unconstitutional and inequitable in light of the
solution

was created by the Supreme Court.
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not Punish Claimants.

2. Worker's Compensation Should be Interpreted to
Code 72-708 states that the "Process and procedure
summary

this

shall be as

simple a reasonably may be and as far as possible in accordance with the rules of

equity."

Commission proceedings have been informal and designed for simplicity;
purpose of these proceedings being the attainment of justice in each

further, the

individual case. Hagler v. lvlicron Technology, Inc., 118 Idaho 596

990). "Proceedings under

Compensation Law are designed to afford employees a speedy, summary and

the

simple remedy for

recovery of compensation for injuries sustained in industrial accidents ... "

Duggan v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 92 Idaho 262, 263-64 (1968) see Brooks v. Duncan, 96 Idaho
see Hogaboom

579 (

Econ. Mattress, 107 Idaho 13 (1984).

to Worker's Compensation laws, Claimant forfeited any personal injury or civil
rights against

employer

exchanged for a simpler and efficient procedure under Idaho Code

the benefits under Worker's Compensation statue provides for

72.

benefits and

financial remunerations, namely, a claimant is only eligible for 500 weeks of future wage loss,
no claim for

and suffering, ect.

Therefore, the benefits and provisions of the Idaho

Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally construed in favor of the employee. Haldiman v.

American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 956 (1990). The humane purposes which it serves leave
no room

narrow, technical construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88 (1996).

Claimant is unable to locate any similar civil or personal injury decision in Idaho that
limits the

of a Plaintiff to receive Disability, or future wage loss,

a Defendant even if

the Plaintiff was undocumented. Therefore, the above cases and statutes should imply that the
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Worker's Compensation benefits of Disability, or future wage loss, should be construed in favor
of the employee.
IlL

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSED
DISCRETION WHEN THEY OVERRULED CLAIMANT-APPELLANT'S
OBJECTIONS REGARDING THE TESTIMONY AND DEPOSITION OF DR.
TIMOTHY DOERR IN THE ORDER DATED THE 1
AUGUST 2011 AND
TH
GRANTING THE SECOND EXTENSION ON THE 7 OF NOVEMBER 2011.

1. Defendants' Discovery was Deficient, not Supplemented and Contradicted the
Deposition of Dr. Doerr Causing Prejudice to the Claimant.
Though the Industrial Commission has adopted its own Judicial Rules of Practice and
Procedure

workers compensation proceedings, it has adopted by reference the Idaho Rules of

Civil Procedure relating to discovery through JRP 7C. Of particular importance in the instant
case is Rule

Civil Procedure 26.

Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) allows opposing counsel to obtain

through interrogatory,
"A complete statement of aU opinions to be expressed and the basis and
reasons therefore; the data or other information considered by the witness in
forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the
opinions; any qualifications of the witness, including a list of
publications
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be
paid for
testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has
testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years."
(Emphasis added)
IRCP 26( e) creates a duty to seasonably update interrogatory answers. Clark v.
Raty, 137 Idaho 343, 346 (Ct. App. 2002) Failure to meet the requirements of Rule 26 typically
results

the exclusion

the proffered evidence. White v. Mock, ] 40 Idaho 882, 888, (2004).

The exclusion of evidence is specifically authorized as a sanction for failing to seasonably
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expert witness disclosures. Radmer v. Ford

supplement a
(1991).

Co., 20 Idaho 86, 91

rule requiring supplementation of disclosures applies 'particularly [to] the

substance of an expert's testimony." Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 158 (2002) (discussing

Hopkins v. Duo-Fat Corp., 23 Idaho 205 (1993)).
In Radmer, the plaintiffs expert witness devised a new theory and a supporting opinion
shortly before trial

one that had not been disclosed pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure

26(b)( 4) or seasonably supplemented by plaintiff s counsel. Id. at 88. The court declined to grant
the defendant's motion in limine and the plaintiffs expert was permitted to offer a new opinion,
the substance of which had not been seasonably disclosed to the defendant. Id. On appeal, the
Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the trial court committed reversible error in permitting the
plaintiffs expert to offer his unseasonably disclosed opinion, and the matter was remanded for a
new trial.

at 91.

Idaho Supreme Court wrote that:

cross-examination of an expert witness requires advance preparation
Similarly, effective rebuttal requires advance knowledge of the line of testimony
of
other side.... Before an attorney can even hope to deal on cross examination with an unfavorable expert opinion he must have some idea of the
bases
opinion and the data relied upon. If the attorney is required to await
examination at trial to get this information, he often will have too little time to
recognize and expose vulnerable spots in the testimony.

Id. at 89 (quoting Advisory Committee Notes, Rule 26, Fed. R. of Civ.
Discovery and Use of an Averse Party's Expert Information, 14 Stan.

. Friedenthal,

Rev- 455, 485 (1962)).

v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 158, (2002), the plaintiffs estate brought a medical
malpractice action alleging that a treating physician negligently failed to detect

treat internal

injuries the plaintiff suffered in an accident. Specifically, it was alleged that the defendant failed
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a small tear in the plaintiffs intestine which later led to infection and death. See td. at

to
156.

disclosed a medical expert, indicating that the expert would testify as to

anatomy

causation.

at 158. At trial, however, the defendant's medical expert was

permitted, over plaintiffs objection, to testify that in his opinion the plaintiffs intestine was not
after he was discharged from the defendant's care. ld. at 158-59. This was a new

torn

theory, and the substance

the expert's opinion on that question

seasonably supplemented. ld. Accordingly, the Idaho Supreme Court

not been disclosed nor
that permitting the

medical expert to offer opinions the substance of which went beyond that disclosed or
seasonably supplemented was reversible error, and the matter was reversed and remanded for
anew trial. ld, at 159.
in Clark v. Klein was the Idaho Supreme Court's determination that the right
of

party opposing the entry of undisclosed expert opinions to have such testimony excluded

is in no way compromised by any failure to depose the challenged expert or failure to bring a
motion to

ld. at

58

The trial court in Clark excused the party seeking to offer

undisclosed expert opinions from full compliance with LR.C.P. 26(b)(4) on
other party

basis that the

have deposed the expert or made a motion to compel, but declined to do so. ld.

In reversing the decision below, the Idaho Supreme Court held that:
Considering the financial and time burdens of depositions, however, it is not
reasonable to expect parties to depose every expert witness listed. As Appellants
point out, if a motion to compel is required to force compliance v\lith the rules of
discovery, it puts the burden of compliance on the wrong (innocent) party, and the
district court abused its discretion in indicating that a motion to compel is
required by the party seeking exclusion of an expert witness for noncompliance
with Rule 26.
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Clark v. Klein, footnote 1. It is the responsibility of the party seeking to present expert

testimony to

disclose the substance of the opinions to which the expert will offer testimony.

That responsibility cannot be cast off on the other party to sniff out undisclosed opinions during
discovery or to file motions to compel a more complete disclosure. The failure

to

disclose the

opinion of an expert should lead to it being excluded and not admissible.
the matter currently before the Court Defendants admitted
January 22 nd 2009
284)

their answer dated

Vol. 1 p. 4) and in their answer dated the 27th of July 2011 (R Vol. 2 p.
s condition for which benefits are claimed was partly caused by an accident

arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment and failed to allege that any preexisting condition might be the cause of Claimant's medical condition.
Defendants also failed to respond fully to or supplement numerous interrogatories.
Defendants' response to Claimant's Interrogatory No.2, requested clarification if Defendants'
claimed
are not aware of

suffered any pre-existing condition. Defendants' answer stated: "Defendants
pre-existing conditions ... " (R VoL 2 p. 207 L 5-6) and no supplement was

made.
Claimant's Interrogatory No.4 stated
"If
contend that the Claimant suffers from a pre-existing condition which is
the basis of, or contributes to the Claimant's present or future symptoms,
complaints, condition, impairment, or disability, please state: the approximate
date that the condition arose; the manner in which the condition arose; the source,
cause or etiology of the condition; the name of the physicians who have
diagnosed
condition; the dates on which the condition was diagnosed by each
physician; the treatment rendered with regard to the condition, and the dates of
such treatment by each physician or other health care provider; the extend you
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that the alleged pre-exlstmg condition contributes to
Claimant's
present or
symptoms, complaints, condition, impairment, or disability; the
manner you contend that the alleged pre-existing condition contributes to the
Claimant's present or future symptoms, complaints, condition, impairment, or
disability; and identify with specificity the medical or other documents which you
contend evidences the factual basis of your contention that the alleged preexisting condition contributes to the Claimant's present or future symptoms,
complaints, condition, impairment or disability_ By this Interrogatory, Claimant
seeks to know all facts which you will attempt to introduce into evidence
concerning any allegation of pre-existing condition at the hearing in this case, and
Claimant will move to strike all evidence not revealed in your answer to this
Interrogatory_
Defendants answered: "Defendants are aware that Claimant had prior injuries, however, do not
believe they

any relationship to the current conditions that Claimant complains of." ((R

Vol. 2 p. 208 L 13- 4)
Interrogatory No. 8 found in the Agency Record Volume 2 page 211
requested the expen disclosures allowed under Rule 26 and DefendaIlts failed to answer or
supplement

discovery with the IRCP required disclosures regarding Dr. Doerr. While Dr.

Doerr's previous medical report contained a brief reference to degenerative disk disease;
Claimant did not prepare for, anticipate, or hire experts to address said medical report as the preexisting condition defense had not being raised. In discovery and throughout the litigation
process the Defendants alleged that either Claimant's condition was caused by a post accident
injury on or about

6th of October 2008 when the Claimant "got up from the couch and felt a

pop in his back,

and fell to the floor." Or that he was not injured at all. See Exhibit 206-

207. IRCP 26( e)

case law cited above required Defendants to seasonably supplement their
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answer to Interrogatory No.8 and provide the necessary expert witness disclosures, which they
failed to do.
Defendants did list Dr. Doerr as a lay witness and disclosed he "May be called to testify
to any matters at issue, including, but not limited to Claimant's alleged

medical condition,

diagnosis, prognosis, and opinions." (R Vol. 2 p. 209) That an expert may testify to "any matters
too vague without the proper supplementation to satisfy

at issue" is

for expert witness disclosures.

26' s requirements

Further, Claimant notified Defendants

1 (R Vol. 2 p. 206) that Claimant would motion to strike any

Interrogatory

Claimant's
~l1d

all facts or

defenses nm revealed in the answer.
hearing, in response to Claimant's counsels concerns that

Even at
potentially raise

Doerr might

defense for the first time, counsel for the Defendants stated that, "The issue

about the pre-existing impairment, whether or not Mr. Serrano had one -- in short, I think that's a
red herring.

don't think that really has any impact on this case." (Transcript of Hearing July

28 th 2011 before the Industrial Commission of the State ofIdaho, 19-22 p.96)
Claimant's objections, the Commission herein on the 5Ih of August 2011 Denied
Claimant's request to limit the scope of the Deposition of Dr. Doerr to testimony and opinion not
previously disclosed and not contradictory to the previous discovery answers. The Commission
allowed Dr. Doerr to testify as an expert and contrary to the admission made in Defendants'
Answer to Complaint that Claimant's condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly
by

accident arising out

and in the course of Claimant's employment. Dr. Doerr introduced
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a defense to the issue of causation that was not only a surprise to Claimant,

was an Issue

Defendants repeatedly asserted was not a factor in the case.
The Commission also based their choice to include Defendants' new theory of preexisting condition on Defendants interest in judicial economy when it allowed Claimant to
include the 2008 injury for consideration at hearing. However, unlike the Defendants claim to
pre-existing condition, Claimant had included the claim in discovery and the claim was
referenced in numerous communications.

The Claimant's sole error was including both

accidents on one complaint. While Defendants were accommodating

allowing

Claimant to

create a second complaint out of he 2008 accident and then to merge both complaints and
continue,

Dr. Doerr's post hearing deposition, this did not create a situation where a party

was prejudiced or blindsided by any new claims.
Defendants stated correctly in their Response to Objection to Defendants' Amended
Notice

Taking Post-Hearing Depositions that the Commission has specifically reserved the

right to determine sanctions for violations of its procedures (JRP 7C). However, using their
reserved power over sanctions to thwart their own adopted rule constitutes abuse of discretion.
Claimant was severely prejudiced by the Commissions ruling in that it was impractical for him,
from both a time and cost perspective, to secure his own expert testimony to combat an
affirmative defense that, until after the hearing on the matter was concluded, was considered by
the Defendants to be a "red herring."
Commission either erred as a matter of law when it determined that simply
listing a

witness is sufficient to satisfy [RCP 26's requirements for disclosures
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witness testimony, or abused its discretion by exercIsmg

concernmg

sanctions to thwart the rule it adopted, Claimant asks this Court to reverse

power over
COIll..lllissions

Order Regarding Objection to Deposition and remand the case back to the Commission for a
decision consistent with the ruling herein.
2. The Defendants' Second Extension of Deposition of Dr. Doer was not Timely Filed
and
Motion was not Based upon Fact.
JRP 10(E)(3) gives defendants twenty-eight (28) days after the conclusion of the hearing
to conduct post-hearing depositions. The Commission gave Defendants in this case a Second
Extension so

Defendants could conduct a deposition more than

Commission issued the Order, granting Defendants more time without allowing

was held.
Claimant to be
JRP 1

months after the hearing

and without a stipulation. The second extension was also untimely under

as it was not made before the original date for the deposition had passed. Further,

Counsel for

Claimant was not requested to agree to, did not agree to, did not sign any

stipulation, and the record is vacant of any agreement to such stipulation to the extension.
Further,

order was granted in express opposition to the letter sent to counsel for the

Defendants on

24th of October 2011 as reflected in Exhibit A. Defendants

to honor the

agreement to supplement the Order with a Second Affidavit and Motion as reflected in Exhibit B
submitted on the 9th of November 2011. The Defendants and the Commission failed to allow
Claimant to respond or represent correctly the failure of agreement between the parties.
IV.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT HAVE SUBSTANTIAL AND
COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSED
THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY DETERMINED THE CLAIMANT-APPELLANT
CURATIVE,
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE MEDICAL BENEFITS
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AND OTHERWISE), WHETHER INCURRED AND NOT
OR WHETHER NOT
INCURRED AND IMPAIRMENT RATING PURSUANT TO I.C 72-432(1, 7),
TEMPORARY DISABILITY AND ATTORNEY FEES AS ORDERED ON THE 20TH
OF MARCH 2013.

While the Commission has discretion as to the weight it gives to the evidence before it,
the Commission abused its discretion or erred as a matter of law

it considered evidence

that should not have been included in the record. As outlined above, the expert opinion of Dr.
Doerr regarding the Claimant's alleged pre-existing condition should not have been admitted.
Even so, the Commission correctly points out that a Claimant in a workers compensation matter
has the burden of proof to establish causation on a more likely than not standard. As the record
indicates,

the post hearing deposition that Claimant was unable to respond to, Claimant

met that burden of proof.
The Commission points out other evidence, including a statement made by Dr.
Thompson, which indicates that the industrial accident was the cause of Claimant's medical
problems.

Commissions Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order) In reference to

Dr. Thompson's suggestion that the industrial accident was the cause of Claimant's condition.
The Commission states "but an inferred opinion is not enough to prove causation where there is
conflicting evidence in the record." (Commissions Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order. p. 29)

But for the post-hearing deposition of Dr. Doerr, the only evidence in conflict

with the Claimants claim of causation, the evidence in the record would have been sufficient to
establish causation.
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the absence of Dr. Doerr's unfairly solicited opinion

Claimant's medical

condition was the result of a pre-existing condition, Claimant provided more than sufficient
evidence as to causation. Therefore, Claimant asks for this Court to reverse the order of the
Commission regarding Claimant's entitlement to medical benefits or remand

claim back to

the Commission for reconsideration.
V.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSED
THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY DENIED THE
REQUESTED IN
CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION AND MOTION TO AUGMENT
RECORD FILED
ON
18 OF JlJNE 2013.

Claimant submitted an Objection and Motion to Augment the Record on the 18th of June
2013. The Motion asked for numerous additional entries, but most importantly the transcripts,
notes, records and audio of the July 28 t \ 2011. The Commission responded by augmenting the
record

to ·a,-,.,~~,-,

the majority of the Claimant's requests, excluding transcripts and audio of the

telephonic hearings stating they were not in their possession. However, the Commissions Order
Regarding Claimants Request to Augment the Agency Record makes no mention of the July 28th
hearing request for audio, etc.
The Supreme Court in Small v. Jacklin Seed Company, 1

Idaho 541, 544 (1985)

remfu'1ded a prior case and recommended a new hearing when the Industrial Commission's
Agency record was not complete and stated as follows:
... it is the conclusion of this Court that the apparent omission by the Industrial
Commission to consider Exhibits 8 and 9 requires this Court to remand the case to
the Industrial Commission for reconsideration. The commission may well want to
consider a new hearing to obtain an accurate record from which to evaluate
appellant's case, considering the apparent inadequacies of the telephone
conference record presently before the Court.
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~<~H'H~UH

therefore asks this Court to remand the case back to

~H'-'~'''U''.

Commission

for reconsideration due to the inadequacies of the record.

ATTORNEYS FEES
Attorney fees are not granted to a claimant as a matter of right under worker's
compensation law, but may only be affirmatively awarded under the circumstances set forth in

I.e. § 72-804. Idaho Code § 72-804 provides:
Attorney's fees-Punitive costs in certain cases.-If the commission or any
court before whom any proceedings are brought under this law determines that the
employer or his surety contested a claim for compensation made by an injured
employee or dependent of a deceased employee without reasonable ground, or
that an employer or his surety neglected or refused within a reasonable time after
receipt a written claim for compensation to pay to the injured employee or his
dependents the compensation provided by law, or without reasonable grounds
discontinued payment of compensation as provided by this law. In all such cases
fees of attorneys employed by injured employees or their dependents shall be
fixed
the commission.

Id. (emphasis in original).
Claimant is entitled to attorney fees because the Defendants' denial of his claim was
unreasonable. Defendants originally denied the claim on the grounds that the Claimant was at
full MMI

condition was the result of a non-work related accident. When both of these

grounds proved unfruitful Defendant introduced new grounds for

a post-hearing

deposition conducted five months after the hearing alleging that claimant suffered from a preexisting condition. Interestingly, the same doctor who found Claimant to be asymptomatic of his
back problems prior to Claimant's first visit (Doerr Deposition, 36:2 -25; 37:14-18) and later
declared him at maximum medical improvement, intimated that Claimant was feigning
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Deposition 35:8-17) while simultaneously asserting that
that his back condition was caused by pre-existing degenerative
Dr. Doerr 18:14-23) Even if the Court finds that the Defendants' grounds for
benefits are reasonable, Claimant should be entitled to those attorneys fees
necessary

pursue his claim for Permanent Disability as such was denied based solely on

to

alleged immigration status.

CONCLUSION
Commission erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it sanctioned
not providing discovery answers to an irrelevant issue and in

his

Commission also erred as a matter of law and abused
to introduce expert testimony a new defense five months
concluded.
order
or

on

Claimant Mr. Serrano respectfully requests that this Court either

the Commission and grant him medical benefits and permanent partial
his case to the Commission with instructions to

to

consistent "viih Claimant's arguments in this brief. Claimant
s fees and costs under I.e. § 72-804, fAR 11.2 and IRCP

1)

unreasonable denial and delay and contrary position to
day of October.
Respectfullv
"
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and
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HAMMOND LAW OFFICE,
AnORNEY AND COUNSElOR AT

P.A.

LAw

R!chard
Hammond
Aaron Moris
Jim Rice
Hansen (of counsel)

October 24,2011

Sent via fax I Total Pages Including Cover: 2
Brown
Whittier & Day
Cloverdale Road
ID 83707
972-3213

.HllJlHVJl>.

Re:

Francisco Serrano
I.C. No.: 2004-501845

you for forwarding The Motion and Affidavit to reschedule the Deposition of Dr.
It appears the Motion and Affidavit gives the unintended impression that the
stipulated and approved the Defendants' Motion to Enlarge Time.
counsel submitted a similar Motion and language and the Commission
the ~otion to reflect that the Claimant stipulated to such when no stipulation
or received.

,,,ti'prcinr,ti

notes and memory reflect that we discussed the new date and agreed that our office is
however, my notes reflect that we could not stipulate or approve to the Second

we request that your Motion and Affidavit be supplemented or amended
48 hours to clarify that the Claimant did not approve of the Motion hours as we
a limited time to respond before the Commission signs the order.
you for your assistance in this matter. Please contact our office if you have any

TTArnp,,,

Hammond
at Law

{(

811 E. Chicago St., St, Caldwell, ID 83605
Phone: (208) 453-4857 Fax: (208) 453-4861 E-mail: richard@hammondlawoffice.com

A

\ 1

HAMMOND LAW OFFICE, P.A.
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT

LAw

Richard L Hammond
Aaron Moris
Rice
Hansen (of counsel)

November 9,2011

via fax / Total Pages Including Cover: I
Brown
Whittier & Day
13 N. Cloverdale Road
ID 83707
(800) 972-3213
Re:

<Francisco Serrano
I.C. No.: 2004-501845

Roger:
aDt)ears the Commission did not receive your Amended Motion and Amended
Affidavit as they granted the Second Order regarding the Deposition of Dr. Doerr on the
grounds that the Defendants obtained a stipulation from the Claimant for such extension.
letter is to request that the appropriate motion be filed with the Commission within
hours to request a telephone hearing regarding the motion as the order based upon
C'",·,.P.,'T factual assertions alleged in the original motion and affidavit.
you for your assistance in this matter. Please contact our office if you have any

Sincere;,

~.k

L. Hammond
at Law

811 E. Chicago St., St, Caldwell, ID 83605
Phone: (208) 453-4857 Fax: (208) 453-4861 E-mail: richard@hammondiawofttce.com
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A,,\'YWHERE FROM 12 TO 20 MILLION FOREIGN NATIONAlS ARE LIVING IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNLAWFULLY, INVIOIATION OF FEDERAL
IMMIGRATION L<\.w.
THE AMERICA.N PEOPLE ARE GUARANTEED PROTECTION AGAINST INVASION UNDER THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 4, SECTION

4:

'WHEN 'liVE ARE CONSIDERING THE ADVANTAGES THAT MAY RESULT FROM AN EASY MODE OF
NATURALIZ4TlON, 'WE OUGHT ALSO TO CONSIDER THE CAUTIONS NECESSARY TO GUARD ~4GAINST
ABUSES ••• ALIENS MIGHT ACQUIRE THE RIGHT OF CITIZENSHIP, AND RETURN TO THE COlIfliTRY
FROM WHICH THEY CAME, AND EVADE THE LAWS INTENDED TO ENCOURAGE THE COMMERCE AND
INDUSTRY OF THE REAL CITIZENS AND INHABITANTS OF AMERICA, ENJOYING AT THE SAME TIME
ALL THE ADVANTAGES OF CITIZENS ••• "

Founding Father James Madison, known as the "Father of the Constitution"

AMERICA'S LESS
LESS SKILLED, YOUNG AND MINORITY WORKERS A.ND THE
AMERICA."'l MIDDLE CLASS ARE BEARING THE BRUNT OF JOB DISPLACEMEl\J~f Al"'lD THE HEAVY
BURDEN OF TAXATION INCURRED BY THE PRESENCE OF LOW-SKILLED ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT
LABOR.

MfERICAN WORKERS ARE BEING REPLACED BY ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT LABOR, ESPECIALLY THE
WORKING POOR. REPLACEMENT BY ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT LABOR HAS LED TO WAGE
SUPPRESSION AND WAGE STAGNATION FOR DECADES, MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR AMERICAN
FAMILIES TO HAVE A DECENT STANDARD OF LIVING.

THE MIDDLE CLASS IS BEARING THE BURDEN OF THE TAXES NECESSARY TO PAY FOR THE
SOCIAL COSTS OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS. STATE AND FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICITS ARE CAUSING
INFLATION, l\IAKING THE COST OF LIVING RISE.

THE STATES CAN AND MUST ENFORCE FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAw TO PROTECT THEIR
CITIZENS BECAUSE THE FEDERAL GoVERNMENT REFUSES TO Do So.
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INTRODUCTION

"You and 1 have a rendezvous with destiny. We will preservefor our children
the
last best
on earth, or we will sentence them to take the first step
a thousand
Ifwefail, at least let our children and our children's children say of us, we
our brief moment here. We did all that could be done."
'" President Ronald Wilson nO;:'dJ';"U

IS HA"lffiORING THOUSA.l~DS OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS

Pew Hispanic Research Center, Idaho was home to 25,000-45,000 illegal aliens in 2005. 1
Fast forvvard to 2010 ...

How many

aliens now live in Idaho?

aliens are either taking jobs away from the state's high percentage of unemployed workers and/or
enjoying unlawful access to Idaho taxpayer benefits and welfare. Either way they are
the legal residents
of Idaho millions of dollars every year.
In

unemployment for November,
this Idaho county.

2009

was 12%.2 Over half of the illegal aliens in the state live

When
enforcement legislation is passed in Idaho in the 2010 Idaho '''.~~''''"U, session, employers
will be forced to check the immigration status of new hires or face penalties.
This
to be introduced by Idaho State Senator Mike Jorgenson, will secure Idaho jobs for citizens
and protect Idaho taA--payers.

CHOICE BmWER'J DEPORTATION MIt'll AMNESTY IS A FALSE CHOICE
Attrition, or the reduction in the number of illegal aliens through enforcement of immigration law, works every
time it is tried. RemO\ing the magnet of jobs and taxpayer funded services will force illegal aliens to le2.ve
Idaho for greener pastures. 4
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: March 15, 2011

n

'"

IS

a

...

I S ..

Jeffrey S. Passel,
D'Vera Cohn,
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DVera
The number of Hispanics counted in the 2010 Census was nearly 1 million more than expected,
based on the most recent Census Bureau population estimates, according to an analysis by the
PCv\' Hispanic Center, a project ofthe Pew Research Center.
Census count of Hispanics was 50,478,000 I, compared v,ith 49,522,000 Hispanics
bureau's own estimates. The count was 1.9% higher (955,000 people) than the estimated
population. In 32 states, the 2010 Census count of Hispanics was at least 2% higher than the
estimates; in nine states, it was at least 2% lower than the estimates. In the nine remaining
states and the District of Columbia, the difference was less than 2% in either direction.
2010

comparison, for the total U.S. population, the 2010 Census count of 308.7 million was
barely lower (about 232,000 people) than the bureau's population estimate for April 1, 2010.
Compared with results a decade ago, the national Hispanic count in the 2010 Census was
closer to the bureau's population estimates than it had been in 2000. The 2000 Census count
included 10% more Hispanics than the population estimates, and state-level discrepancies also
were larger than in 2010.
Unlike the decennial Census, designed to be a 100% count of the u.s. population, the Census
Bureau's population estimates are annual
based
largely on birth certificates, death certificates, immigration data and other government
The most recent published state population estimates for Hispanics were as of .July 1,
2009. For this analysis, the Hispanic estimates were updated to Census Day, April 1, 2010, by
extrapolating the 2009 estimates based on each state's Hispanic population grO\\th rate from
2008 to 2009. This report replaces an analysis published March 15, 2011, which examined
Census 2010 data and population estimates from 33 states.

1

~jumbers

throughout this report are rounded to the nearest thousand.

2 The Census Bureau also analyzes a sample of federal tax returns for people who moved from one state to another (linked to
other data on age, sex, race and ethnicity of the tax filers) to calculate the number and characteristics of in-migrants and outmigrants for each state. For group quarters such as prisons and college dormitories, the bureau mainly relies on counts supplied
by states and localities.
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Pew Hispanic Center analysis
indicates that states with large
percentage differences between their
Hispanic census counts and census
estimates also were likely to have large
differences between census
counts and census estimates for their
total populations. This reflects the large
that Hispanics play in overall
population grO\'vth-nationally,
accounted for 56% of the U.S.
increase. Hispanics have accounted for
most of the discrepancy between 2010
Census counts and census estimates of
total populations.
In addition, according to the Pew
U.~lYUUH.· Center analysis, states that
Hispanic populations under a
million people (including many where
counts grew sharply)
collecth'ely had a larger percentage gap
behveen their census counts and census
estimates than did the nine states ""ith
larger, long-duration Hispanic
communities.
nine traditional Hispanic states
include Arizona, California, Colorado,
Florida, Illinois, New ,J ersey, New
Mexico, New York, and Texas. Each has
more than a million Hispanic residents
New Mexico, with 953,000).
Collectively, 28% of their population is
As a group, those states are
home to 38.6 million Hispanics,
according to the 2010 Census, and their
aggregate census count was about
:)62,000 (or .9%) larger than their

(%)
Census higher than estimate

15.9%

Alabama
Louisiana
Kansas
Maryland
Delaware
Kentucky
Wyoming

9,7

Wisconsin

9,1

South Carolina

9,0
8,5

Iowa

Census !ower than estimate
District of Columbia
Colorado
Vermont
New Hampshire

-6,1 _ _

West Virginia

-8,6 . . . . Montana
-8,7

Arizona

- 1 0 , 1 : : South Dakota
-10,2

Maine

- 1 2 . 9 ' - : : North Dakota
-14,3 _
Alaska

PEW HISPANIC

CENT.:=E~R_ _ _ _ __
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census estimate.
41 states and District of Columbia, Hispanics make up 7% of the total population.
states as a group are home to 11.9 million Hispanics, and their combined 2010 Census
count was 593,000 people (or 5.3%) higher than their combined census estimate. Among them
Alabama, where the Hispanic census count of 186,000 people was 16% higher than its
census estimate, the largest gap among states. At the other extreme, the census count of
:)9,000 Hispanics in Alaska was 14% below the most recent census estimate. (Smaller
PUPUluLIUll;:' by nature tend to be more volatile than large ones, so even a small numerical
could result in a large percentage change.)

In

In the nine states with large Hispanic populations, five had gaps of more than two percentage
in either direction between census estimates and census counts. In four, the count was
than the estimate. In New Jersey, the census count of 1.555 million ,vas 4.6% higher
the census estimate for Hispanics. In Florida, the census count of 4.224 million was 3.7%
than the estimate. In New York, the census count of 3-417 million Hispanics was 2.9%
than the census estimate. In New Mexico, the census count of 953,000 ,vas 2.6% higher
the estimate of Hispanics.
In the fifth, Arizona, the census count of 1.895 million Hispanics was 8.7% lower than the
estimate; it also was lower than the Census Bureau's estimates for 2008 and 2009. The gap in
Arizona 'was almost entirely due to a lower-than-expected Census count in Maricopa County,
which includes Phoenix. The numerical gap of 180,000 between Arizona's 2010 Census count
and census estimate of Hispanics was the largest among states.
accompanying table shows, there were differences between census counts and census
estimates for Hispanics in most parts of the country.

accuracy of these census population estimates is important not only because they are the
I11L\jor source of basic demographic data in the years behveen census counts, but also because
are the basis for distributing billions of dollars in federal funds during those years. They
on for sample design and weighting in widely used federal surveys, including the
own American Community Survey and the Current Population Survey from which
unemploYlnent and poverty rates are calculated. The estimates also are used to
calculate birth and death rates for the total population and for sub-populations such as race
and ethnic groups.
The Census Bureau has invested study and effort over the past decade to improve its
population estimates after the publication of 2000 Census counts pointed to a shortfall in
census estimates published in the 1990S.
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the population estimate for April I, 2000 of 274.5 million was about 7
of the census count for that day of 281.4 million people, or 2.5%. Later analysis
attributed much of the gap to a low census estimate of Hispanics, the nation's largest minority
group. The 2000 Census count of Hispanics of 35.3 million was nearly 10% larger than the
estimate for April 1, 2000 of 32.2 million.
2000,

Much of the problem, the bureau concluded, was that the estimates failed to account for
growth in the number of unauthorized immigrants. Analysts also concluded the 1990 Census
count had been too low, so the estimates began from a base that was too small.
At the state leyel, the gap between 2000 Census counts and census estimates of Hispanics was
(for this analysis the 1999 estimates were extrapolated to Census Day 2000). In
states, the count was 50% or more above the estimate, higber than any variation found in
2010 state census counts. In only three states was the census count within 2% of the census
estimate.
The bureau made several changes to its population estimates methodology oyer the past
Most notably, it began including state-level data obtained from the
Community Survey, which collects information on characteristics ofthe U.S. population,
immigrants. The bureau also devoted additional effort to outreach in the 2010
'./~.".nh' to groups that haye been hard to count in the past, such as immigrants.
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(thousands)

HISPANIC POPULATION

CENSUS COUNT DIFFERENCE
FROM CENSUS ESTIMATE
----- -- ----

~----

~.-,----------"--

Official Census
Count

U.S. total
Alaska

Anzona
p.,rkansas
California

D:sthct or· Columbia

Idaho
flhnols

K~;ntu(k\j

LOU1SkJtla

Nebraska
Nevada
Hampshire
New
f\1ex!I:::o
York
Carohpd
North Dakotz:'i

'tVv<')rninq

Arnount

50,478

49,522

+955

+1.9%

186
39
1,895
186
14,014

160
46
2,076
180
13,916

+25
-7
-180
+6
+97

+15,9%
-14,3%

1,039
479
73
55
4,224

1,043
446
66
55
4,071

A

-0,4%
+7,5%
+10,4%
-0,3%
+3,7%

854
121
176
2,028
390

848
118
170
2,006
361

+6
+22
+29

152
300
133
193
17

140
271
121
170
19

+12
+29
+12
+22
-2

+8,5%
+10,8%
+9,8%
+13,2%
-10,2%

471
628
436
250
81

425
599
427
233
78

+46
+28
+9
+18
+4

+10,7%
+4,7%
+2,2%

212
29
167
717
37

211
31
156
717
38

+2

+0.7 %
-8,6%
+7,0%
0,0%
-3,3%

1,555
953
3,417
800
13

1,487
929
3,320
746
15

+68
+24
+97
+54

355
332
450
720
131

336
315
441
669
131

+19
+17
+9
+50

236
22
290
9,461
358

216
25
274
9,375
355

+19
-2
+16
+86
+4

9
632
756
22
336
50

10
592
712
24
308
46

+40
+43
-1
+28
+4

+33
+7

°

+152
+6

+3

+11

°

-1

°
°

-8.7 %

+3,4%
+0,7%

+0,7%
+2,6%
+3,3%
+-1.1%

+8,0%

+7,5%

+4,8%

+4,6%

+2,6%
+2,9%
+7,2%
-12,9%
+5.5~jo

+5,5%
+2,2%

+ 7.Sq'b
-0,2%
+9,0%
-10,1%
+6,0%
+0,9%
+1.0%
-3.3%

+6,7%
+6,1%
-6,1%
+9,1%
+9,7%

PEW HISPANIC CENTER
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Estimates of the Unauthorized
Immigrant Population Residing in
the United States: January 2009
MICHAEL HOEFER, NANCY RYTINA. AND BRYAN C. BAKER

This report provides estimates of the number of unauthorized immigrants residing in the United
States as of January 2009 by period of entry, region and country of origin, state of residence, age,
and gender. The estimates were obtained using the "residual" methodology employed for estimates
of the unauthorized population in 2008 (see Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker, 2009). The unauthorized
resident population is the remainder or "residual" after estimates of the legally resident foreignborn population - legal permanent residents (LPRs), asylees, refugees, and non immigrants - are
subtracted from estimates of the total fo reign-born population. Data to estimate the legally resident
population were obtained primarily from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) w hile the
American Community Survey (ACS) of the U.S. Census Bureau was the source for estimates of the
total foreign-born population.
In su mmar y, DHS es tim ates that th e un au th o ri zed
immigrant populati o n li ving in th e United State s
decreased to 1O.S million in January 200 9 from 1 l .6
million in Jan uary 20 0S . Betw'een 20 00 and 200 9, the
unauthori zed po pulation grew by 2 7 percent. Of all
unauthor ized immigrants li ving in the United States in
2009, 63 percent entered before 2000 , and 62 percent
were from Mexico.
DEFINITIONS

Legal Residents
The legally resident immigrant popul ation as defin ed
fo r th ese es timates inclu de s all persons w h o were
granted lawful permanent residence ; granted asylee status; admitted as refugees ; or admitted as nonimmigrants
fo r a te mp o rar y stay in th e United Stat es an d no t
re qU ired to leave by January l , 200 9. Non immigran t
residents refer to certai n aliens vyho were legally admitted temporarily to the Un ited States for specified tim e
periods such as students and temporary workers.

Unauthorized Residents
The un auth o ri ze d residen t im migrant po pu lat io n is
defin ed as all foreign-born non -citi ze ns who are n o t
legal residents. Most u nauthoriz ed residents either
entered the United States w itho u t inspection or were
admitted temporarily and stayed past the date they were

Homeland
Security

re qUired to leave. Unau tho rized immigrants applying
fo r adjust m en t to lawful p ermanent resident status
u nd er th e Immig r ati o n and Na tionalit y Act ( INA)
Section 24S(i) are un authorized until they have been
granted LPR sta tus , even th o ugh they may have been
auth orized to work. Persons wh o are beneficiaries of
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) - an es timated several
hundred thousand- are n ot technically nnautho rized
but were excluded fro m the legally resident immigrant
po pulatio n because data are un available in suffiCient
detail to estimate this population.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA

Two po pulations are es timated in order to der ive the
unauthorized population estimates : I) the total foreignborn population liying in the United States on January
I , 200 9 , and 2) the legally resi dent population o n the
same date. The unauthorized population is equal to I )
minus 2) . It was assum ed th at foreign -born residents
w ho h ad entered the United States prior to 19S0 were
legall y resident since m ost were eligible for legal permanent resident status. I Therefore, the starting point for
: The Registry ProviSion of the Immigration and Nationa lity Act (INA) allows persons
who have been in the United States si nce January 1. 1972 to ap ply fo r LPR status.
Addition ally. persons who ha d lived in the United Sta tes before 1982 as unauthorized res idents were eligible to adj ust to LPR status under the Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA") of 1986.

Office of Immigration Statistics
POLlCY DIRECTORATE

I
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the estimates was January 1, 1980. The steps involved in es timating
the components of each population are shown in Appendix 1. Data
on the foreign -born population that entered during 1980-2 00 8 by
country of birth, state of residence, year of entry, age, and gender
were o btained from the 2008 ACS. The ACS is a nationwide sample
survey that collects information from u.s. h ouseholds on social,
demographiC, and economic characteristics, including country o f
birth and year of entry of the fore ign-born population. The ACS
consists of non -overl app ing samples from which information is
collected monthly over the course of a year. The ACS was selected
for the estimates because of its large sample size , ab out 3 million
households in 2008 co mpared to 100,000 for the Marc h 2009
Current Population Survey, th e primary alter na tive so urc e o f
national data on the foreign-born population.
Data on persons w ho ob tained LPR status by country of bir th, state
of residence, age, gender, category of admission, and year of entry
were o btained from DHS adm inistrative records maintained in an
application case tracking system of US. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USerS). Data on refugees arriving in the United States by
country of origin were obtained from the Department of State. Data
on persons granted asylum by country of origin were obtained from
users for those granted asylum affirmatively and fro m the Executive
Office of Immigration Review of the Departm ent of Justice for those
granted asylum defenSively through removal proceedings. Data on
nonimmigrant admissions by country of citizenship, state of residence, age, gender, and class o f admission were obtained from 1-94
arrival-departure records in the TECS system of the US. Custom s and
Border Protection. Estimates of the unauthorized population were
generated for the ten leading countries of birth and states of residence, ag e, and gender. The Cuban-born population living in the
United States was excluded from the estimates since, according to
immigration law, Cubans li ving in the United States more than a
year are eligible to apply to adj ust to LPR starns.
Caution is recommended in interpreting changes in the size of the
unauthorized population presented in this report. Annual estimates
of the unauthorized immigrant population are subject to sampling
error in the ACS and considera ble nonsampling error becau se of
uncertainty in some of the assumptions required for estimation (see
Lim itations below). In addition, changes in the ACS, including revisions in the wording of the question on Hispanic origin in the 2008
ACS and m easure m ent of net internatio nal migr ati on (see U.S .
Census Bureau, 2009) may have affected the size of the foreign born
population and thus estimates of the unauthorized population. This
report does not discuss chan ges in the unauthorized population
between 2008 and 2009 by countries of origin or states of residence
because of greater un certainty in those es timates. For reference,
Appendix 2 provides DHS estimates by leading countri es of birth
and states of residence for 2000 and 2005-2009.

Limitations
Assumptions about undercounl of the foreign-born population in the ACS and rates of
emigration. The estimates are sensitive to the assumptions that are
m ade about these components (see RESULTS).

on the year of entry question, "When did this person come to live
in the Uni ted States)" Errors also occur in converting DHS administrative dates for legally resident immigrants to year of entry dates.
Assumptions about the nonimmigrant population es timate. The estimates are
based on admission dates and length of visit by class of admission
and not actual population counts. Length of visit, which is calculated by matching arrival and departure records, is su bject to more
error than admissions data.
Sa mpling error in the ACS. The 2008 ACS data are based on a san1ple of
the US. population. Thus the estimates of the total foreign-born
population that moved to the United States in the 1980-2008
period are su bject to sampling variability The estimated margin of
error for the estimate of the foreign - born population in the 2008
ACS at the 90 percent confidence level is plus or minus approximately 154,000.

Accuracy of state of residence for the legally resident population. State of residence
for legally resident 1980-2008 entrants is assumed to be the state
of residence on the date the most recent status (e.g., refugee, LPR,
or naturalized Citizen) was obtained; however, the accura cy of the
estimates may be affected by state-to -state migration that occurred
between the date of the status change and January 1, 20 09.

RESULTS
Overall Trend
Between Januar y 2008 and January 20 0 9, the num ber of unauthorized immigrants living in the United States decreased seven
percent from 1 1.6 million to 10.8 million (see Figure 1). Between
2000 and 2007 , th e unauth orized population grew by 3.3 million
from 8. 5 m illion to 11. 8 m illion . The nu mb er of unauthorized
residents declined by 1.0 million between 2007 and 2009, coincident with the U S. economic downturn. The overall annual average
increase in the unauthorized population during the 2000-2009
period was 250,000.

Figure 1.

Unauthorized Immigrant Population: 2000-2009
Millions
14.0

12.0

11.3

11.6

2007

2008

10.0

8.5
6.0

6 .0

4.0

2.0
DHS estimates not produced

for 2001-2004

2000

Accuracy of year of entry reporting. Concerns exist among immigration
analysts regarding the validity and reliability of Census survey data

11.8

2005

2006

Sou rce: U. S. Department of Home land Security.
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2009

Tabie :1.

The sensitivity of the estimates to assumptions about under count
of the foreign-born population and emigration is illustrated with
several examples. Doubling the unauthorized immigrant undercount rate from 10 percent to 20 percent increases the estimated
unauthorized population from 10.8 million to 12.1 million. By
lowering or raising emigration rates 20 percent and holding all
other assumptions constant, the estimated unauthorized immigrant population would range from 10.0 million to 1 1. 5 million.
Doubling the unauthorized immigrant undercount rate and lowering or raising emigration rates by 20 percent would expand the
range of the estimated unauthorized immigrant population to
11.3-13.0 million.

Period of Entry of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population:
January 2009
Estimated population
January 2009
Number!

Period of entry

Percent

-~~~'--~~~

10.750.000
910.000
3.040.000
3.080.000
1.670.000
1.190.000
860.000_

All years.
2005·2008.
2000·2004.
1995·1999.
1990·1994.
1985·1989 ...
_1~80·1~~4_c __ ~~~_.._

100
8
28
29
16

11
.- ..- ..

~.-

8

..-.-

Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding.

Period of

Source: 1..;5. Department of Homeland Security.

Of the 10.8 million unauthorized immigrants in 2009, 4.0 million (37 percent) had entered the United States on January 1,
2000 or later (see Table 1). An estimated 0.9 million (8 percent)
came to the United States between 2005 and 2008 while 3.0 million (28 percent) came during 2000 to 2004. Forty-four percent
came to live in the United States during the I 990s, and 19 percent
entered during the 1980s.

The decrease in the size of the unauthorized population betvveen
2008 and 2009 is not likely due to sampling error in the estimates
of the foreign-born population in the 2007 or 2008 ACS. The margin of error at the 90 percent confidence level was 151,000 for
the 2007 ACS and 154,000, as noted above, for the 2008 ACS.'
Changes in the ACS, e.g., revisions in the question on Hispanic origin in 2008 and measurement of net international migration, may
have had an impact on the 2009 estimate and therefore the magnitude of change between 2008 and 2009. Trends in the unauthorized population reported by DHS are consistent with the most
recent estimates by the Pew Hispanic Center showing 1 1.9 million
unauthorized immigrants living in the United States in March
2008, 12.4 million in March 2007, 11.5 million in March 2006,
and 11.1 million in March 2005 (Passel and Cohn, 2008).

in 2009
The size of each component of the unauthorized immigrant population estimates for 2009 is displayed in Table 2. See Appendix I for
a detailed explanation of each entry in Table 2. For the foreign-born
population, the starting point ,vas the estimated 29.0 million foreign-born residents in the 2008 ACS that entered the United States
during 1980-2008. This population was increased by 2.2 million,
or 8 percent, by adjustments for the shift in the reference date from
mid-year 2008 to January I, 2009 and the addition of undercounts
for the populations of non immigrants, other legally resident immigrants, and unauthorized immigrants. The estimated undercount of

The additional samplmg error introduced by shifting the reference date of the foreign born population to January liS not large enough for sampling error to account for the 2008-2009 change In
L

the unauthorized populat:on.

Components of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population: January 2009

a. Foreign·born population. entered 198()'2008, 2008 ACS.

29.010,000

b. Adjustment for shift in reference date from July 1. 2008 to January 1. 2009 .

490,000

c. Undercount of nonimmigrants in ACS

190,000 '

d. Undercount of other legally resident immigrants (LPRs. recent refugeejasylee arrivals) in ACS

470,000

e. Undercount of unauthorized immigrant population in ACS .

1.080,000

g. LPR, refugee, and asylee flow January 1. 1980-December 31. 2008 ................................................... .

j.

!

23.540.000

h. Mortality 1980·2008 ..

1,520.000 .

I. Emigration 1980·2008.

3.420,000

LPR, refugee. and asylee resident population. January 1. 2009 (g.·h. i.) .

18,610,000

k. Nonimmigrant population on January 1. 2009 .

1.860,000

m. Estimated resident unauthorized immigrant population. January 1. 2009 (f.·I.) .

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

20.470,000
~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

-

~

__

, 3) Unauthorized immigrant
population
........ .. ....

~

Estimated legally resident population. January 1, 2009 U.+k.).

10,750,000

Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding.
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
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Figure 2.

Region of Birth of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population:
January 2009 and 2000
Millions
10.0
8. 5

8.0

6.0

Between 2000 and 2009, the Mexican-born unauthorized immigrant population increased 2.0 million or 4 2 percent. The greatest
percentage increases occurred among un authorized immigrants
fro m Honduras (9 5 percent), Guatemala (65 percent), and India
(64 percent).

4 .0

2.0
0.3

o

Mexico continued to be the leading source of unauthorized immigration to the United States (see Table 3 and Appendix 2). There
were 6.7 million unauthorized immigrants from Mexico in 2009,
representing 62 p ercent of the unauthorized population . The n ext
leading source countries for unauthorized immigrants in 2009
were El Salvador (530,0 00 ), Guatemala (48 0,00 0), Honduras
(320,000), and the Philippines (270,000). The ten leading coun tries of o rigin represented 85 percent of the unauthorized immigrant population in 2009.

North America

Asia

South America

0.3

Euro pe

0.2

0.2

Oth er

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

the unauthorized immigrant population
in the ACS was nearly I . 1 million and
represents 49 percent of all adjustm ents
to the foreign -born population.

Estimates by State of Residence
California re mained the leading state of resi den ce of the unau thorized immigrant population in 2009 , w ith 2.6 million (see
Table 4 and AppendiX 2). The n ext leading state, Texas , had 1.7
million unauthorized residents, followed by Florida with 720,000,

Table 3 .

Country of Birth of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population: January 2009 and 2000
- . Estimated

For the legally resident population, the
starring point was the fl ow of23 .5 million LPRs, refugees, and asylees during
1980 -2008. By January 200 9, the 23.5
million had bee n reduc ed by 4. 9 m illi on to 18.6 mi lli on du e to mortality
and emigration. Emigration acc ollnted
for 3.4 million , or 69 percent, of the
4.9 million. The addition of the nonimmigrant population, es timated at 1.9
millio n, resu lted in a total estimate d
legally resident immigrant population
o f 20.5 mi lli on on January I , 2009 .
Subtracting the 20.5 million legally resid ent immigrants fr om the to tal 3 1.2
million for eign-born po pulati on on
January I , 2009 that entered the United
States during 1980-2008 yields the fin al
estimated unauthorized population of
10.8 million.

POPUlatio~---

in January
, Country of birth
All countries .
Mexico
EI Salvador
Guatema la ..
Honduras,
Phi lippines.
Ind ia.
Korea .... .. ..
Ecuador.
Brazil .
Chi na
Othe r countries .

2009

.....

1

2000

i

2009 :

100
62
5
4
3 '
2
2
2 :
2 .
1
1
15

An es timated 8 5 m illion of the to tal
10.8 million unauthor ized immigrants
living in the United States in 200 9 were
from the North America region, including Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, and
Central America (see Figure 2). The next
l ea ding regi ons of origin were Asia
(980,000) and South Am e rica
(740,000).

Average annual
change

i

2000 to 2009

2000 to 2009

100
55
5
3
2
2
1
2
1
1
2
24 ·

27
42
25
65
95
33
64
14
55
49
·37
·17

250,000
220,000
10.000
20,000
20,000
10,000
10,000

2000

- ---'-----

---~
.

10.750,000 8.460,000
6,650.000
4.680,000
530,000
430.000
480.000
290.000
320,000
160,000
200.000
270.000 ,
200.000 '
120.000
180,000 .
200.000 .
170,000
110,000
100.000
150.000
190.000
120.000
1.650,000
2.000 .000

.

:

.

!;

10,000
10,000

:
'
:

(10,000)
(40,000)

1

- Represents less than 5,000.
Detail may not sum to tota ls becau se of rounding.
Source: U. S. Department of Hom eland Security,

Table 4 .

State of Residence of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population: January 2009 and 2000
........

- ------ ~- . -- - -.--.-----,

I

Percent of total
: State of residence

Estimates by Region and Country
of Birth

Percent
change

I Percent of total

2000

--- '-"-'- '~' -

All states.
Ca lifornia.
Texas
.. . . . .. . Florida.
New York .
Illino is .. . . . . . . . . .
Georgia.
Arizona.
North Carolina . .
New Jersey.
Nevada . .... .. . . . . .
Ot her states

-

10.7 50,000
2,600.000
1 ,680 .000
720.000
550.000
540 .000
480.000
460,000
370.000
360.000
260 ,000
2.730 ,000

8 .460.000
2.510,000
1 ,090.000
800,000
540.000
440.000
220.000
330,000
260.000
350,000
170.000
1 ,760.000

100
24
16
7
5
5
4
4
3
3
2
25 .

100
30
13
9
6
5
3
4
3
4
2
21

!I

Percent
change

Average annual
change

2000 to 2009
i---- -

_ 2000 to 2009

27
3
54 :
·10 :
.
'
'

;

1
24
115 i
42
43
3
55
55 i

Represents 'ess than 5.000.

Detail may not sum to totals beca use of roun ding.
Source: U. S. Department of Homeland Security.
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J

250,000 j
10,000 !
70,000 ;
(10 ,000) i
-I

I

10.000
30,000
20,000
10,000

I

I
I

-I

10,000 !
1
110,000 i

New York w ith 550,000, and Illino is
with 540,000. California's share of the
n ational total \vas 24 percent in 2009
compared to 30 p ercent in 2000. The
greatest per centage incr eases in the
unauthorized population betwe en 2000
and 2 009 o ccurred in Geo rgia (115
perce nt), N evada (55 p ercent), and
Texas (54 percent).

Figure 3 .

Age and Gender of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population: January 2009
Millions

3 .0

2 .5
2. 3

2.0

Estimates by Age and Gender

1.5

In 2009, 61 percent of unautho ri zed
immigrants were ages 25 to 44 years,
and 58 percent were male (see Figure 3
and Table 5). Males accounted for 62
percent of th e unauthorized population
in the 18 to 34 age group in 200 9 while
females accounted for 5 2 percent of the
45 and older age groups.

1.0

0 .5
0.2

0. 2

0
Under

18 years

18 to
2 4 years

25 to
34 years

35 to
44 years

45 to
54 years

55 years
and over

Source: U.S . Department of Homeland Security.
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Tab!e S.

Age and Gender of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population: January 2009
Total

i Age
Al l ages.
Under 18 years .
18 to 24 years .
25 to 3 4 years .
, 35 to 44 years .
; 45 to 54 yea rs.

._~~.X~~r::;_ ,!':l~Cl'/e.!...:..

Number

I

10,750.000
1 ,320,000
1.410.000
3,650,000 .
2 ,930,000
1 ,040 ,000
.. ___ . 39.9~.2()() ___ ....

Male
percent !

Female

Number_l _ !~rce~.:.L_Number_L __ .~ce~~.J

6 .190.000
100
12
710 ,000
890,000
13
34
2 ,270.000
27
1.630,000
530 ,000
10
4 ._._._16()!000 . _

100
11
14
37
26
8
3

4 ,570,000
620.000
520 ,000
1.380,000
1 .300 ,000
510,000
.:130,000

100
13
11
30
29
11
5

Th e estimates presented h ere w ill be
updat ed periodically based on annual
data of the foreign-born population collected in th e Am eri can Community
Sur vey and on th e estima te d lawfully
re s id e nt for e ign - b o rn populati o n
derived from various ad ministrative
data sources.

Detair may not sum to totals because of rounding.
So urce: U. S. De partment of Homeian d Security.
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e. Undercount of unauthorized immigrants in the ACS

APPENDIX 1

the Unauttmrlzed Resident
The material below describes how each component was estimated.
Note that the labels for each component correspond with the
entries in Table 2.

1) Foreign-born population

a. Foreign-born population, entered 1980- 2008
The estimated total foreign-born population that entered
between 1980-2008 was obtained from the ACS's
FactFinder. FactFinder is the Census-maintained online data
portal for obtaining ACS estimates from the full sample for
a particular year. Data on the distribution of the foreign
born by country of origin, state of residence, year of entry,
age, and gender were obtained from the 2008 Public Use
Microdata Sample (PUMS). The overall FactFinder estimate
for the total foreign-born population entering in the post1979 period \vas reduced to remove PUMS estimates of the
post-19 7 9 Cuban-born population. Further, a three-year
moving average was applied to PUMS data for year of entry
to reduce heaping effects.

b. Shift in reference date to January 1, 2009
The reference date for the 2008 ACS, the most recently a\'ai!able ACS data, was shifted from mid-year 2008 to January 1,
2009 by multiplying the population of 2008 entrants by
1.72, which is the average of three ratios: the ratio of the
estimated population in the 2008 ACS that entered the
United States during 2007 compared to the population in
the 2007 ACS that entered in 2007 and the comparable
ratios for the 2006 entrants in the 2006 and 2007 ACS surveys and the 2005 entrants in the 2005 and 2006 ACS surveys. Previous DHS estimates used an average of five ratios;
however, the average of three ratios better reflects recent
population growth in the second half of the year.
e. Undercount of nonimmigrants in the ACS
Undercount refers to the number of persons who should
have been counted in a surveyor census, but were not. A rate
of 10 percent was used to estimate the nonimmigrant undercount. This rate was used in previous DHS unauthorized
population estimates for 2000 and 2005-2008 (Department
of Homeland Security, 2003; Hoefer et a!., 2006, 2007,
2008,2009).

The under count rate for unauthorized immigrants in the
ACS \vas assumed to be 10 percent. This was the same rate
used in previous DHS estimates for 2000 and 20052008 (Department of Homeland Security, 2003; Hoefer
et a!., 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009).

f. Estimated foreign-born population, January 1,2009
The sum of 1a. through 1e. (above) is the estimated foreign-born population on January 1, 2009 that entered the
United States during the 1980-2008 period.

2) Legally resident population

g. Legal permanent resident (LPR), refugee, and asylee
flow, entered 1980-2008
The 1980-2008 flow was calculated separately for LPRs,
refugees, and asylees. LPRs consist of two groups: new
arrivals and those who have adjusted status. New arrivals
include all persons with immigrant visas issued by the State
Department who were admitted at a U.S. port of entry. For
new arrinl LPRs, the date of entry into the United States is
the same as the date of approval for LPR status. For LPRs
adjusting status, year of entry was assumed to be the year
of last entry between 1980 and 2008 prior to adjustment.
Year of entry was imputed when last entry date was missing (affecting approXimately 40 percent of adjustment of
status records during 1998-2005) using category of admission, year of LPR adjustment, and known last entry date.
Refugees and asylees included in the legally resident flow
had not adjusted to LPR status as of January 1, 2009. The
refugee and asylee flmv was estimated based on the average time spent in the status before adjustment to LPR status~3.0 years for refugees and 5.3 years for asylees
adjusting in 2008. The refugee and asylee portion of the
legally resident flow therefore included refugees who
arrived in the United States during the 3.0 years prior to
2009 and persons granted asylum during the 5.3 years
preceding 2009.

h. Mortality oflegally resident flow 1980-2008
Data are not collected on the mortality of legally resident
immigrants. LPRs were survived to 2009 by gender and age
(taking into account subsequent naturalization) using mortality rates by age and sex from 1989-1991 life tables
(National Center for Health Statistics, 1997).

d. Undercount ofLPRs, refugees, and asylees in the ACS
The undercount rate for LPRs, refugees, and asylees in the
ACS was assumed to be 2.5 percent. This was the same rate
used in DHS estimates for 2000 and 2005-2008
(Department of Homeland Security, 2003; Hoefer et a!.,
2006,2007, 2008, 2009).
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i. Emigration oflegally resident flow 1980-2008
Emigration is a major component of immigrant population
change. In the absence of data that directly measure emigration from the United States, researchers have developed indirect estimates based largely on Census data. For this report,
annual emigration rates by year of entry (year of naturalization if the immigrant subsequently became a US. citizen)
were calculated from estimates of emigration of the foreignborn population based on 1980 and 1990 Census data
(Ahmed and Robinson, 1994). In addition, refugees and
asylees, with little likelihood of returning to their country of
origin, were assumed not to emigrate. The overall effective
rate of emigration for legally resident immigrants in 2009
was about 22 percent after twenty years.

j. LPR, refugee, and asylee population on January 1,2009
Subtracting mortality (2h.) and emigration (2i.) from the
LPR, refugee, and asylee flow during 1980-2008 (2g.) results
in the estimated LPR, refugee, and asylee resident population
onJanuary 1,2009.

k. Nonimmigrant population on January 1,2009
The number of nonimmigrants living in the United States on
January I, 2009 was estimated by counting days of presence
between July I, 2008 and June 30, 2009 and dividing the

result by 366. The estimate was restricted to classes of admission such as students, temporary workers, and exchange visitors where the length of stay typically exceeds two months.
The estimate does not include border crossers or visitors for
business or pleasure. Year of entry for the 2009 nonimmigrant population was based on the distribution of year of
entry for nonimmigrants used in previous DHS unauthorized
immigrant population estimates (Department of Homeland
Security, 2003; Hoefer et al., 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009).

1. Estimated legally resident immigrant population on
January 1,2009
Adding the population of LPRs, refugees, and asylees on
January 1, 2009 (2j.) to the nonimmigrant population on
the same date (2k.) results in the total estimated legally resident immigrant population in the United States on January
1,2009.

3) Unauthorized immigrant population
m. Estimated unauthorized immigrant population on
January 1,2009
Subtracting the estimated legally resident immigrant population (2L) from the total foreign-born population on
January 1,2009 (If) yields the estimate of the unauthorized immigrant population.

APPENDIX 2

2000 and 2005-2009
Estimated population in January
Country of birth
All countries.
Mexico
EI Salvador .
Guatemala.
Honduras ..
Philippines.
India.
Korea.
Ecuador.
Brazil.
China
Other countries .

8.460,000
4,680,000
430.000
290,000
160,000
200.000
120,000
180,000
110,000
100,000
190,000
2~000,000

2005

2006*

10.490,000
5,970,000
470,000
370,000
180,000
210,000
280,000
210,000
120,000
170,000
230,000

11,310,000
6,570,000
510,000
430,000
280,000
280,000
210,000
230,000
150,000
210,000
170,000

.. ~,:2i30,00Q.~ ..

2,290.000_~.. ..

2007

2008

2009

11,780,000
11,600,000
10,750,000
6,980,000
7,030,000
6,650,000
540,000
570,000
530,000
500.000
430,000
480,000
280,000
300,000
320,000
290.000
300,000
270,000 i
220,000
160,000
200,000
230,000
240,000
200,000
160,000
170,000
170,000
190,000
180,000
150,000 .
290,000
220,000
120,000
2,100,000 "-----.. :2,OOO,OOO_~_ _~_l~"O,OOO

~-~-~,,---~

"

Estimated population in January

2000

State of residence
California. .
Texas
Florida.
New York.
Illinois. , .
Georgia.
Arizona.
North Carolina. .
New Jersey.
Nevada.

8,460,000
2,510,000
1,090,000
800,000
540,000
440,000
220,000
330,000
260,000
350,000
170,000

...Qtherstates_.._

.._ . _ . .......!..!60,00g

All states.

2005
10.490,000
2,890,000
1,670,000
970,000
560,000
550,000
490,000
510,000
370,000
440,000
230,000
1,800,000 _

2006*
11,310,000
2.790,000
1,620,000
960,000
510,000
530,000
490,000
490,000
360,000
420,000
230,000
__ E()O-,OOO..

2007

2008

2009

11,780,000
11,600,000
10,750,000
2,840,000
2,850,000
2,600,000
1,710,000
1,680,000
1,680,000
960,000
840,000 '
720,000
640,000
640,000 ~
550,000
560,000
550,000
540,000
490,000
460,000
480,000
530,000
560,000 I
460,000
380,000
380,000
370,000
470,000
400,000
360,000
260,000
280,000
260,000
. .. 2,950,O~ ____:2,,,50,000 _...____2_.7}0,000.

Detati may not sum to totals because of rounding.
""Rev<scd as noted in the 1/1/2007 unauthorized estirrates report published In September 2008
Source: u.S. Department of Homeland Security.
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USClS - What is E-Veri1)r?
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u.s. Citizenship

and Immigration
Services

What is E-Verify?
E-Veri1)r is an Internet-based system that compares
information from an employee's Form 1-9, Employment
Eligibility Verification, to data from U.S Department of
Homeland Security and Social Security Administration
records to confirm employment eligibi lity.

Why E-Verify?
Why do people come to the United States illegally? They come here to work. The public can,
and should. choose to reward companies that follow the law and employ a legal workforce.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is working to stop unauthorized employment. By
usi ng E-Veri1)r to determine the employment eligibility of their employees, companies become
Paft of the solution in addressing this problem.
Employment eligi bil ity verification is good business and it's the law.

Who UsesE-Verify?
More than 225,000 employers, large and small, across the United States use E-Verify to check
the em ployment eligibil ity oftheir employees, with about 1,000 new businesses signing up
each week.
Whi le participation in E-Veri1)r is yoluntary for most businesses, some companies may be
requ ired by state law or federal regulation to use E-Verify. For example, most employers in
Arizona and Mississippi are required to use E-Veri1)r. E-Verify is also mandatory for
employers with federal contracts or subcontracts that contain the Federal Acquisition
Regulat ion E-Verify clause.

This p age provides general information about E- VerifY and is meant to provide an overview of
the program. For instructions and policy guidance, visit the For Emp loyers and For
Employees sections of the website.

Last updated: 09/30/2010
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U. S. Citizenship
and Inlmigration
Services

Statistics and Reports
Statistics
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These stati stics are based on E-Verify cases in Fiscal Year 2010 (October 2009 through September
20 I0). Statistics may not appear to sum to 100 percent (or to the subtotals listed below) due to
rounding.

Most employees are automatically confirmed as work authorized.
• 98.3 percent of employees are automatically confirmed as authori zed to work (" work
authori zed") either instantly or withi n 24 hours, requiring no employee or employer action.
• 1.7 percent of employees receive initial system mismatches.

Of the 1.7% of employees who receive initial system mismatches:
• 0.3 percent are later confirmed as work authorized after contesting and resolving the
mismatch.
• 1.43 percent are not found work authorized.
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employees not found to be work authorized:
• 1.3 percent of employees who receive initial mismatches do not contest the mismatch either
because they do not choose to or are unaware of the opportunity to contest and as a result are
not found work authorized. The E-Verify program closely monitors uncontested mismatches
and actively reaches out to employers to ensure that they are aware
responsibility to
employees of the right to contest.
• 0.01 percent of employees who receive initial mismatches contest the mismatch and are not
work authorized.
• 0.14 percent of employees with initial mismatches are unresolved because the employer
closed the cases as "self-terminated" or as requiring further action
either the employer or
employee at the end ofFYlO.
Note: The statistics reported above differ from the 96 percent "accuracy rate" as reponed by the
Westat
in
" because Westat used EVerify transaction data from April-June 2008 in a model to estimate accuracy rates.
E-Verify is

updated and enhanced to improve its accuracy and usability.

For a description orE-Verify program improvements, please see the

:c:--'-='-'-'-'---'-"=~-==

~=~""" webpage.

Reports
In order to continue to improve E-Verify operations and efficiency, several government and
independent reports are conducted to provide information to guide the direction ofthe program.

Last updated: 02/04/201
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Work Authorization

Search
Entire Site

Services

JuSt thiS sectlO:l

01 1' IR!
> E-Ver:fy> VVhat IS E-Vetlfy? > Instant Verification of Work
f...Ulncnzation

tij.Printer Friendly

Verification of Work Authorization
E.-Verify's most impressive features are its speed and accuracy. E~Verify is the only
service that verifies employees' data against millions of government records and provides
results within seconds, There's no other program that provides the same peace of mind in
such little time

Useful
i::.-Verify compares the information an employee prOVides on Form 1-9, Employment
e:lgibillty VerifiCG!.lon, against millions of government records and generally provides
results in three to five seconds. !f the Information matches, that employee is eligible to
WO;1( in the
States, If there's a mismatch, E-Verify wi!! alert the employer and the
be allowed to WOrK while he or she resolves the problem.

Sta:lstlcs and Reports

/~,dd

Our RSS Feec

E-Verify works by comparing Information entered from an employee's Form 1-9 to:
455 million Sccial Security Administration (SSA) records
80 million U.S Department of Homeland Security records
U.S Department of Homeland Security databases contain records aoout employmentbased Visas, immigration and naturalization status, and U.S. passport issuance, which
allow E-Verify to compare mformation against a wide vanety of sources.

TI;ls page provides general informatIOn about E-Verify and is meant to provide an
overview of the program. For Instructions and policy gUidance, visit the For Employers
and For Employees sections of the website

Last updated: 12/08i2010
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Workmg
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HOuse

Department of State
U-SA,gov
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i Index

Home! espana!] 8!og :

Search
Entire Site

> E-Ver:f; > I/<Jhat IS E-Verify? > Business"Friend!Y Features

J<JS~ thiS

section

mPrinter Friendly

Au,nonzallon
E-Venfy gives compames peace ofmmd In ensunng that employees are legal U<S, workers, E-

Venfy ehmlOates tne guesswork of determmmg employment eligibility when a new employee IS
hIred and !s a powerful too! in protecting businesses against those who try 10 cheat the system

1-9.Emp!cyment

So what's the eaten? There isn't one. Companies are already required by law to complete Form 1-9
for each newly nired employee, and E.verify works seamlessly with the Form !~9 process to
cC:1firm employment eligibility
JU[ RSS Feed
EwVerify features:
secure 24~hour access - Access E~Verify anytime, anywhere with no special software
reqUired. Ail tr,at is needed is a Web browser and Internet access.
instant results - Employment eliglb!lity results for most employees are displayed in three to
five secondS.
Error checking - E-Verify can alert employees to mIsmatches and possible errors in their
governmem records. Clearing up errors sooner ratner than later saves employees time ar.d
frustration down the road.

Photo matching - E~Verify features a photo matching tool to combat document fraud and
ensure the documents that employees present are genume.
Compliance peace of mind - Compames that properly use E~Verify get a ~rebuttab!e
presumpMn" tnat they are In compliance with Form !~9 and employment eligibility laws.

User access flexibility - With two different user roles to choose from, companies can select
what their USers can see and do in E-Verify
Usage reports - E-Verify offers companies the ability to monitor usage to assist with their
comphance efforts

Implementation flexibility - With E-Verify, companies can decide thelrpartidpation on a
location-by-iocation basis (state laws and federal regulations may limit use of this feature)

Support for large companies - E-Verify offers features through its corporate administrator
access methoG that allow companies to link and manage their locations that use E-Verify.
interactive training - E-Verify offers a comprehensive online tutorial as weI! as qUick
reference gUideS, user manuals and other publications to assist users.
Customer service - You're never on your own with E-Verify. E-Verify customer support is
available to provide you WIth technical and program assistance.
This page provides general informat!on about E-Verify and IS meant to provide an overview of the
program. For instr..:ctions and policy gUIdance, VIsit the For Employers and For Employees
sechons of the weoslte.

Last updated: 04/1212010
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Adoption
USA.gov
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Search
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> E-Venf'j' > About the Program> History and .Miiestones

sPrinter Friendly

and MHestones

Enrol! n

:...og In te
Contact

ThiS !s a chrono:ogical summary of the milestones of the E-Verify Program (the
electronic employ:nent eligibility verification program formerly known as the Basic Pilot
Program)

Useful Links

y';;--o-es;;,i-pt-io-n-o-f-E-.V-erify His-to-ry-a-n-d-----N-u-m-be-r~-::--7NC""u-m-:be-'O"'C1;--'1
Milestone
Participating
E·Verify
Employers
cases (per I
(cumulative)
Fiscal
Year)

R'SS Feed

I
I

1986

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA) Enacted
The Immigration Reform and Control Act

(lRCA) of 1986 required employers to
examine documentation from each newly
hired employee to prove his or her identity and
to work In the United States, This act
Form 1·9, Employment Eligibility
Verification, requiring employees to attest to
t~eir work eligibility, and employers to certify
that the documents presented reasonably
appear (on their face) to be genuir,e and to
relate to the individual

1996

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) Enacted
The Illega! Immigration Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 required
the then Immigration and Naturalization
SerJice ONS)--which became part of the U.S,
Depanment of Homeland Security In 2003--to
condL<ct three distinct pilot programs: Basic
Pilot, the Citizen Attestation Pilot, and the
Machine-Readable Document Pilot These
pilots were used to determine the best method
of verifYIng an employee's
employment verification,

1997

Basic Pilot Program Launched
The INS, in conjunction with the Socia!
SecLlnty Administration (SSA), implemented
the Basis: PHot Program in California, Florida,
liunois, Nebraska, New York and Texas. The
Basic Pilot Program was voluntary and
allowed employers to confirm the work
elig:OI:!ty of their newly hired employees, The
Basic P!!ot Program used informat:on from the
employee's Form 1-9 and compared it to the
information in INS and SSA records. To verify
information with SSA. employers were

required to call SSA Once the SSA
information was confirmed by phone, the
employer entered 1-9 data into a computer
program which transmitted the data to INS via
a modem connection

1998

Basic Pilot Program Integrates SSA
Verification
Employers were able to complete both the
SSA and INS portion of the verification case
by entering 1-9 data Into a computer program
which transmitted the data to INS and SSA via
modem

1999

Designated Agent Basic Pilot Launched
INS, in conjunction with the Socia! Security

Administration (SSA), implemented the
DeSignated Agent BasiC Pilot Program. The
DeSignated Agent Basic PHot Program was
vOluntary and allowed empioyers to use a third
-party agent to confirm the work eligibility of
their newly hired employees
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2001

2002

2003
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Basic Pilot Program Reauthorized

1,064

559,815

Congress reauthorized and extended the
Basic ?l!ot program until 2003

Employers
enrolled in EVerify

Cases

Basic Pliot Program Continued to Grow

1,704

660,885

Thougr: no major upgrades were made to the
program Of its systems, the Basic Pilot
Prograrr, continued to grow within the pilot
states

Employers
enrolled in E·
Verify

Cases

Basic Pilot Program Extension and

2,144

588,479

Employers
enrolled in EVerify

Cases

Expansion Act of 2003 Enacted
Cor.gress enacted the Basic Pilot Program
Exten5ion and Expansion Act of 2003. Th!s
extended the Basic Pilot Program to
November 2008, The new law also required
the expansion of the BasiC Pilot Program to all
50 states no later than December 1, 2004.

2004

Basic Pilot Program Access Expanded to
World Wide Web
The BaSIC Pilot Program lmtJlemented a new
Web-based access method to confirm
employment eligibility The new Web-based
access method allowed users to access Basic
Pilot through any Internet-capable computer
Other features of the jnternet version Include
online enrollment, reporting capability for
users, and availablhty of the web interface 23
hours a day.

2005

Additional Access Methods Added to the
Basic Pilot

2007

757,342
Cases

5,899

980,991

Employers
enrolled In EVerify

Cases

BaSic Pilot Program Added Web Services

11,474

1,743,654

Web Se;vices allows DeSignated Agents or
employers to develop software that intertaces
between their own systems and E-Verify

Employers
enrolled In EVerify

Cases

The Corporate Administrator access method
was created to ailow companies to enrol!,
maintain, and oversee compames under the
Junsdict;on of their corporate offices. The
Corporate Administrator does not create
employment eligibility verification cases

2006

3,478
Employers
enrolled In E·
Verify

BaSic Pilot Improved and Renamed E·
Verily
The Basic Pilot Program was renamed EVenfy Along With the new name, the program
added more features inCluding an automatic
flagging system that prompts employers to
douole~check the data entered into the web
interfaCe for those cases that are about to
result In a mismatch, ThiS change reduced
data entry errors and initial mismatches by
approxi;nately 30 percent.

24,463

3,271,871

Employers
enrolled in EVerify

Cases

The launch of E-Venfy also marKed the
addition of photo matching, Photo matching !s
the first step in incorporating biometric data
Into the web interface_ Photo matching was
developed for employees presenting a
Permar.ent Resident Card or Emp!oyment
Authorization Document, and allows the
emplOyer to match the photo on an
employee's document with the photo in USCIS
records

State workforce agencies were encouraged to
use E~Veri'fy to confirm the employment
eligibility of any worker referred to an
employer in response to an H-2A job order

Public Education Program Launched
U.S_ Cit!zenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) launChed a public education branch
to educate employers, employees and other
stakehofders about E-Verify and the Form 1-9
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Milestones

Addltior.ally, Informative materials were
created and distributed. Brochures mdude
"You Should Know Your Riahts and
Respor.sibilities," "You Have Rights" and
"How Do I Use E-Venfy?"

2008

E-Verify Web Interface Further Enhanced

88,116

6,648,845

New upgrades to E-Verify now allow the
progra;r, to automatically check U.S,
CitizenShip and Immigration Services (USCIS)
naturalization data, This reauced citizenship
status mismatches by approximately 39
percent The Integrated Border Inspection
Systerr, real time arrival and departure
mformatlon for non-citizens IS also added to
the records E-Venfy record checks

Employers
enrolled In EVerily

Cases

ICE Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)

u.s Citizenship and immigration Services
(USCIS) and U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) signed a MOA for the
sharing of informatton between the two
agencies. This agreement formalized the
coordi:iation and management of referralS
oetweef'l USCIS Verification Division and ICE
regard,ng the misuse, abuse or fraudulent use
of E-Venly.

2009

Compliance Tracking and Management
System (CTMS) Launched
USCIS ::.egan momtoring of employers based
on Cinalysis of their system usage and
Idemif:cation of specific noncompliant
benavlors. Potential Incidents of
noncompliance are tracked In CTMS, aiang
with the compliance actions that have been
taken ~o address them.

156,659

8,171,711

Employers
enrolled in EVerily

Cases

Congress authorizes a three year
extension of E~Verify untii the end of
September 2012.

Federal Contractor Regulation Goes into
Effect
On Sepember 8. 2009, the 'Federal
Contractor Regulation" went Into effect. The
new rule implements Executive Order 12989,
as amended on June 6, 2008. Executive
Order 12989 directs federal agencies to
require many federal contractors entering into
ne"" CO:ltracts to use E-Verify on aU new
and on existing employees
on covered federal contracts.

2010

E-Verily Web Interface Redesigned

216,721

13,411,411

The E-Verify Web Intertace :-edesign, released
in June. changed more than 200 indiVIdual
screens. The redesigned interface creates
greater efficiency and ease-of-use through
Improved navigational tools such as

Employers
enrolled in EVerify

Cases

Drcp down boxes to minimize input errors

*" Icor.s to aid understanding
C;ear and simple language
A new home page
A new 'case alerts' feature
improved case management
Streamlined tutOrials

Employee Hotline Launched
U.S. CI:lzenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) launched the E-Verify Employee
Hotline 888-897-7781 The hotline connects
employees to customer service
representatives who answer questions about
E-VeJify. Fonm 1-9. and employment eligibility
verification in general, in English and Spanish

Department of Justice Memorandum of
Agreement Signed
U.S Cillzenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) and Department of Justice (DOJ),
Civil RIghts Division, Office of Special Counsel
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(ose) s:gned a Memorandum of Agreement
for shanng information between the two
agencies. This agreement formahzed
Information sharing between USC!S
Verification Division and (OSe) regarding
discriminatory use of E-Verify.
Civil Rights/Civil Liberties Videos Released
DHS Otice for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Cieated two new, educational training videos
exp:air:,ng E-Venfy procedures and policies,
employee rights and employer responsibilities,
The videos are viewable

Last updated: 02103/201 1
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USC IS - Companion to Form 1-9

Home I Espana! i BlDg i Archive I Index

u.s. Citizenship

Search

and Immigration
Services

Entire Site

RES()(,RCE.S
Heme >

E~Venfy

> \.'\J11al is E-Ve,jfy?

:>

~

Ju st !hls section

LAWS

Companion to Form 1-9

{8Printer Friendly

Start He,..,

Wt)at is E-Ve!lf{'
inStant Veflflcation or Work
A uthOriZation

Compa ni on to Farm
Busine5S~F(lendtl

i~9

Fe2:tt..res

View a verno

Companion to Form 1-9

"" Enroll In !::,. V.::rify
;.. Log in to E.·Verify
-.. Cor;ta c~ E·Ve nfy

E-Verity IS closely iinked to Form 1-9, E mployment E ligibility Verification . and exists to strengthen
!he Form 1-9 employment eligibility verification process that aU employers, by law , must follow .
vVhi!e participation ir, E-Verity is voluntary for most employers, completion of Form 1-9 is required of
aU employers .

Re!ated Links
..... 1-9 .Employmem Eiigil:l:ilty
Verification

Attend Elr', Infonrtat,o:"l Session
Getting S!arted
Abc~i1.

the Prcgf.<.'l1'!"1

Cu~tOr'l1ef

Support

For Employer,,;
Fur Emp'cycf;s
For Fecer3f Contractors

The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 prohibits employers from knowingly hiring
1Hegal woric::ers. To comply with this law , employers must collect information regarding an
employee's identtty and employment eligibility and document that information on Form
An
employee must provide certain information on the form, such as name and date of birth, as w eI! as
pre sent supporting documents

'-9.

WhIle Form f- 9 req uires employers to collect information, there was no way for employers to ve rify
that the information employees provide is valid or that the documents presented are genuine-that
;s, :.;nlil E-Vecify. E-Verify offers employers a powerful tool in protecting themselves against those
who try to cheat the system .

iJseful Links
.,. immigration Reform and Control

Act of 1936 ([RCA)
..- M-274. ~andboo k for
Employ••• (3907KB PDF)

Ace Our RSS Feed

Publications

By addi ng E-Ve,ify to the existing Form 1-9 employment eligibility verification process, a company
can benefit from the peace of mind of knowing that it maintains a legal workforce.

How it Works

----r(fCfl\'i

~(

-

, ,",

Before a company can use E-Verify to verify the employment eligibility of its employees, the
company and employee must first complete Form 1-9. All of the Form 1-9 ru les that companies
roliowed before signing up for E-Verify stilt apply with two exceptions .
.... Employees must provide their Social Security numbers on Form 1-9. (Providing a Social
Security number on Form 1-9 is voluntary u nless the employer participates in E-Verifj.)
.. Any list B dOCLzment that emp loyees present must contain a photo. (Some List B documents
without photos are acceptable unless the em ployer participates in E-Verify.)
Once Form '-9 is completed , the company enters the information from Form 1-9 into E Verity.
Depending on the documents an employee provides, the employer may have to compare a photo
displayed on a computer screen to the photo on the employee's document. The photos should
match, which ensures the document photo is genuine and hasn't been altered.
Once the information has been entered and submitted, E~Ve rify wilt compa;-e it against millions of
govemment records. If the information entered matches, E-Verify will return an 'Employment
Authoriz ed' result This confirms the employee is authorized to work in the United States. After
priming the results page and attaching it to the employee's Form 1-9 (or recording the employee's E
-Venty case verifJCa!ion number on the form itself), the employer simply closes the case to
complete the E-Venfy process.

if t he re's a mismatch , E-Verify will return a 'Tentative Nonconfirmation (TNC)' result If this
happe ns. 1t1e employer needs to print and review a notice with the employee that explains the
cause of the mismatch and what it means for the employee,
!f the employee decides to contest the mismatch, the employer will refer the case in E~Verify to the
appropriate agency (either the U.S. Department of Homeland Security or S ocial Security
Administration) and print a letter that it must give to the employee. The letter contains important
instructions and contact information that the employee will need to resolve the mismatch. The
employee t hen has eight federal gove rnme nt work days from the date the case was referred in EVerify to resolve the problem.
E-Verity will alen the employer of an update in the employee's case . If the employee successfully
resolves the mismatch, E-Verify wiH return a result of employment authorized. If the employee
doesn 't resolve the mismatch , E-Verify w it! return a final nonconfirmation resun . Only after an
em ployee receives a final nonconfirmation may an employer terminate an employee based on E·
Ve~lfy

in rare cases, the U,S. Department of Homeland Security or the Social Security Administration
might need more time to verify the employee's employment eligibility.
When this happens, E-Verity wi!! return a case in continuance result. When an employee's case is
In continuance the employer must allow the employee to continue to work until E-Verify gives a
final result of 'Empioyment Authorized' or a 'Final Nonconfirmation.'
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page provides general mformation about ENerify and is meant to provide an overview of the
program For Instr:..;ctions and policy guiaance, visit the For Employers ano For Employees
sections of the webSite

Last updated: 04/12/2010
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Home-

! EspanOi!

8!("g i Archive

I Index

Search
Entire Site 'it JUSt ~hls section

OUTRi
::>

BPrinter Friendly

E.venfy > For Employers> Photo Matching

Matching

E-Vcrify's photc marching is an important part of
the employmem eligibility verification process. It
~eqUires the employer to verify that the photo
dlspiayed In ENenfy is identical to the photo on
the document that the employee presented for
section 2 of Form 1-9.

Acd Ou: RSS Feed

PhotO matching is act!vated automatically ;f an
employee has presented with his or her Form 1-9

1·551, (Permanent Resident Card)
Form 1-766, (Employment Authorization Document), or

- U.S. passport cr passport card
if no photo is avail8;:)le, the case will either automatically skIp photo matchl:lg or ~No Photo on this
Dccument" may display in place of a photo
Other documents with photos (such as a driver's license) will not activate pnoto matching.
Reminder. A photo displayed In ENenfy should be compared wrth the photo In the document that
the employee has p~esented and not with the face of the employee,

Photo Matching Requirements
if an empioyee presents a Permanent Resident Card, Employment Authorization Document or U.S.
passport or passport card as the verification document, the employer must make a copy of that
document and keep it on file with Form 1-9.
if tna photo dlspiayed on the E-Verify screen does not match the photo on the employee's
document, the employee will receive a "DHS Tentative Nonconfirmation" (TNC) and must be given
the opportunity to correct the problem. If the employee chooses to contest the TNC, the employer
must either attach and submit electronically a copy of the employee's photo document or mail a
copy of the employee's document to DHS via express mail at the employer's expense.
Avoiding Discrimination
Employees have th.a right to present any acceptable aocumentatlon to complete Form 1~9,
Employers may nO! require an employee to present a speCIfiC document. Employers must accept
the documents the new employee chooses to present as long as they appear to be genuine and
relate to the person presenting them. Otherwise, employers may violate feceral law prohibiting
dlscnmlnatlon In the verificatIon process

Last updated: 10/04/2010

immigmtlon &

Cust~ms.

Efl1orcem.ent

White

lLS. Department of State
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INTRODUCTION

The presence of an estimated 11.5 million undocumented immigrants in the
United States, I of which an estimated 7.2 million are working, 2 has become a
flash point in the emerging national debate about immigration. Despite the fact
that immigrants often accept jobs and working conditions that no citizens seem
willing to undertake, 3 this country has responded with hostile state initiatives 4
and federal legislative efforts that not only fail to recognize their contributions,
but also penalize many aspects of their daily existence. 5

l. JEFFREY S. PASSEL PEW HISPANIC CTR .. THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY I (2006). http://www.pewhispanic.org/tiles/reports/6l.pdf
(explaining that as of March 2005 there were Il.l million unauthorized immigrants in the
United States).
2. Id. at ii (explaining that approximately 7.2 million unauthorized migrants were
employed as of March 2005. which accounts for approximately 4.9% of the civilian labor
force).
3. See Haya EI Nasser. Family. Better Jobs Pull :'vlexicans to CSA. USA TODAY. Dec.
7. 2005. at A3; S. Mitra Kalita & Krissah Williams. Help Wanted as Immigration Faces

Overhaul: Congress Considers :Yew Rules. and Businesses Worry About Finding Workers.
WAS!-!. POST. Mar. 27. 2006. at A I ("Businesses say it is hard to persuade Americans to
perform the unski1led jobs that immigrants easily fill."): Dave Montgomery. Bush Presses

Immigration Proposal: Illegal Aliens to Get Chance to Work Here 6 Years Before Return.
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE. Oct. 19. 2005. at All ("[F]oreign workers are needed to fill
jobs that U.S. citizens often bypass. including unskilled labor and seasonal agricultural
work."): Mary Lou Pickd & Matt Kempner. Reliance on Illegals Props up Economy: Law
Would Hit Industry. Consumers. ATLANTA J. & CONST .. Mar. 23.2006. at Al ("[Tjhe hotel
industry in Georgia has become a magnet for workers from other eountries who are willing
to take tough. low-paying jobs. such as housekeeping .... ").
4. See Nicholas Riccardi. States Take On Border Issues. L.A. TIMES. Jan. 16. 2006. at
A I ("In New Hampshire . . . two sheriffs last year began arresting illegal immigrants.
reasoning that their presence violated state laws against criminal trespass."): John Turner
Gilliland. Ari:::ona Prosecutor Has :Yew Twist on Prosecuting Illegal Aliens. CNSNEWS.COM.
Mar. 15. 2006. http://www.cnsnews.comlNationlArchive/200603INAT20060315b.html
(describing Arizona Maricopa County Attorney's tiling of felony conspiracy charges against
illegal immigrants under Arizona's antihuman smuggling law).
5. REAL ID Act of 2005. Pub. L. No. 109-13. Div. B. 119 Stat. 231. 302-23
(preventing states from issuing standard federally recognized driver's licenses to
undocumented immigrants: creating additional proof requirements in asylum claims:
eliminating habeas corpus review of removal orders and expanding the grounds of
inadmissibility).
On December 16. 2005. the United States House of Representatives passed the Border
Protection. Antiterrorism. and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005. sponsored by James
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When an employer, wittingly or unwittingly, hires an undocumented
worker, a question arises regarding the extent to which labor and employment
statutory protections extend to undocumented workers. In analyzing this
question, courts are forced to address the interplay between immigration and
employment statutes and their respective underlying policy rationales. Prior to
2002, courts confronting these issues developed a body of law that harmonized
these two distinct areas of jurisprudence, finding, in many contexts, that
undocumented workers were entitled to statutory protections in the
workplace. 6 This body of law shifted in 2002 when the United States Supreme
Court decided Hoffinan Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB and found that backpay for undocumented workers under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) was foreclosed by federal immigration policy.7 Since the Hoffman
decision, lower courts have struggled to define the parameters of the case, and,
while the jurisprudence is still evolving, many courts have limited Hoffman's
reach and found workers entitled to seek legal remedies for workplace
violations under a variety of statutes. 8

Sensenbrenner (R-WI) and Peter King (R-NY). H.R. 4437. 109th Congo (2005). The bill
includes a provision that makes "unlawful presence" in the United States a federal crime. Id.
§§ 201, 203. For a description of additional measures set forth in H.R. 4437, see NAT'L
IMMIGRATION FORUM. THE SENSENBRENNER-KING BILL'S "GREATEST MISSES" (2006).
http://www.immigrationforum.org/documents/policyWire/legislation/SenseKingGlance.pdf
(summarizing some of the provisions of the bill including: a provision that makes any
relative. employer. coworker. clergyman. or friend of an undocumented immigrant into an
"alien smuggler" and a criminal: a provision that makes it harder for legal permanent
residents to become citizens: a provision that requires employers to verify workers' legal
status: a provision that denies admission to nationals of certain countries: a provision that
authorizes state and local police to enforce federal immigration laws: and various provisions
that erode due process. including a provision that reverses the burden of proof).
6. Sure-Tan. Inc. V. NLRB. 467 U.S. 883. 884 (1984) (holding that undocumented
workers were considered employees under the National Labor Relations Act): Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n V. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504.1517 (9th Cif. 1989)
(finding that the district court did not err in awarding undocumented workers back-pay under
Title VII): Rios V. Enter. Ass'n Steamfitters Local Union 638. 860 F.2d 1168. 1172 (2d Cif.
1988) (permitting undocumented workers remedies under Title VII prior to passage of the
IRCA): In re Reyes. 814 F.2d 168. 170 (5th Cif. 1987) {finding that both undocumented and
documented workers are covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA»: Local 512.
Warehouse & Oftlce Workers' Union V. NLRB. 795 F.2d 705. 716 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding
that undocumented workers are entitled to the protections afforded under the NLRA): Bevies
CO. V. Teamsters Local 986. 791 F.2d 1391. 1392-93 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding an
arbitrator's award of back-pay and reinstatement to undocumented workers prior to passage
of IRCA): Donovan V. Burgett Greenhouses. Inc .. 759 F.2d 1483. 1485 (lOth Cir. 1985)
(allowing for the enforcement of the FLSA on behalf of undocumented workers): NLRB v.
Apollo Tire Co .. 604 F.2d 1180, 1183 (9th Cif. 1979) (finding that undocumented workers
qualify as employees under the NLRA and are entitlcd to seek relief under the act). But see
Del Rey Tortilleria. Inc. V. NLRB. 976 F.2d 1115. 1121 (7th Cir. 1992) (interpreting SureTan as disallowing undocumented workers back-pay under the NLRA).
7. 535 U.S. 137. 151-52 (2002).
8. Workers who are not paid can seek recovery of wages. See, e.g.. Galaviz-Zamora V.
Brady Farms. Inc .. 230 F.R.D. 499. 501-02 (W.D. Mich. 2005): Trejo V. Broadway Plaza
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Undocumented workers who pursue enforcement of their legal rights have
heightened concerns about the disclosure of their status in the context of civil
litigation. Because of the precarious situation that undocumented workers
inhabit in the workplace, 9 the potential for mistreatment is great. 10 Further,

Hotel. No. 04 Civ. 4005. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17133. at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16.2005):
Cortez v. Medina's Landscaping. No. 00 C 6320. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18831. *2-3 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 30. 2002): Flores v. Amigon. 233 F. Supp. 2d 462. 463-64 (E.D.N.Y. 2002): Singh
v. Jutla. 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056. 1060-61 (N.D. Cal. 2002): Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Inn
Inc .. 207 F. Supp. 2d 191. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Those who are discriminated against can seek relief under anti-discrimination statutes.
Rivera v. Nibco. Inc., 364 F.3d 1057. 1066-69 (9th Cir. 2004). cert. denied. 125 S. Ct. 1603
(2005) (holding that Ho.ffman does not apply to Title VII claims): Escobar v. Spartan
Security Service, 281 F. Supp. 2d 895. 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (finding that Ho.ffman did not
preclude all remedies for undocumented workers under the NLRA or other comparable
federal labor statutes): De La Rosa v. Northern Harvest Furniture. 210 F.R.D. 237. 238-39
(C.D. Ill. 2002) (reasoning. in dicta. that given the differences between the authority of
federal courts and the NLRB. as well as Title VII precedent favoring back-pay. Ho.ffman was
not dispositive of issues raised by the defendant): Lopez v. Supertlex. Ltd .. No. 0 I Civ.
10010. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15538. at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21. 2002) (rejecting
employer's argument that in order to state a claim of disability discrimination. the plaintiff
was required to plead that he was a documented alien).
Those injured on the job can pursue personal injury remedies or workers'
compensation. See, e.g.. Farmers Bros. Coffee v. Workers' Compo Appeals Bd .. 35 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 23. 27-30 (Ct. App. 2005): Safeharbor Employer Serviees L Inc. V. Velazquez. 860
So. 2d 984.985-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003): Earth First Grading V. Gutierrez. 606 S.E.2d
332.334-36 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004): ConrI PET Techs .. Inc. V. Palacias. 604 S.E.2d 627. 63031 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004): Wet Walls. Inc. v. Lcdezma. 598 S.E.2d 60. 63-64 (Ga. Ct. App.
2004): Design Kitchen & Baths V. Lagos. 882 A.2d 817. 829-30 (Md. 2005): Correa V.
Waymouth Farms, Inc .. 664 N. W.2d 324.329-31 (Minn. 2003): Rosa V. Partners in Progress.
Inc .. 868 A.2d 994.997. 1001 (N.H. 2005): Cherokee Indus. V. Alvarez. 84 P.3d 798. 799.
801 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003): Tyson Foods. Inc. V. Guzman. 116 S.W.3d 233. 244. 247 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2003).
9. Rebecca Smith. Immigrants' Right to. Wo.rkers· Co.mpensatio.n. 40 TRIAL 48. 49
(Apr. 2004) ("'Latino immigrants are now far more likely to be killed on the job than their
counterpart, of European ancestry. From 1992 to 2000. fatalities among Latino immigrants
rose by 67 percent-at a time when the number of fatal occupational injuries to all workers
declined by 5 percent.") (citing BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. CENSUS OF FATAL
OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES. FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES TO FOREIGN-BORN WORKERS BY
SELECTED WORKER CHARACTERISTICS (2002): CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION.
PROTECTING THE
SAFETY AND HEALTH OF IMMIGRANT
WORKERS
(2002).
http://www.cdc.gov/programs/workforc22.htm: AFL-CIO. DEATH ON THE JOB: THE TOLL OF
NEGLECT 9-10 (12th ed. 2003). http://www.atlcio.org/issues/safety/memoriallupload/
death_2003jntro.pdf): Rebecca Smith. Amy Sugimori & Luna Yasui, Lo.w Pay, High Risk:
State .'vfo.dels fo.r Advancing Immigrant Wo.rkers· Rights, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
597. 598-600 (2003-2004) (detailing the statistics showing that immigrant workers are at
greater risk of work-related injuries and death than their counterparts).
10. See Christopher Ho & Jennifer C. Chang, Drawing the Line After Hoffman Plastic
Compounds. Inc. V. NLRB: Strategies fo.r Pro.tecting Undo.cumented Wo.rkers in the Title VJJ
Co.ntext and Beyo.nd. 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 473. 477 & n.12 (2005) (stating that "the
conditions under which these persons work are--owing to their precarious circumstancestypically substandard. rife with exploitation by avaricious employers and. sometimes.
astoundingly appalling in the extent and depth of their cruelty" and providing examples of
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once their status is disclosed, the ramifications for undocumented immigrants
are uncertain at best; they could be reported to the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (BICE) and deported, charged criminally and/or barred
. t he country. 11
f'rom reentering
Lawyers litigating employment-related claims involving undocumented
workers are likely to confront a host of complex ethical issues. The ethical
quandaries have grown increasingly more difficult in light of ongoing debates
about comprehensive immigration reform. Recent legislative proposals contain
stepped-up employer verification provisions,12 make mere presence in the
United States a federal crime, 13 and make those who help undocumented
immigrants susceptible to liability as "alien smugglers." 14 These looming
developments increase the potential risks and consequences to undocumented
immigrants, their employers, and, potentially, to the lawyers who are involved
in the litigation. The following case is illustrative of the complex interplay of
ethical issues that can arise.
A group of workers sued their employer, a landscape company, for
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). As the case proceeded,
defense counsel repeatedly questioned the immigration status of some of the
workers and suggested that plaintiffs' counsel was somehow aiding and
abetting illegal conduct by failing to report the plaintiffs' whereabouts to
immigration officials. In an attempt to protect the clients, plaintiffs' counsel
obtained a written agreement from the defendant that it would not raise the
issue of plaintiffs' immigration status at depositions. This agreement was
promptly violated at the first plaintiffs deposition and, in response, plaintiff
asserted his rights under the Fifth Amendment. Then, during a break, defense

such exploitation).
11. 8 U.s.c. § 1227(a)(I)(B) (Supp. V 2006) (making individuals who are present in
the United States without lawful status deportable): see Rivera. 364 F.3d at 1064 ("While
documented workers face the possibility of retaliatory discharge for an assertion of their
labor and civil rights. undocumented workers confront the harsher reality that. in addition to
possible discharge. their employer will likely report them to the INS and they will be
subjected to deportation proceedings or criminal prosecution.").
12. Stepped-up verification has been included in many of the proposed bills designed
to address immigration reform. See, e.g.. The Secure America Through Verification and
Enforcement ("SAVE") Act of 2007. H.R. 4088. S. 2368. I 10th Congo (2007) (expanding
the already existing Basic Pilot/E-Verify employment eligibility verification program to
require participation by all employers and all workers in the country): The Comprehensive
Immigration Reform Act of 2006. S. 2611. 109th Congo (2006) (creating a new Electronic
Employment Verification System (EEVS) for checking the employment eligibility of every
newly hired worker in the United States).
13. Border Protection, Antiterrorism. and Illegal Immigration Control Act. H.R. 4437.
109th Congo §§ 20 I. 203 (2002).
14. ld. § 202 (expanding the definition of "smuggling" to include a person who
knowingly "assists" an undocumented immigrant to "reside or remain" in the United States.
even if that person does not encourage or induce the immigrant to come to or reside in the
United States unlawfully).
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counsel called the local police who, upon their arrival, called the local
immigration enforcement office to report plaintiff as an illegal alien based only
upon the assertion of plaintiffs Fifth Amendment rights. IS
This Article explores the increasingly complex ethical obligations with
regard to a client's immigration status in the context of employment-related
civil litigation. 16 The inquiry begins with the initial question of whether or not
a lawyer can represent an undocumented worker in such litigation. In light of
prohibitions on lawyers assisting in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent, the
answer to the question is not necessarily evident. 17 Undocumented workers
currently can be criminally liable for various actions related to the manner in
which they entered the country and the method by which they obtained
employment. Thus, even though undocumented workers may have a legal right
to certain employment-related remedies, lawyers need to determine whether the
rules of professional conduct bar such representation. Ultimately, this Article
concludes that, in most every instance, lawyers are not prohibited from
representing undocumented workers in employment-related civil litigation,
even if actions related to their manner of entry or method of obtaining
employment are criminal or fraudulent. 18
After determining that a lawyer can represent an undocumented worker in
employment-related civil litigation, the Article explores additional complexities
that arise in the course of the representation when lawyers have to decide
whether to protect or disclose a client's immigration status. The lawyer's
decision to protect or disclose the information is, in the first instance,
dependent upon whether or not immigration status is relevant to the underlying
lawsuit. In the wake of Hoffman, employers have attempted to broaden the
Court's holding by arguing that immigration status is relevant to a whole range
of employment-related civil litigation. If immigration status is determined
relevant to the litigation, the lawyer's ethical obligations to protect the
information involve inquiries into the rules of confidentiality, the client's Fifth

15.
NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW erR., LITlG. GUIDE FOR IMMIGRANT WORKER
ADVOCATES § 1Il(B)(2) (2007).
16. Throughout this Article. I refer to the American Bar Association (ABA) Model
Rules of Professional Conduct in analyzing the ethical questions raised herein. While the
ABA Model Rules themselves are not binding on anyone state. the large majority of states
have adopted them. See Alphabetical List of States Adopting Model Rules.
http://www.abanet.org/cpr!mrpc!alpha_states.html(last visited Dcc. 24. 2007). To the extent
a state has adopted professional responsibility rules that differ from the Model Rules. the
analysis might differ as well.
17. A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage. or assist a client, in conduct that the
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of
any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counselor assist a client to make a
good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2007).
18. See inFa Part II.
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Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,19 and the applicability and
scope of the attorney-client privilege.
If, on the other hand, immigration status is determined not relevant, the
client's immigration status would constitute confidential information and
lawyers would be obligated to protect this information unless they were
pennitted or mandated to disclose it. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
contain a strong obligation to keep client information confidential as well as
rules designed to prohibit lawyers from counseling or assisting a client in
fraudulent or criminal activities. Proposed and existing legislation that
characterizes an undocumented worker's presence or work in this country as
criminal or fraudulent, thus, creates a tension between the lawyer's
confidentiality obligations and the potential for permissive 20 or mandatory
disclosure. 21 Among the applicable provisions are Rule 3.3(b)--which requires
lawyers representing clients they know intend to engage or are engaging in
criminal or fraudulent conduct to take reasonable remedial measures, including
disclosure of such information to the tribunal 22 -and Rule 4.1 (b )--which
requires lawyers to disclose material facts in order to avoid assisting a criminal
or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6. 23
In trying to address the tension between confidentiality and disclosure
obligations, lawyers should bear in mind that there are two important
limitations on the crime and fraud rules embodied in the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. First the rules apply only if there is a sufficient nexus
between the alleged crime or fraud and the pending action. 24 Second, the rules

19. Generally the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination can be invoked
"whenever information sufficiently relevant to civil liability to be discoverable provides
even a clue that might point a hypothetical government investigator toward evidence of
criminal conduct:' Robert Heidt. The Conjurer 's Circle-~The Fifth Amendment Privilege in
Civil Cases. 91 YALE L.J. 1062. 1065 (1982).
20. Model Rule 1.6 contains several exceptions that are arguably relevant to this
context. First. Rule 1.6(b)(2) is designed to prevent future client misconduct and allows
attorneys to disclose if failure to do so will result in substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2007).
Second. Rule 1.6(b)(3) is designed to permit disclosure to mitigate or rectiry the type of
harm described in Rule 1.6(b)(2). Jd. R. 1.6(b)(3). Finally. Rule 1.6(b)(6) addresses a
lawyer's disclosure obligation pursuant to a court order. Additionally. Rule 4.1(b) scts forth
a lawyer's obligation to disclose to third parties. Jd. R. 4.I(b). Since Rule 4.I(b) has many
conditions that must be met before disclosure, I include this in the category of permissive or.
more accurately, conditional disclosure.
21. My use of the term "mandatory disclosure provisions" includes a lawyer's
obligation to disclose to the tribunal under Model Rule 3.3(b). Jd. R. 3.3(b).
22. Jd.
23. Jd. R. 4.I(b).
24. HAZARD & HODES. THE LAW OF LAWYERING 37-6 to 37-8 (3d ed. Supp. 2008)
(stating that rule 4.I(a) "still prohibits only statements that are materially false"). Model
Rule 3.3(b) requires only that information "related to the proceedings" be disclosed to the
tribunal. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2007).
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apply only if there is a sufficiently close relationship between the lawyer's
actions and the client's alleged crime or fraud. 25 Essentially, disclosure is only
required if the lawyer is directly counseling or assisting in the crime or fraud or
if there is a close causal connection between the client's crime or fraud and the
underlying litigation. Thus, despite the statutory provisions criminalizing
certain acts, the constellation of ethical rules relating to client crime or fraud
may not actually require a lawyer to disclose a client's immigration status, but,
instead, may obligate the lawyer to protect this otherwise confidential
information.
Lawyers representing employers will also be affected by the immigration
status of opposing parties. 26 If immigration status is not relevant to the pending
litigation, lawyers representing employers mi9ht consider whether it is
appropriate to seek access to this information. 2 Further, the way in which
these disclosure issues are decided will have larger implications for the justice
system. If the risks and costs of disclosure are too high, undocumented workers
will be deterred from seeking enforcement of their rights or forced to drop
litigation once started. This chilling effect might also undermine the policies of
employment laws that may, as a result, go under enforced. Additionally,
lawyers might be forced to alter their client relationships so as to avoid learning
information they might later have to disclose.
Despite this Article's conclusion that the ethical rules do not mandate
disclosure of a client's immigration status, the rules might permit the disclosure
and some lawyer may want to exercise this discretion to reveal. For example,
an attorney might believe that disclosure would make her client more credible
or preempt certain strategic benefits gained by the opposing party. In order to
assist lawyers in addressing these decisions, this Article will briefly explore
whether the decision to disclose belongs to the lawyer or the client and the
extent of the lawyer's obligation to counsel the client and to obtain informed
consent prior to disclosure.
Part I of this Article analyzes the initial ethical question whether
undocumented workers seeking employment-related civil remedies will be able
to avail themselves of legal representation, or whether the limitation on

25. MODEL RULES Of PROf"L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2007) (stating that a lawyer cannot
counselor assist a client in perpetrating a crime or fraud); id. R. 4.1 (b) (stating that a lawyer
shall disclose only "hen necessary to avoid assisting with a client's crime or fraud); HAZARD
& HODES. supra note 24. at 5-6 to 5-7 ("'Rules 3.3(a)(3) and 4.I(b) are of like effect. for
together they provide that a lmvyer must disclose material facts to a tribunal or to a third
party. even if the information would otherwise be confidentiaL when such action is
necessary to avoid either participating in or passively assisting a clienfs fraud through
silence.").
26. While this Article raises some ethical issues that lawyers for employers might face.
the main focus is on the ethical issues involved in representing undocumented employees.
27. For a discussion of ethical limitations on the employer. see infra notes 230-44 and
accompanying text.
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assisting clients in the commission of a crime or fraud will bar representation.
After concluding that there is likely no bar to representation in this context, the
Article then examines how undocumented status affects decisions made during
the course of the representation. Part II explores the development of the law
regarding relevancy of immigration status in the context of civil litigation. In
particular, this Part focuses on a comparison of the law before and after the
Supreme Court decision in HofJman and then examines the development of law
by lower courts post-Hoffinan. Part 1lI then explores lawyers' obligations to
protect or disclose immigration status and contrasts lawyers' ethical obligations
if immigration status is determined to be relevant to the proceedings with
instances in which immigration status is not relevant to the proceedings.
Finally, Part V examines the ethical obligations of lawyers who determine that
it would be strategically beneficial to the case to disclose a client's immigration
status.
In the current climate of hostility toward immigrants, and undocumented
immigrants in particular, lawyers representing undocumented clients need to be
mindful of the implications of disclosure. An improperly made disclosure could
have catastrophic consequences for a client, including deportation, criminal
charges, and the inability to reenter the country legally. Given these potential
harmful consequences, lawyers should be cognizant of their ethical obligations
at all stages of legal proceedings, and should keep clients informed about and
prepared to address immigration status issues.
I. IMPACT OF UNDOCUMENTED STATUS ON ATTORNEy-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
Under current jurisprudence, undocumented workers are entitled to some
legal remedies for workplace violations. For lawyers seeking to represent
undocumented workers in this context, an initial ethical question is whether the
rules of professional responsibility limit such representation. Specifically, the
inquiry of this Part is whether Rule 1.2(d), which prohibits an attorney from
assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct, categorically bars an
attorney from counseling or representing an undocumented worker in
employment-related civil litigation. This Part proceeds by first examining the
meaning of 1.2(d) and then analyzing its application to typical scenarios in
which undocumented workers seek the assistance or representation of a lawyer.
This Part will then move to an analysis of the broader policy implications of
various interpretations of 1.2(d) and conclude that, in most instances, 1.2(d)
does not prohibit undocumented workers from seeking the advice, counsel, and
representation of an attorney in employment-related civil litigation.
Rule 1.2(d) states:
[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the
legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may
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counselor assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity,
. or app I"lcatlOn 0 f t he Iaw. 28
scope, meanmg

By its plain language, the rule distinguishes between directing, suggesting or
assisting in criminal or fraudulent conduct and providin? the client with
information about the law and predicted legal consequences. 2
On its face, the application of this rule seems quite simple. Ifthe conduct in
question is the filing of a lawsuit to enforce existing employment rights, this
conduct, in and of itself, is not criminal or fraudulent. However, the more
complex issue is whether the representation indirectly amounts to counseling or
assisting a client to engage in a crime or fraud. In analyzing this question it is
necessary to initially explore what, if any, crime or fraud is at issue and
whether or not any of the crimes could be construed as "continuing offenses.,,30
Once these parameters are defined, the Article then examines whether or not
representation in employment-related civil matters amounts to "assisting" and

28. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2007). Prior 10 adoption of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
stated that "a la\\yer shall not counselor assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to
be illegal or fraudulent." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY at DR 7-102(A)(7) (1981).
This rule was much broader in its application as "illegal" could be construed as a larger
category of actions than merely criminal.
29. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 5-37 to 5-38:
[Ilt is frequently the case that educating the client about the law may function as the
equivalent of suggesting or assisting in its violation. It is therefore important to note that the
explicit phrasing of the rule appears to deal with this overlap directly
and clearly by indicating that communicating ·the law' is always acceptable. and by itself
is not to be considered suggestion or assistance.

Stephen L Pepper. Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence
and Ethics of Lawyering. 104 YALE L.J. 1545. 1588 (1995): see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 9 (2007) (noting that even if the client uses the advice of the
lawyer in the course of criminal or fraudulent actions it does not by itself make the lawyer "a
party to the eourse of action").
30. By "continuing offense" I mean to refer to that group of offenses that criminal law
defines as ongoing. See United States v. Midstate Horticultural Co .. 306 U.S. 161. 166
(1939) ('"[A continuing offense is a] continuous. unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by
a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force. however long a time it may
occupy. Where such an act or series of acts runs through several jurisdictions. the offense is
committed and cognizable in each."): State v. MaidwelL 50 P.3d 439. 441 (Idaho 2002)
(defining a continuing offense as "a continuous. unlawful act or series of acts set in motion
by a single impulse and operated by unintermittent force") (citing State v. Barlow's. Inc ..
729 P.2d 433.436 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986»: State v. Ramirez. 633 N.W.2d 656. 660 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2001) (defining a continuing offense as '''one which consists of a course of conduct
enduring over an extended period of time'" (quoting John v. State. 291 N.W.2d 502 (Wis.
1980»: see also.l. Michael Callan & Harris David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty
of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client :Hisconduct in an Adversary System. 29 RUTGERS L
REV. 332. 363 (1976) (detining a continuing crime as one "which. though committed in the
past. has ramifications or effects which continue into the present or future"). But see Nancy
E. Stuart. Child Abuse Reporting: A Challenge to Attorney-Client Confidentiality. I GEO. 1.
LEGAL ETHICS 243. 253 (1987) (arguing that the definition articulated by Callan & David is
too narrow and should instead include continuing acts that are crimes in the future).
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is thus prohibited under Rule 1.2(d).
Undocumented workers can be criminally liable for a number of different
actions which, for ease of analysis, can be grouped into two broad categories:
those related to entry and continued presence in the United States; and those
related to obtaining and maintaining employment. In terms of those criminal
activities related to entry and presence in the country, while mere presence in
the United States is not currently a crime,31 entry and presence in the United
States after a deportation order has been entered is a criminal offense. 32
Additionally, entering the country without inspection or entering by use of false
or misleading representations 33 and willful failure to register as an alien after
thirty days are crimes. 34 Further, it is a crime to knowingly forge, alter, make,
obtain, possess, or accept false immigration documents for entry into or as
evidence of a lawful stay or employment in the United States. 35 In terms of
criminal or fraudulent activity related to work, using a false Social Security
number for the purpose of obtaining any payment or any other benefit is a
felony.36 It is not currently a crime to work without any legal documents, but it
is grounds for removal. 37
Of those acts that constitute a criminal offense, are any of them considered
"continuing crimes"? If so, the ongoing nature of the offense might impact the
analysis of whether or not a lawyer'S work on employment-related civil
litigation could be construed as "assisting" the client in a crime or fraud. Courts
have found that entering without inspection or entering with false documents
and using a false Social Security number to obtain a benefit are not "continuing
crimes.,d8 The crime of entering by eluding examination or immigration

31. Unlawful presence in the United States, in and of itself. is not currently a crime.
but it is a deportable offense. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (2007): see also Gates v. L.A. Superior Court.
238 Cal. Rptr. 592.603 (Ct. App. 1987) (explaining that aliens' being in the United States in
violation of thc immigration laws is a civil offense and exclusively within the federal
domain).
32. 8 U.s.c. § 1326(a) (2000). A person found to have committed an offense under
this statute shall be imprisoned for a period often years. Id. § 1326(b)(3}.
33. Id. §§ 1325(a)(2)-(3} (defining as criminal the entry into the country by eluding
examination as well as entry by use of false or misleading representation). A person found to
have committed an offense under this statute can be fined or imprisoned not more than two
years. or both. Id. § 1325(a)(3).
34. Id. §§ 1302. 1306 (stating that any alien who willfully fails to register after thirty
days can be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined up to $\000 or imprisoned up to six months
or both).
35. 18 U.s.c. § 1546(a) (2000). A person found to have committed an offense under
this statute shall be fined or imprisoned not more than ten years for the first offense. Id.
36. 42 U.s.c. §§ 408(a)(7)-(8) (2000). A person can be fined or imprisoned for not
more than five years. or both. for such an offense. Id.
37. 8 U.S.c. § 1227(a)(l)(8) (SUpp. V 2006).
38. United States v. Payne. 978 F.2d 1177. 1180( 10th Cir. 1992} (finding that falsely
representing a social security number is not a continuing offense): United States v. RinconJimenez. 595 F.2d 1192. 1194 (9th Cir. 1979) (l1nding that entering by eluding examination
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officers has been held to be "consummated at the time an alien gains entry
through an unlawful point and does not submit to these examinations ... 39 Based
upon this analysis, once an immigrant reaches a place of repose within the
country, the misdemeanor of improper entry is concluded. Similarly, using a
false Social Security number in order to obtain a benefit has been held to be
completed when the false representation is made and is not considered a
continuing crime. 40 However, there could be numerous separate crimes if an
individual were to make numerous representations utilizing a false Social
Security number.
In contrast, willful failure to register as an alien after thirty days and entry
and presence in the United States after a deportation order have been found to
be continuing crimes. 4 ! Additionally, while there is no specific case analyzing
whether all, or part, of 18 U.S.c. § 1546 amounts to a "continuing crime,"
related case law supports an interpretation that at least some acts under § 1546
could be construed as continuing crimes. Section 1546 makes it a crime to
knowingly forge, counterfeit, alter or falsely make immigration documents for
entry or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the U.S. and to utter,
use, attempt to use, possess, obtain, accept, or receive such immigration
documents for entry or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the
United States. 42 Employing the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in
Toussie v. United States, the doctrine of continuing offenses should be applied
in only limited circumstances. 43 Toussie requires that, in order to constitute a
continuing offense. the explicit language of the substantive criminal statutes
must compel such a conclusion or the nature of the crime must be such that

or inspection was not a continuing crime, but instead one that was completed at the time an
unauthorized alien gains entry without inspection): United States v. Joseph. 765 F. Supp.
326. 330 (E.D. La. 1991) (finding that the crime of using a false social security number with
the intent to deceive is completed when the talse representation is made).
39. Rincon-Jimenez. 595 F.2d at 1193-94: see a/so United States v. Pruitt. 719 F.2d
975.978 (9th Cir. 1983) ("A violation of 8 U.s.c. § 1325 occurs only at the time of entry
and does not continue thereafter."): Gates v. L.A. Superior Court. 283 Cal. Rptr. 592. 602-03
(Ct. App. 1987) (citing Rincon-Jimenez for the proposition that a violation of 8 U.S.c. §
1325(a)(2) has been held to be "consummated at the time an alien gains entry through an
unlawful point and does not submit to these examinations").
40. Payne. 978 F.2d at 1180-81 (finding that using a false social security number for
tax-evasion purposes, with intent to deceive, was not a continuing otfense): Joseph. 765 F.
Supp. at 330 (finding that use of a talse social security number on a credit application for a
bank loan. with intent to deceive. was not a continuing offense).
41. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza. 468 U.S. 1032. 1047 n.3 (1984) (finding that willful
failure to register after thirty days constitutes a continuing crime): United States v. RuelasArreguin. 219 F.3d 1056. 1061 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that a violation of § 1326 constitutes
a "continuing offense").
42. 18 U.s.c. § 1546 (2000).
43. 397 U.S. 112. 115 (1970) (analyzing the doctrine of continuing otfense in the
context of statute of limitations issues and explaining that the doctrine should apply only in
limited circumstances because of the tension that exists between the statute of limitations
and the continuing-offense doctrine).
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Congress intended that it be treated as a continuing crime. 44 Of all of the acts
prohibited by this statute, possession is the only one that implies an ongoing
activity. The other actions such as uttering, obtaining, using or accepting appear
more likely to be construed as completed upon the act constituting the crime.
There are many cases involving "possession" offenses and no matter the
divergent circumstances, each court found that possession is a "continuing
offense.,,45 Thus, in addition to willful failure to register after thirty days and
entry and presence after a deportation order, it also appears that possession of
immigration documents for the purposes identified in the statute might be
construed as a continuing crime.
Further, because the ethical rules address fraudulent, as well as criminal,
actions of the client, the lawyer should explore what, if any, actions of a client
could be considered fraudulent. The rules define fraudulent as "conduct that is
fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction
and has a purpose to deceive." 46 Fraud typically consists of a false
representation, whether oral, written or based in conduct that creates an untrue
or misleading impression in the mind of another with the intent that the person
would rely upon the false representation. 47 Certainly, entering without

44. fd at 115-16 (construing a statute and regulation that required male citizens
between the ages of 18 and 26 to register for the draft).
45. See United States v. Winnie. 97 F.3d 975. 976 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding unlawful
possession of a cheetah traded in violation of the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora was a continuing ot1'ense): United States v.
Blizzard. 27 F.3d 100. 101 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that the crime of receiving and
concealing stolen government property was a continuing offense): United States v. Jones.
533 F.2d 1387. 1391 (6th Cir. 1976) (finding that possession of a firearm constituted a
continuing offense): United States v. Cunningham. 902 F. Supp. 166. 168 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(finding that possession of stolen mail was a continuing offense).
46. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(d) (2007).
47. 9 STUART M. SPEISER ET At., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 32:4. at 212-13
(1992) ("[11n very general terms [fraud J can be said to comprise anything calculated to
deceive. including all acts. omissions. and concealments involving a breach of legal or
equitable duty. trust, or confidence justly reposed. reSUlting in damage to another or by
which an undue and unconscionable advantage is taken of another."). For examples of how
some states define fraud. see Weinstein v. Weinstein. 882 A.2d 53. 62-63 (Conn. 2005):
"Fraud consists in deception practiced in order to induce another to part with property or
surrender some legal right. and which accomplishes the end designed.... The elements of a
fraud action are: (I) a false representation was made as a statement of fact: (2) the statement
was untrue and known to be so by its maker: (3) the statement was made with the intent of
inducing rei iance thereon: and (4) the other party rei ied on the statement to his
detriment.. ..

ld (quoting Mattson v. Mattson, 811 A.2d 256. 259 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002»: see also Vigil
v. Fogerson, 126 P.3d 1186. 1197 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) r-[F]raud is defined as 'a false
representation. knowingly or recklessly made. with the intent to deceive. on which the other
party acted to his [or her] detriment. "'(quoting Robertson v. Carmel Builders Real Estate. 92
P.3d 653.662 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004»): McCarthy v. Wani Venture. 251 S.W. 3d 573. 585
(Tex. Ct. App., 2007) (,,[A]ctual fraud can be the concealment of material facts or the failure
to disclose a material fact.").
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inspection, with false papers or obtaining employment with false documents
might be construed as fraudulent activity.
Based upon the fact that some of the actions of the undocumented worker
might constitute either a crime or a fraud, the issue is whether or not legal
representation of an undocumented worker in an employment-related civil case
would amount to "assisting" in any of these criminal or fraudulent acts. In
analyzing this question, it is helpful to think about a continuum at one end of
which are those instances where there exists an obvious connection between the
client's crime or fraud and the lawyer's actions or inactions. The most extreme
examples are those in which the lawyer directly participates in the client's
crime 48 or directly advises a client to commit a crime or fraud. 49 In these
instances, Rule 1.2( d) would bar representation. On the other end of the
spectrum would be an example in which the client commits a crime or fraud
that is so wholly unrelated to the representation that it is obvious Rule 1.2(d)
would not prohibit the attorney's representation. For example, assume a client
who is undocumented seeks compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
and the state counterpart, for wages owed for completed work. In the course of
representation, the client discloses to his attorney that he previously has been
violent toward his wife. Even assuming that his actions would constitute an

48. S'ee. e.g. Townsend v. State Bar of Cal.. 197 P.2d 326. 327-29 (Cal. 1948) (lawyer
was suspended for three years for advising his client to make a fraudulent conveyance to
frustrate a judgment and prepared the deed knowing it was to be used in a fraudulent fashion
and backdated it to facilitate the fraud); People v. Theodore. 926 P.2d 1237. 1242 (Colo.
1996) (lawyer drove client to family home in violation of restraining order issued against
client): Fla. Bar v. Brown. 790 So. 2d 1081. 1083. 1089 (Fla. 2001) (lawyer who. at client's
request. solicited campaign-contribution checks from subordinate la\\yers and delivered
them to a corporate client and premium billed the client as reimbursement suspended for
ninety days): Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Sheinbein. 812 A,2d 981. 989. 1001 (Md.
2002) (lawyer who assisted his son/client in fleeing to Israel after committing a murder
disbarred): In re Berglas, 790 N.Y.S.2d 119 (App. Div. 2005) (lawyer who submitted false
filing to INS in order to give the New York City office jurisdiction over the matter
suspended for one year): Disciplinary Counsel v. Cirincione. 807 N.E.2d 320, 323. 326
(Ohio 2004) (lm\yer who helped client obtain rental housing in violation of court ordered
conditions for client's release from jail suspended for six months).
49. Regardless of whether actual assistance is rendered. a lawyer may never advise a
client to engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct. See, e.g.. Peoplc v. Gifford. 76 P.3d 519,
520, 522 (Colo. App. 2003) (la\\yer who advised client to pay wife to recant testimony in
criminal case disbarred): Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Somers. No. CV 980585853S. 1999
WL 732978 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (lawyer who counseled witnesses to tcstify falsely
disbarred): Fla. Bar v. Boland. 702 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1998) (lawyer who told client not to
comply with a court-ordered child-visitation schedule suspended for two years): In re
Holden. 982 P.2d 399 (Kan. 1999) (lawyer who advised client to remove child from
jurisdiction in violation of court order indefinitely suspended): State ex reI. Counsel for
Discipline v. J-Jorncber, 708 N.W.2d 620. 622 (Neb. 2006) (lawyer who counseled client to
violate a court order to convey title to property as part of marriage dissolution suspended for
two years): In re Edson. 530 A.2d 1246 (N.J. 1987) (lmvyer disbarred for advising clients to
invent evidence in defense of drunk driving case).
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assault, nothing prohibits his representation in the claim for unpaid wages 50
because Rule 1.2(d) recognizes a distinction between assisting the client in the
commission of a crime or fraud and merely being aware that the client has or is
committing a crime or fraud. 51
A gray area exists in between these extremes-inst_ances in which a
lawyer's actions can be construed as "passively assisting,,)2 the client in the
commission of a crime or fraud. 53 Consider the following factual scenarios and
how they implicate the underlying policies of Rule 1.2(d). 54

50. In this context. the lawyer should still consider her obligations under Rule 1.6 to
keep this confidential. in the absence of an exception. This ultimately may cause a conflict of
interest, but the fact that the client has committed a crime in and of itself does not mean that
the lawyer is barred from representing that client in a wholly unrelated case.
5!. In analyzing the application of Model Rule 1.2( d). courts and regulatory bodies
have found no violation for counseling a client where the lawyer provides the client broad
advice or provides advice for a client who has committed some prior bad act. See, e.g.. State
Bar of Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof! Conduct, Op. 2000-04 (2000) (opining that a
Imvyer may ethically advise a client to tape record a telephone conversation in which one
party has not given consent to the recording as long as the lawyer concludes that such taping
is not prohibited by state or federal law).
Also. courts have found no violation for assistance where the lawyer recognizes the
crime or fraud and takes steps to correct or remedy it. or vvhere the lawyer relied upon the
opinion of other counselor conducted his own research into the facts and law and could
argue that he did not have knowledge. See. e.g.. In re Tocco. 984 P.2d 539. 543 (Ariz. 1999)
(lawyer who did not deliberately omit assets from bankruptcy schedules not subject to
discipline); Iowa Supreme Court Bd. ofProfi Ethics v. Jones. 606 N.W.2d 5.8 (Iowa 2000)
(lawyer who had no evidence a current client's transaction with former client was fraudulent
other than that the current client's story sounded "incredible" did not knowingly assist the
current client's fraud, but lawyer misstatements and omissions in persuading former client to
loan money to current client did constitute misrepresentation, which resulted in suspension
of the lawyer's license): In re Claussen 14 P.3d 586. 595 (Or. 2000) (lawyer who
misrepresented client's withdrawal of assets as in the ordinary course of business after legal
research gave lawyer a basis for so opining did not assist a client's fraud); In re Fink, 764
A.2d 1208. 1209. 1211 (Vt. 2000) (lawyer who incorrectly advised client that she could sign
her ex-husband's name on a car title following a divorce did not knowingly assist client
fraud).
52. The term "passively assisting." as used in this context. denotes a form of assistance
that does not directly assist or further a client's crime or fraud. but may do so indirectly.
53. However. even passive assistance. such as withholding information trom a court or
the government. may violate Model Rule 1.2. See. e.g.. People v. Casey. 948 P.2d 1014
(Colo. 1997) (forty-five day suspension for lawyer who tailed to inform court that client
facing trespassing charge was using someone else's identity); In re Price. 429 N.E.2d 961
(Ind. 1982) (lawyer withheld information from government to assist client in obtaining
Medicaid benefits illegally). But see Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm .. Op. 97-02
(1997) (lawyer's failure to give law-enforcement authorities telephone number of client
accused of crime does not amount to assisting client in committing crime).
54. In this Part. I talk specifically about whether or not the client's actions constitute
crimes as opposed to fraud. It is certainly the case that many of the client's actions would
likely be construed as fraud both in the manner of entry and the method of obtaining
employment. However, I do not think that calling the action a fraud as opposed to a crime
changes the analysis meaningfully.
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A. Hypothetical One: Client Enters with Proper Immigration Documentation
and Is Not Asked to Provide Work Authorization Papers
On one end of the spectrum, a client enters with a lawful visa, but does not
obtain proper work authorization. The employer hires the employee without
asking for papers and thereafter fails to pay the client for work performed. In
this instance, the client has not committed a crime; he entered lawfully, and
working without papers itself is not a criminal act. 55 Further, since the
employer did not ask about the client's immigration status it is unlikely that the
client's actions would be construed as fraudulent. 56 In the absence of actual
criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer's representation cannot be construed
as assisting in a crime or fraud.
B. Hypothetical Two: Client Enters Without Proper Documentation and Is Not

Asked to Provide Work Authorization Papers

Moving along the spectrum, suppose the client enters the country by
evading inspection, the employer hires the client without asking for papers and
thereafter fails to pay the client for work performed. In this example, the client

55. The employer, on the other hand. could be liable for not complying with the
employment-authorization verification mandates set forth in the 1986 Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA). See 8 U.s.c. § 1324(a)(I)(B) (2000) (cstablishing what is now
commonly known as the 1-9 requirements). Also. in the absence of immigration reform at the
national level. states have passed an unprecedented number of bills related to immigration.
See Press Release. Nan Conference of State Legislatures. Federal Gridlock on Immigration
Reform Leads States to Action (Nov. 29. 2007). available at http://www.ncsl.org!
programs/press/2007/prlI2807.htm CAs of November 16. 2007. roughly 1562 pieces of
legislation related to immigrants and immigration had been introduced among the 50 state
legislatures. Of these bills. 244 became law in 46 states .... State legislators have introduced
roughly two and a half times more bills in 2007 than in 2006. Thc number of enactments
from 2006 (84) has more than tripled to 246 in 2007.").
:Y1any of these bills create employer sanctions. See. e.g.. H.B. 2779. 48th Leg .. 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2007) (prohibiting employers from knowingly or intentionally hiring
undocumented workers and rcquiring all employers to use the Basic Pilot Program to
determine employees' legal status); H.B. 729. 105th Gen. Assem .. Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007)
(providing for administrative procedures against employers who knowingly hire illegal
immigrants. including the temporary suspension of the employer's business license): S.B.
70. 2007 Leg .. Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2007) (making it unlawful for any employer to knowingly
cmploy an unauthorized worker and requiring employers to verify a prospective employee's
legal status or authorization to work. The law also creates penalties for employing
unauthorized workers. including fines. jail sentences and revocation of business licenses).
56. There is an argument that by holding oneself out for work. the individual is
implicitly representing that she is authorized to work and if not so authorized is committing a
fraudulent act. However. given the reality that many undocumented workers are in the
workforce despite employers' knowledge of their status. and given the fact that federal law
places the burden on the employer to verify employment authorization. holding oneself out
for work does not necessarily mean that the employee is implicitly represcnting that she is
lawfully authorized to work.
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did commit a crime of entry without inspection, 57 which courts have found to
be a noncontinuing crime, complete upon entry. 58 If the client thereafter seeks
assistance in the wage-and-hour case, does 1.2(d) prohibit a lawyer from
counseling or representing the client? There is no ongoing crime or fraud; the
crime was completed upon entry and there is no crime or fraud related to the
employment because the employer did not ask for papers from the employee. 59
Thus. 1.2(d) would not prohibit a lawyer from counseling or representing a
client in this situation.
C. Hypothetical Three: Client Enters Lawfitlly but Uses a False Social Security
Number to Obtain Employment
As the crime becomes more closely connected to the employment, the
1.2(d) analysis is a bit less clear. Assume the client enters lawfully, but uses a
fraudulent Social Security number to obtain employment and the employer
thereafter fails to pay him for hours worked. Does a lawyer's representation of
the client in a wage-and-hour claim in this context assist him in criminal or
fraudulent conduct?6o
It is a crime to use a false Social Security number to obtain benefits 6l but
the crime is completed when the false representation is made. 62 Thus,

57. 8 U.s.c. § 1325 (2000).
58. United States v. Rincon-Jimenez. 595 F.2d 1192. 1194 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that
a violation of 8 U.s.C. § 1325 is consummated at the time of entering the United States and
is not considered a continuing oITense).
59. While employers in the past may not have asked for documents. given the
increasing criminalization of an employer's failure to ask for and document the immigration
status of clients. as well as stepped-up enforcement. this practice may be waning. There have
been a number of states that have passed statutes requiring an employer to obtain
immigration information on each employee. See 8 U.s.c. § 1325 (2000).
60. This example also has the potential to raise Rule II issues for the lawyer
representing the employee. Rule II of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:
[b]y presenting to the court a pleading. written motion. or other paper-whether by signing.
filing. submitting. or later advocating it-an attomey or unrepresented party certitles that to
the best of the person's knowledge. information. and belie( formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances: ... (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support
or. if specifically so identified. will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery.

FED. R. CIV. P. II(b). As part of the filing of a legal action. the lawyer may be required to
provide a social security number on court papers such as case-designation sheets. If the
lawyer provides the false social security number that the client is using. he or she could be
su~iected to sanctions under Rule II for asserting factual contentions that are not truthful.
61. 42 U.S.c. §§ 408(a)(7)(A)-(8) (Supp. V 2006). A person can be fined or
imprisoned for not more than five year or both for such otTense.
62. See United States v. Payne. 978 F.2d 1177. 1180 (lOth Cir. 1992) (finding that
using a false social security number for tax evasion purposes. with intent to deceive. was not
a continuing offense): United States v. Joseph. 765 F. Supp 326. 330 (E.D. La. 1991)
(finding that use of a false social security number on a credit application for a bank loan.
with intent to deceive. was not a continuing offense).
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representation of the client to obtain wages he is due does not directly assist
him in that completed crime. There are arguments however that the
representation indirectly assists the client to remain unlawfully in the United
States by providing financial assistance. And, while unlawful presence in the
United States is not currently a crime,63 it may amount to fraud. Is this type of
indirect assistance what Rule 1.2(d) was designed to prohibit?
Analyzing the nexus between the lawyer's actions and the client's criminal
or fraudulent activity helps to explore this question. 64 While the lawyer in this
example has not directly caused the client to remain in the United States, there
still exists a potential causal link between the representation and the presence.
How close does the connection between litigation for past due wages and the
client's unlawful presence in the United States have to be to bar the provision
of advice and representation to clients in this context? If the rule were
interpreted to prohibit anyone who committed a crime from seeking legal
services on an unrelated civil matter, the interpretation would run contrary to
deeply rooted concepts of access to justice. 65 Further, the connection between
the lawyer's actions and the client's crime in this context seems too remote to
bar representation in light of the uncertainty of both the outcome and the
consequence of a recovery. There is no guarantee that the lawyer will be
successful in her attempt to recover wages for the client and no necessary link
between the recovery of money and the client's continued unlawful presence. 66
So, while there is some factual causal proximity 67 between the lawyer's
conduct and the client's crime or fraud in this example, the link appears too
uncertain and tenuous to construe 1.2(d) as prohibiting a lawyer's advice and
representation. 68

*§

63. See H.R. 4437. 109th Congo
201. 203 (2005) (proposing to make unlawful
presenee in the United States an "aggravated felony").
64. Geoffrey C. Hazard . .If.. How Far :'vfay a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in
Legally Wrongful Conduct.? 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669. 671-72 (1981) (explaining that there
needs to be a nexus between the assistance and the actual crime or fraud for 1.2(d) to bar
attorney representation).
65. See inFa notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
66. If the 1.2(d) analysis depended upon whether the money recovered in litigation
would directly support the client to remain in the United States. lawyers would have to
inquire. prior to accepting a case. how money recovered in litigation would be used. Such an
interpretation of Rule 1.2(d) seems implausible.
67. Hazard. supra note 64. at 672 (referring to the lack of a nexus between the
lawyer's conduct and the client's criminal or fraudulent acts as a lack of "causal proximity").
68. The analysis otJered above in hypothetical three would be similar even if the client
was engaged in an ongoing crime. For example, assume a client enters the country after
having been previously deported. The client obtains employment. without presenting
documents. and thereafter seeks legal assistance to recover wages for work performed.
Similar to the hypothetical above. the lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any
proposed course of conduct with a client. As such. the lawyer would be able to advise the
client that entry and presence in the United States after a deportation order is a crime. The
question then is whether the lawyer's representation in wage-and-hour litigation assists in the
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D. Hypothetical Four: Client Enters Lawfitlly but Uses and Still Possesses
False Immigration Documents to Obtain Employment

On the far end of the continuum would be the situation in which the client
is committing an ongoing crime that is related to the employment situation.
Suppose the client enters lawfully but thereafter uses false immigration
documents to obtain employment and still possesses the documents, which is a
continuing crime. 69 The client seeks the lawyer's advice and representation to
recover damages and pursue reinstatement for a discriminatory termination. In
this hypothetical, there are several steps the lawyer might take to comply with
Rule 1.2(d). First since it could be considered an ongoing crime to possess
false immigration documents. the ethically prudent lawyer should advise the
client that possession of such documents is illegal and recommend that the
client no longer retain possession of them. 70 The lawyer could then explain to
the client that the ethical rules would not permit her to bring a claim seeking
reinstatement based on the false immigration documents. 71 If the client had
since obtained lawful immigration status, then the lawyer could proceed with
the representation, including a claim for reinstatement. If not, then she could

clicnt's criminal conduct. As described above. the analysis would depend upon how close a
connection exists between the crime of entry and presence in the United States and the
recovery of wages. While arguments exist on both sides. it is likely that the link between the
lawyer's representation and the client's ongoing crime would be too tenuous to prohibit
representation under Rule 1.2( d).
69. 18 U.s.c. ~ 1546(a) (2000): see also supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
70. Rule 1.2( d) states that "a lawyer may discuss the legal consequenccs of any
proposed course of conduct with a client and may counselor assist a client to make a good
faith effort to detenmine the validity, scope. meaning or application of the law." MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2007). Thus it is entirely permissible for the lawyer to
explain to the client the illegal nature of some conduct and to counsel that the conduct cease.
For a thoughtful discussion of when counseling can cross the line into assistance. see Pepper,
supra note 29. However. lawyers cannot counselor assist in the obstruction of justice. Model
Rule 8.4 states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: "(b) commit a criminal act
that ret1ects adversely on the la\\yer's honesty. trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects: (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud. deceit or misrepresentation; (d)
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2007): see also Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Klaas, 742
N.E.2d 612, 614 (Ohio 2001) (per curiam) (suspending lawyer for one year with six months
for telling a fonmer client to "clean up his acC based on lawyer's knowledge that the FBI
was going to initiate a drug raid).
71. In practical tenms, afterthe Supreme Court's decision in Hoflman, it would be hard
to argue for reinstatement on the merits, unless the client had lawful immigration papers. To
date. courts have approved only those requests for reinstatements that are conditioned upon
an undocumented worker's obtaining proper work authorization within a specified period of
time. See. e.g.. Sure-Tan. Inc. v. NLRB. 467 U.S. 883. 902-03 (1984) (approving the
NLRB's order that conditioned reinstatement of the injured workers upon proof of "legal
readmittance to the United States"): NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group. Inc .. 134
F.3d 50, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1997) (approving order to reinstate workers if "they present within a
reasonable time, INS Fonm 1-9 and the appropriate supporting documents").
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proceed with only the claim for damages based on the discriminatory firing on
the grounds that representation in a claim for damages would not further the
crime of possession of false immigration documents.
In addition to the application of 1.2(d) to these hypotheticals, construing
the rules of professional responsibility so as to deny lawyers the ability to
represent undocumented workers could conflict with established legal and
public policy principles. Our legal system is premised on the notion that the law
should be knowable and that law is, by nature, public information. 72 One of the
lawyer's roles is to provide clients access" to the law so long as providing access
is done within the bounds of the law. 7.) In fact, the preamble to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct talks about the lawyer'S obligation to assure
access to the legal system. 74 If Rule 1.2(d) were interpreted so broadly as to
prohibit a lawyer from representing an undocumented worker in employmentrelated civil litigation, undocumented workers might be legally entitled to relief
but unable to access the legal system.
While the legal system does recognize the integral relationship between
rights and remedies,75 having a substantive right without the ability to enforce
is not unprecedented. 76 Immunity from suit standing limitations, narrower
standards for private enforcement of civil rights. and legislation prohibiting
access to federal courts are all examples where remedies have been restricted
by the courts or Congress. 77 However. each of these limitations. whether

72. Pepper. supra note 29. at 1547.
73. Id. at 1547-48.
74. As a public citizen. a lawyer should seek improvement of the law. access to the legal
system. the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal
In addition. a lawyer should further the public's understanding of and
profession. .
confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal institutions in a
constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their
authority . . . . [A]II lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic
influence to ensure equal access to our system of justice.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 6 (2007).
75. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137. 163 (1803) (quoting 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES *23. * 109) ("[I]t is a general and indisputable rule. that where
there is a legal right. there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law. whenever that right
is invaded .... [E]very right. when withheld. must have a remedy. and every injury its proper
redress. '").
76. Donald H. Zeigler. Rights Require Remedies: A :Yew Approach to the Enforcement
of Rights in the Federal Courts. 38 HASTINGS LJ. 665. 666 (1987) (explaining that courts
have erected procedural barriers to obtaining remedies in various contexts. but. at the same
time. have supported the underlying substance of the right): see also David Rudovsky.
Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies. 2005 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1199. 1202 (identifying an ongoing debate among constitutional scholars about
whether rights and remedies are best understood as separate legal concepts or as being
"inextricably intertwined"").
77. Rudovsky. supra note 76. at 1200 ("Over the past three decades. the Supreme
Court (and in recent years. the Congress) has restricted civil rights remedies through a series
of complex and controversial measures, including expanded immunities from suit, narrower
standards for standing and for private enforcement of civil rights legislation. exceptions to
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created by the courts or Congress, has independent rationales underlying it that
do not relate to the attorney-client relationship.78 Rule 1.2(d), on the other
hand, is a rule of professional responsibility designed to keep the provision of
legal services within proper bounds. 79 As such, the examples from other areas
of law are not determinative of the rights without a remedy argument in this
context.
It could be argued that because an undocumented worker intentionally
ignores legal obligations, other remedies afforded by the legal system should be
foreclosed to that individual. Like with the equitable doctrine of unclean hands,
wrongdoers should not be able to avail themselves of legal protections when
they have otherwise disregarded the law. On the other hand, however, the legal
system is full of rights and protections, particularly procedural protections, that
apply regardless of whether the underlying litigant broke the law. For example,
prisoners are entitled to challenge the conditions of their confinements as well
as access the courts for general civil matters, such as divorce,80 and criminal
defendants are entitled to a whole host of procedural protections designed to
preserve their rights. 81 Thus, a concern about clean hands would be addressed
better by congressional action that defines or limits the substantive rights of
undocumented immigrants rather than through rules of professional
responsibility.

the exclusionary rule, limitations on remedies in criminal cases and federal habeas corpus.
and direct federal court door-closing legislation.").
78. For example. standing limitations are designed to promote separation of powers.
serve judicial efficiency. improve judicial decision making. and serve the value of fairness.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 61-62 (3d ed. 2006).
Sovereign immunity doctrine is designed to create efficiency by limiting litigation. preserve
the unhampered exercise of governmental discretion. and further separation of powers by
limiting judicial review. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY. FEDERAL JURISDICTION 611-12 (4th ed.
2003).
79. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 5-6 (stating that Rule 1.2(d) is "part of an
important constellation of rules directed at keeping the scope of legal services provided to
clients within proper bounds").
80. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817. 821-22 (1977) (finding that prisoners have a
constitutional right of access to the courts): White v. Kautzky. 494 F.3d 677. 679-80 (8th
Cir. 2007) (finding that "meaningful access" to the courts includes the ability to bring
actions "seeking new trials. release from confinement. or vindication of fundamental civil
rights" (quoting Bounds. 430 U.S. at 827»: Walbert v. Walbert. 567 N.W.2d 829.832 (N.D.
1997) (finding that denial of an incarcerated person's request to appear at a divorce hearing
by telephone deprived him of his due process right to have reasonable access to the courts).
81. For example. the Fourth Amendment contains an exclusionary rule. Weeks v.
United States. 232 U.S. 383 (1914): Boyd v. United States. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). an
expectation of privacy. Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). and a requirement of
probable cause, United States v. Harris. 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (search warrant): Henry v.
United States. 361 U.S. 98 (1959) (arrest warrant). The Fifth Amendment contains a
privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(interrogation): Hoffman v. United States. 341 U.S. 479 (1951) (trial). The Sixth
Amendment preserves the right to counsel in certain criminal cases. Gideon v. Wainwright.
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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In sum, while lawyers representing undocumented workers in employmentrelated civil litigation should be mindful of 1.2(d) prohibitions, it is unlikely
that the rule would bar a lawyer's representation of such clients. A lawyer may
have a sense of uneasiness representing an undocumented worker, but the rules
of professional responsibility do not define a lawyer's role as that of a police
officer. 82 While lawyers are prohibited from assisting a client in criminal or
fraudulent action, lawyers are not barred from representing an undocumented
worker in employment-related civil litigation for which the worker is entitled to
relief because the immigration-related crimes or fraudulent actions are most
sensibly understood as not sufficiently related to the underlying legal claim.
II. THE RELEVANCE OF IMMIGRATION STATUS TO THE UNDERLYING
LITIGATION

The question of whether to protect or disclose immigration status is a
difficult one. The legal analysis of a lawyer's ethical obligation regarding
disclosure of a client's immigration status initially depends upon whether the
information is relevant to the pending litigation. This Part examines the
development of the law on the relevance of immigration status in the context of
employment-related civil litigation. Specifically, it will explain the state of the
law prior to the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(lRCA), the import of IRCA's passage, the impact of the Supreme Court's
decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, and the development of law
post-Hoffman.
,
The question of relevance arises in two different contexts in these cases:
first in the discovery stage and second at trial as evidence is being introduced.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b), "[p ]arties may obtain
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's
claim or defense." 83 "Relevant:' in the discovery stage, is defined very
broadly84 and includes information that may not be admissible at trial but that

82. Part of the uneasiness stems from the fact that the ethical issues raised in this
Article are but a symptom of the larger underlying problem-namely. what the United States
will do about the millions of undocumented workers who contribute to our economy on a
daily basis. In the absence of meaningful immigration reform. the ethical issues raised in this
Article are timely and crucial. but they do not address the larger. unresolved. vexing problem
of meaningful immigration reform.
83. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)( I): see also Manning v. Gen. Motors. 247 F.R.D. 646. 651
(D. Kan. 2007) ("Relevancy is broadly construed. and a request for discovery should be
considered relevant if there is 'any possibility' that the information sought may be relevant
to the claim or defense of any party." (citing Owens v. Spring/United Mgmt. Co .. 221 F.R.D
649.652 (D. Kan. 2004»): Jackson v. AFSCME Local 196.246 F.R.D 410, 412 (D. Conn.
2007) ("Information that is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence is considered relevant for the purposes of discovery.").
84. The purpose of discovery is to allow a broad search for facts. the names of
witnesses. or any other matters that may aid a party in the preparation or presentation of his
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might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 85 Once at trial, the question
of what is relevant is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 401, which defines
"relevant evidence" as evidence that tends to make a fact at issue in trial more
or less probable than it would have been in the absence of the evidence. 86 The
standard of relevance is more stringent at the trial stage, and the information
allowed into evidence at trial will necessarily be more narrow than that allowed
to be explored in the discovery stage. 87
Lawyers representing undocumented immigrants in employment-related
civil litigation should be ~repared to address issues of relevance in both the
pretrial and trial stages. 8 The distinction is critical to understanding the
lawyer's ethical obligations. If the information is determined relevant to the
litigation, then it will be discoverable by, or disclosed to, the other side unless it
is privileged. 89 If it is not relevant to the litigation, then the information will be

case. See Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co .. 139 F.2d 469. 472 (2d Cir. 1943): Mahler v. Pa. R.
Co .. 8 Fed. R. Servo 33.351 (E.D.N.Y. 1945).
85. The rule reads. "Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence:'
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(I). Subsection (b) was intended to create a broad scope of examination
and allows not only for the discovery of evidence for use at trial but also inquiry into matters
that are themselves inadmissible as evidenee but that might lead to the discovery of such
evidence. FED. R. Crv. P. 26 annot.
86. FED. R. EVID. 401.
87. Dominion Exploration & Prod .. Inc. V. Waters. 972 So. 2d 350.361 (4th Cir. 2007)
eNot only may diseovery be had on any relevant matter involved in a pending action. but it
may be had of any matter even if inadmissible at trial. which is reasonably ealculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence.""): Lee V. State. 141 P.3d 342.347 (Alaska 2006)
("[D]iscovery rules are to be broadly construed and 'relevance for purposes of discovery is
broader than for purposes of trial. ... (quoting Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage. 718 P.2d
456.461 (Alaska 1986))): Catrone V. Miles. 160 P.3d 1204. 1212 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007)
C'The requirement of relevancy at the discovery stage is more loosely construed than that
required at trial. .. · (quoting Brown V. Superior Court. 670 P.2d 725.730 (Ariz. 1983))).
88. In many instances. questions of relevance will be raised at the pretrial and trial
stage through motions for protective orders or motions to compel the production of evidence.
See. e.g.. Rivera V. NIBCO. Inc .. No. CIV-F-99-6443. 2006 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 16967. at *2122 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31. 2006) (analyzing whether immigration status is relevant to the
underlying case through a motion for a protective order): Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady Farms.
Inc .. 230 F.R.D. 499. 501-02 (W.D. Mich. 2005) (deciding whether immigration status is
relevant to claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Protection Act by ruling on Plaintiffs motion for a protective order):
Cortez V. Medina's Landscaping. No. 00 C 6320. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18831. at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 30. 2002) (raising the question of relevance of immigration status through a motion
to compel discovery): De La Rosa V. N. Harvest Furniture. 210 F.R.D. 237. 238-39 (C.D. III.
2002) (raising the question of relevanee of immigration status through a motion to compel
discovery): Zeng Liu V. Donna Karan Int'1. Inc .. 207 F. Supp. 2d 191. 192-93 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (using a motion to compel discovery to ascertain the relevance of immigration status).
89. For a detailed discussion of the lavvyer's ethical obligations if immigration status is
relevant to the underlying proceedings. see inFa Part IV.
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kept confidential 90 and cannot be disclosed unless the lawyer is permitted or
mandated to do so pursuant to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 91
The law regarding the interplay between immigration status and
employment-related civil claims has evolved over time. Prior to 1986 and the
passage of the [RCA, laws governing employment remedies and those relating
to the control of immigration were largely separate. 92 Instead of regulating
undocumented labor, federal immigration laws focused on the admission,
classification, and naturalization of noncitizens. 93 In fact, seeking employment
in the United States as an undocumented worker was not il\egal,94 and most
courts interpreting the rights of undocumented workers found that they were
still entitl ed to statutory protections in the workplace. 95
In 1986, Congress passed the IRCA, which established an extensive
employment-verification system, 96 designed to deny employment to

90. The term "relevant:' as used in this Part. is limited to the definition under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) relating to discovery and Federal Rule of Evidence 401
concerning relevant evidence at trial. While the term "relevant"" sounds similar to the term
"relating to" used in Model Rule 1.6(a) to define "confidentiality of information:' the terms
have ditTerent meanings. For a detailed explanation of the difference between these terms
and the relationship between the two. see infi-a notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
91. For a detailed discussion of the lawyer's ethical obligations if immigration status is
not relevant to the underlying proceedings. see infra Part IV.
92. See Sure-Tan. Inc. v. NLRB. 467 U.S. 883. 892-94 (1984) (finding that the
immigration laws "as presently written" expressed only a "peripheral concern" with the
employment of undocumented workers) (quoting De Canas v. Bica. 424 U.S. 351. 360
(1976»): see also Linda S. Bosniak. E,clusion and ,ifembership: The Dual Identity of the
L'ndocumented Worker C'nder Cnited States Law. 1988 WIS. L REV. 955. 979 (stating that
prior to employer sanctions. immigration laws were focused on immigrants' entry and border
crossing): 110 & Chang. supra note 10. at 478-79 (explaining that prior to passage of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). immigration laws were focused on the terms and
conditions under which immigrants would be classified and admitted into the country).
93. Cf Ho & Chang. supra note 10. at 479 n.16 (noting. however. that there were other
immigration laws that were designed to regulate the labor market in discrete ways. such as
the Chinese Exclusion Act. which was designed to protect domestic workers from having to
compete with the Chinese labor market. and the Immigration Act of 1924. which contained
preferences within the quota system for those with job skills in specific sectors of the
economy).
94. Del Rey Tortilleria. Inc. v. NLRB. 976 F.2d 1115. 1124 (7th Cir. 1992) (Cudahy.
1.. dissenting) C'Once an alien has crossed the border. however. employment is not an
additional offense (in fact. it is no crime at all):').
95. See Ho & Chang. supra note 10. at 479 (referring to cases supporting protection
under Title VII. the National Labor Relations Act. the Fair Labor Standards Act. the Farm
Labor Contractor Registration Act. and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Act): Michael J. Wishnie. Prohibiting the Employment of Cnauthori::ed
Immigrants: The Experiment Fails. 2007 U, CHI. LEGAL F. 193.211 (""Before IRCA. courts
and executive-branch agencies generally enforced labor and employment laws without
regard for the immigration status of the employee:").
96. 8 U.S.c. §§ 1324(a)(l )(A)-(B) (2000). At the same time. Congress created new
provisions barring employers from discriminating against applicants or cmployees because
of their national origin or citizenship status. Jd. § I 324b(a)(l ). Despite these new provisions
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immigrants who were not lawfully present in the United States or who were not
lawfully authorized to work in the United States. 97 The statute also made it a
crime for an unauthorized immigrant to subvert the employer-verification
system by tendering fraudulent documents 98 and made it unlawful for
employers to knowingly hire undocumented workers. 99 Under lRCA, in order
to enforce these provisions, employers must complete forms verifying the
immigration status of employees. 100
Despite prohibitions on the employment of undocumented workers and
corresponding sanctions, lRCA's legislative history illustrates Congress's
intent not to diminish the protections afforded undocumented workers under
existing labor and employment statutes. 101 To do otherwise might adversely

designed to address undocumented workcrs. the legislative history clearly illustrates that
passage of this bill was in no way intended to diminish the already existing labor law
protections afforded to such workers. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682(II). at 8-9 (1986), reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757. 5758 (""[T]he committee does not intend that any provision of
this Act would limit the powers of State or Federal labor standards agencies such as the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. the Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor. the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. the National Labor
Relations Board. or Labor arbitrators. in conformity with existing law. to remedy unfair
practices committed against undocumented employees for exercising their rights before such
agencies or for engaging in activities protected by these agencies. To do otherwise would be
counter-productive of our intent to limit the hiring of undocumented employees and the
depressing effect on working conditions caused by their employment.").
97. 8 U.s.c. § 1324a(h)(3) (2000) (defining "unauthorized alien"" for the purpose of
the statute).
98. ld. § 1324c(a)(2).
99. Id. § 1324a(f)(l) (making employers who violate IRCA subject to criminal
prosecution). Despite the new provision making it criminal for employers to hire
undocumented workers. only a small percentage of arrests made in 2007 involved criminal
charges against those who hired such workers. See Spencer S. Hsu. Immigrant Crackdown
Falls Short; Despite Tough Rhetoric, Few Employers of Illegal Workers Face Criminal
Charges. WASH. POST. Dec. 25. 2007. at A3 (citing a 2007 report by the Department of
Homeland Security that found that while arrest rates had gone up to nearly four times the
previous year's level. only 2 percent of the arrests involved charges against individuals who
had hired undocumented workers-""[f]ewer than 100 owners. supervisors or hiring officials
were arrested in fiscal 2007. compared with nearly 4.900 arrests that involved illegal
workers. providers of fake documents and others, the figures show"").
100. 8 U.S.c. § 1324a(b )( I) (2000) (requiring the completion of 1-9 forms designed to
verify immigration status); see also Michael 1. Wishnie. Emerging Issues for Undocumented
Workers. 6 U. PA. 1. LAB. & EMP. L. 497. 500 (2004) (""In 1986. Congress passed the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (lRCA). which deputized private employers in the
public effort to control 'illegal immigration. "').
10 I. It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer sanctions provisions of the
bill be used to undermine or diminish in any way labor protections in existing law. or to limit
the powers of federal or state labor relations boards. labor standards agencies. or labor
arbitrators to remedy unfair practices committed against undocumented employees for
exercising their rights before such agencies or for engaging in activities protected by existing

law.
H.R. REP. No. 99-682(1). at 58 (1986). reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649. 5662.
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affect the wages and employment conditions of lawful residents.
Courts
generally followed this intent and continued to extend workplace protections to
undocumented workers. I03 Because undocumented workers were generally
protected under labor and employment statutes, the immigration status of the
worker was not relevant.
This jurisprudence remained largely consistent until 2002, when the
I04
Supreme Court decided Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRE.
The
issue before the Court was whether the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) could award back-pay to an undocumented worker harmed by the
employer's unfair labor practice. 105 In a 5-4 decision, the Court decided that,
by passing [RCA, Congress intended to bar certain legal remedies to
undocumented workers under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) if the
remedy could be construed as encouraging one to evade existing immigration
laws. 106 Specifically, the Court held that undocumented immigrant workers are
not entitled to claim back-pa6- under the NLRA in light of federal immigration
policies set forth in IRCA. I 7. The Court found that the NLRB did not have
discretion to provide a remedy that conflicted with another federal policy,
namely the immigration policy of deterring illegal immigration. 108
This decision marked another step in the evolving jurisprudence
surrounding the rights of undocumented workers. Prior to 2002, the only
Supreme Court case involving undocumented workers and labor and
employment statutes was the pre-IRCA decision in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRE. I09
[n Sure-Tan, the Court found that undocumented workers were "employees" as
defined under the NLRA but concluded that workers who "voluntarily" left the

102. Id
lO3. Sure-Tan. Inc. v. NLRB. 467 U.S. 883. 884 (1983) (holding that undocumented
workers were considered employees under the National Labor Relations Act); Rios v. Enter.
Ass'n Steamfitters Local Union 638. 860 F.2d 1168. 1172-73 (2d Cir. 1988) (permitting
undocumented workers remedies under Title VII prior to the passage of the IRCA): In re
Reyes. 814 F.2d 168. 170 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that both undocumented and documented
workers are covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Local 512. Warchouse & Ot1ice
Workers' Union v. NLRB. 795 F.2d 705. 716 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that undocumented
workers are entitled to the protections afforded under the NLRI\); Bevies Co. v. Teamsters
Local 986. 791 F.2d 1391. 1392-93 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding an arbitrator's award of backpay and reinstatement to undocumented workers prior to passage of IRCA): Donovan v.
Burgett Greenhouses. Inc .. 759 F.2d 1483. 1485-86 (10th Cir. 1985) (allowing for the
enforcement of the FLSA on behalf of undocumented workers): see also Ho & Chang. supra
note 10. at 484-85.
104. Hot1n1an Plastic Compounds. Inc. v. NLRB. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
105. Id. at 146-47.
106. Id. at 149-50.
107. Id at 151-52.
108. Id at 149.
109. Sure-Tan. Inc. v. NLRB. 467 U.S. 883. 894-96 (1984) (finding that the NLRA
was violated when undocumented workers were reported to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) as retaliation for having voted for a union).
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country were not eligible for an award of back-pay because they were not
available to work, as required by the statute. I 10 Unlike the decision in Hoffman,
the Court found that protecting undocumented workers under the NLRA would
assist in the enforcement of immigration laws. III However, the majority in
Hoffinan did not rely upon Sure-Tan in reaching its conclusion and instead
relied upon the changed "legal landscape"I 12 that came about as a result of the
passage of IRCA. 113 The Court focused its analysis of [RCA on the provisions
that prohibit employers from knowingly hiring or employing unauthorized
workers, 114 with a particular emphasis on the criminal fraud by employees who
use fraudulent documents. I IS
Since 2002, lower courts have been analyzing the scope and impact of
Hoffman as applied to other types of employment law claims. Some courts have
been asked to address the question of relevance directly, often in the pretrial
stage, 116 while other courts have been asked to address whether undocumented

110. Id. at 892-93. 903. After Sure-Tan. the circuits split on the question of eligibility
for back-pay under the NLRA tor undocumented workers who were in the U.S. after
discharge from employment. Compare HofTman Plastic Compounds. Inc. v. NLRR 237
F.3d 639 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (allowing an award of back-pay to an undocumented
worker in the U.S.). and NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group. Inc .. 134 F.3d 50. 57
(2d Cir. 1997) (allowing an award of back-pay to an undocumented worker where employer
was aware of worker's status). and EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel. 881 F.2d 1504. 1517 (9th Cir.
1989) (reasoning that the District Court did not err in finding that plaintiffs in a Title VII
case were entitled to an award of back-pay). and Rios v. Enter. Ass'n Steamfitters Local
Union 638. 860 F.2d 1168. 1173 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that plaintiffs in a Title VII case.
who have remained in the country. arc eligible for back-pay as of thc time of the violation).
and Local 512. Warehouse & Office Workers' Union v. NLRB. 795 F.2d 705. 719 (9th Cir.
1986) (finding that undocumented workers who are in thc U.S. remain eligible for back-pay).
and Bevies Co. v. Teamsters Local 986. 791 F.2d 1391. 1393 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that an
arbitrator's decision granting reinstatement and back-pay to undocumented workers was not
reviewable because it was not in manifest disregard of the law). with Del Rey Tortilleria Inc.
v. NLRB. 976 F.2d IllS. IllS (7th Cir. 1992) (finding undocumented workers who remain
in the country are ineligible for back-pay).
I I 1. Sure-Tan. 467 U.S. at 893-94 ('"If an employer realizes that there will be no
advantage under the NLRA in preferring illegal aliens to legal resident workers. any
incentive to hire such illegal aliens is correspondingly lessened. In turn. if the demand for
undocumented aliens declines. there may then be fewer incentives for aliens themselves to
enter in violation of the federal immigration laws.").
112. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147.
113. Id. at 147-48.
114. Id. at 148.
115. Id.: see Wishnie. supra note 100. at 506-07 (asserting that the majority's focus
was on the use of fraudulent documents by workers. as evidenced by "its repeated invocation
of the fraudulent document provisions of immigration law. but also in its attempt to align its
holding with prior decisions denying reinstatement or back-pay ·to employees found guilty
of serious illegal conduct in connection with their employment' and who 'had committed
serious criminal acts'" (citing Hoffman. 535 U.S. at 148».
116. See, e.g.. Rivera v. NIBCO. Inc., No. CIV-F-99-6443. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16967 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2006): Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady Farms. Inc .. 230 F.R.D. 499. SOl
(W.O. Mich. 2005): Garcia-Andrade v. Madra's Cafc Corp .. No. 04-71024. 2005 U.S. Dist.
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workers are entitled to certain legal relief l17 or even have standing to bring
lawsuits. 118 In those cases where courts are deciding the relevance of
immigration status to the underlying litigation, courts have consistently
analyzed three factors: the type of relief requested by the plaintiff; 119 the nature
of the underlying substantive claims; 120 and how prejudicial the court views
the disclosure when compared to the probative value, if any.121 Courts have

LEXIS 22122 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 3. 2005): Colindres v. Quiettlex Mfg .. No. H-01-4319. 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27982 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19.2004): Cortez v. Medina's Landscaping, No. 00
C 6320. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18831 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30. 2002): Flores v. Amigon. 233 F.
Supp. 2d 462 (E.D.N.Y. 2002): De La Rosa v. N. Harvest Furniture. 210 F.R.D. 237 (C.D.
Ill. 2002): Zeng Lui v. Donna Karan Int'l. Inc .. 207 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2002): Pontes
v. New Eng. Power Co .. No. 03-00160A. 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 340 (Mass. Dist. Ct.
Aug. 17. 2004): Cabrera v. Ekema. 695 N.W.2d 78 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005): Llerena v. 302
W. 12th St. Condo .. No. 102490/03.2004 WL 2793176 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 7.2004): AsgarAli v. Hilton Hotels Corp .. 798 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. CL 2004).
117. See inFa notes 130-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether or not
undocumented workers are entitled to various substantive rights.
118. See, e.g.. Martinez v. Mecca Farms. Inc .. 213 F.R.D. 60 l. 604-05 (S.D. Fla. 2002)
(finding that undocumented farm workers are not precluded from having standing to sue
under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act).
119. See, e.g.. Rivera v. NIBCO. Inc .. 384 F.3d 822. 825-26 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding
that immigration status is relevant to back-pay and front-pay damages under Hoffman):
Flores v. Limehouse. No. 2:04-1295-CWH. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30433. at *6-7 (D.S.C.
May II. 2006) (finding that IRCA does not prohibit undocumented aliens from bringing a
claim under RICO): Trejo v. Broadway Plaza Hotel. No. 04 Civ. 4005. 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17133. at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16.2005) (concluding that immigration status is not
relevant because not seeking back-pay): De La Rosa. 210 F.R.D. at 239 (finding that
immigration status is not relevant to back-pay because back-pay would only the period
between termination and reinstatement): Pontes v. New Eng. Power Co .. 18 Mass. L. Rep.
183. 2004 WL 2075458. at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 19. 2004) (finding that immigration
status is not relevant to a claim for impaired earning capacity based upon a work injury
because the analysis does not implicate what the plaintiff previously did or what job the
plaintiff intends to do in the future).
120. See, e.g., Galaviz-Zamora. 230 F.R.D. at 502 (finding that immigration status is
not relevant to damages for unpaid wages. nor to standing. class certification. or credibility):
Corte:::. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18831. at *2 (finding that immigration status does not bar
recovery of unpaid wages): Amigon. 233 F. Supp. 2d at 464 (determining that immigration
status does not preclude a claim for unpaid wages and overtime under the Fair Labor
Standards Act): Lill. 207 F. Supp. 2d at 192-93 (denying defendant's request to discover
plaintiffs immigration status in a claim for back-pay): Llerena. 2004 WL 2793176, at *1-2
(finding that immigration status is not relevant to a case involving tort and state labor law
violations).
12l. See, e.g.. Galavi:::-Zamora. 230 F.R.D. a1502 (finding that the prejudicial impact
of disclosure far outweighs its probative value): Ponce v. Tim's Time. Inc .. No. 03 C 6123.
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20263 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14.2005) (finding that even though there was
evidence that plaintiff made false statements to hide immigration status that may have been
relevant for impeaching or attacking credibility. the potential prejudice to plaintiff
outweighed the possible probative value): Garcia-Andrade. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22122. at
*6 (finding plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment rights bar defendants from requiring documentation
of plaintiffs' immigration statuses): Amigon. 233 F. Supp. 2d at 464-65 (finding that the
potential for prejudice by allowing the disclosure of immigration status far outweighs its
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overwhelmingly decided to prohibit the disclosure of immigration status in the
context of employment-related civil litigation, often citing the highly
prejudicial impact of the disclosure compared to its relatively small probative
value. 122
In those cases where courts address the rights of undocumented workers to
pursue certain civil remedies, there are many other variables. However, in
separating the cases by subject matter, some underlying trends can be
identified. Cases that involve claims for unpaid wages typically find that
undocumented workers are entitled to recover an award for work performed. 123
For cases involving the availability of damages under the FLSA or the NLRA,
courts typically find that status is not relevant to liability, though it may be
relevant to the damages portion of the case. 124 Cases involving claims for lost
wages due to an injury, on the other hand, make a few distinctions. Many cases
find that an undocumented worker is entitled to lost wages but find that
immigration status is relevant to the amount of wages that can be recovered. 125
Other courts, relying on the argument that there is no federal preemption, find
that undocumented workers can recover lost wages they would have earned. 126

minimal probative value): Liu. 207 F. Supp. 2d at 192-93 (stating that the risk of injury to the
plaintiff of the disclosure outwcighs thc need for disclosure): Pontes. 2004 WL 2075458. at
*3.
122. See. e.g.. Rivcra v. NIBCO. Inc .. 364 F.3d 1057. 1064 (9th Cir. 2004)
(concluding that immigration status does not have to be disclosed because of the substantial
and particularized harm of the discovery-namely. the chilling ctTeet that disclosure can
have on the ability to enforce rights): EEOC v. City of Joliet. 239 F.R.D. 490. 492-93 (N.D.
III. 2006) (eoncluding that the potential damages that could result from disclosure of
immigration status. namely the chill on plaintiffs' enforcement of their Title VII rights. far
outweigh any minimal legitimate probative value): EEOC v. First Wircless Group, Inc .. 225
F.R.D. 404. 406 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (prohibiting the disclosure of immigration status based on
a finding that the unacceptable burden on the public interest that would result from deterring
plaintiffs from seeking relief outweighs the potential relevance).
123. See, e.g.. Chell en v. John Pickle Co .. 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Okla. 2006):
Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc .. 393 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J. 2005): Martinez v. Mecca
Farms. Inc., 213 F.R.D. 601 (S.D. Fla. 2002): Gomez v. Falco. 792 N.Y.S.2d 769 (App. Div.
2004).
124. See. e.g.. Renteria v. Italia Foods. Inc .. No. 02 C 495. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14698. at * 19-20 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21. 2003) (finding plaintiffs not entitled to back-pay under
FLSA for retaliatory discharge because this would contravene the policies embodied in
IRCA. but they are entitled to compensatory damages): In re Tuv Taam Corp .. 340 N.L.R.B.
756. 759-60 (2003) (granting back-pay conditionally and leaving for the compliance stage a
determination of whether any of the discriminatees were lawfully entitled to be present and
employed in the United States).
125. Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found .. Inc .. 315 F. Supp. 2d 504. 506-08 (S.D.N.Y.
2004): Echeverria v. Lindner. No. 018666/2002. 2005 WL 1083704. at *12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 2. 2005): Celi v. 42d St. Dev. Project. Inc .. No. 37491101, 2004 WL 2812902. at *3.
2004 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 9. 2004): Cano v. Mallory Mgmt.. 760 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sup. Ct.
2003).
126. See, e.g.. Balbuena v. !DR Realty LLC. 845 N.E.2d 1246. 1259-60 (N.Y.2006):
Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp .. 802 N.Y.S.2d 56. 66 (App. Div. 2005): Tyson
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Several other cases distinguish. between U.S. and home country earnings if the
plaintiff is undocumented. 127 Various courts have addressed the impact of
undocumented status on Title VII claims post-Hoffman. A couple of courts
have questioned the applicability of Hoffinan to the Title VII context
altogether,128 while others found that while Hoffman may limit the back-pa~
remedy, it does not foreclose other remedies available under Title VII. 12
Another case found that once an undocumented worker obtains legal status she
may be eligible for all remedies except back-pay for the period of time she was
undocumented. 130 Worker compensation cases consistently find that
undocumented workers are eligible for benefits because there is no federal
preemption. 131 A couple of cases limit the type of worker compensation

Foods. Inc. v. Guzman. 116 S.W.3d 233. 244 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003). But see Veliz v. Rental
Servo Corp. USA. Inc .. 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317. 1335-36 (D. Fla. 2003) (finding that
undocumented status precludes an award of lost U.S. wages).
127. Hernandez-Cortez V. Hernandez. No. 01-1241-lTM. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19780. at * 19 (D. Kan. Nov. 4. 2003) (finding that an undocumented alien can only recover
money based on country of origin wages): Rosa V. Partners in Progress. Inc .. 868 A.2d 994.
1000 (N.H. 2005) (holding that if defendant knew or should have known that plaintiff was
undocumented then the undocumented worker can recover U.S. wages. but if the defendant
did not know or had no reason to know then the undocumented worker can only recover
damages based upon country of origin wages); JaIlO\\ V. Kew Gardens Hills Apts. Owners.
803 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup. Ct. 2005): Sanango V. 200 E. 16th St. Hous. Corp .. 788 N.Y.S.2d
314.321 (App. Div. 2004). overruled by Balbuena. 812 N.Y.S.2d 416.
128. Rivera V. NIBCO. Inc .. 364 F.3d 1057. 1066-70 (9th Cir. 2004) (suggesting that
Hoffman may not apply in the Title VII context because of the differences between Title VII
and the NLRA): De La Rosa v. N. Harvest Furniture. 210 F.R.D. 237. 239 (C.D. Ill. 2002)
(noting that Hoffman was not dispositive in addressing the question of whether
undocumented workers are entitled to back-pay under Title VII).
129. Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv .. 281 F. Supp. 2d 895. 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003)
(suggesting that Hoffman precludes undocumented workers from receiving back-pay under
Title VII. but does not foreclose other remedies available to plaintiffs): see also Nancy
Montwieler. EEOC: EEOC Limits Undocumented Workers' Relief Based on Recent Supreme
Court Decision. 126 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA). at A2 (July L 2002) (,,[T]he Hoffman decision
in no way calls into question the settled principle that undocumented workers are covered by
the federal employment discrimination statutes .... "). But see Morejon V. Terry Hinge &
Hardware. No. B 162878. 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10394. at *23-25 (Cal. Ct. App.
Nov. 4. 2003) (finding plaintiff barred from bringing discrimination claim because of
unclean hands doctrine for use of false documents): Crespo V. Evergo Corp .. 841 A.2d 471.
476-77 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (barring undocumented worker from economic and
noneconomic damages in state anti-discrimination action because of status).
130. Escobar. 281 F. Supp. 2d at 897.
131. See, e.g.. Safeharbor Employer Servo I. Inc. v. Velazquez. 860 So. 2d 984. 986
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (finding plaintiff is not barred from workers' compensation
because of undocumented status as there is no federal preemption): Earth First Grading V.
Gutierrez. 606 S.E.2d 332. 334 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (finding plaintiff entitled to workers'
compensation benefits as federal law does not preempt award): Cont'! PET Techs. V.
Palacias. 604 S.E.2d 627. 631 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (finding plaintiff entitled to workers'
compensation because no federal preemption); Wet Walls. Inc. V. Ledezma 598 S.E.2d 60.
63 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (finding plaintiff entitled to workers' compensation because no
federal preemption): Correa v. Waymouth Farms. Inc .. 664 N.W.2d 324. 329-30 (Minn.
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benefits that an undocumented worker is entitled to receive. 132 The holdings of
these cases in tum determine whether or not status is relevant to the underlying
action.
The current jurisprudential framework provides no clear answer to the
question of whether immigration status is relevant to the underlying
proceeding. However. the trends outlined above provide some guidance as to
the factors often considered.
III. BALANC]"IG CONFlDENTlALITY AND DISCLOSURE OBLIGATlONS

Once a determination is made that representation is permissible, lawyers
will have to grapple with the decision of whether to protect or disclose
immigration status. This analysis hinges upon a determination as to whether
immigration status is relevant to the underlying civil action. If immigration
status is relevant to the underlying litigation, the information will be
discoverable unless the client is entitled to claim a privilege. If, on the other
hand, immigration status is not relevant to the underlying litigation, the
information will remain confidential 133 unless the lawyer is mandated or
chooses to disclose it. This Part will explore the balancing of these obligations
when immigration status is relevant and irrelevant to the underlying claims.
A. Immigration Status Determined Relevant to Underlying Litigation
If immigration status is determined to be relevant to the underlying
litigation, then the information generally will be discoverable in the pretrial
stage pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b) 134 and admissible at

2003) (finding IRCA does not preempt undocumented workers from receiving state workers'
compensation benefits).
132. See, e.g.. De Jesus Uribe v. Aviles. No. B166839. 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
9698. at *12-13 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 26. 2(04) (finding undocumented workers may not be
eligible for vocational rehabilitation benefits but that plaintiff was entitled to workers'
compensation regardless of his immigration status): Cherokee Indus .. Inc. v. Alvarez. 84
P.3d 798. 801 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003) (finding that status alone does not deprive an alien
from all worker compensation benefits. but claimant may not be eligible for vocational
rehabilitation or medical treatment by a specific doctor).
133. It is important to note that infonnation not relating to the representation is not
considered confidential. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007). However. the
tenns "relevant" to the litigation and "relating" to the representation are distinct. with
"relating to the representation" being broader. Because of this. infonnation can be related to
the representation and thus confidential. but not relevant to the underlying litigation. For a
detailed explanation of the difference. see infi'a notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
134. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(I) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense-including the
existence. description. nature. custody. condition. and location of any documents or other
tangible things and the identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable
matter .... ").
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135
One way in which
the trial stage pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 401.
immigration status could be protected from discovery and precluded from
admission into evidence is through a claim of privilege. 136 In this context, the
most likely claim of privilege would be a client's claim of privilege against
self-incrimination. 137
The privilege against self-incrimination is found in the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and can be claimed in criminal and civil
proceedings, whether formal or informal, including administrative, judicial,
138
investigatory; or adjudicatory proceedings.
The privilege is invoked by an
individual 1-,9
in instances where providing a response might be
incriminatory. 140 Generally, the privilege may be used whenever information,
sufficiently relevant to civil liability to be discoverable, provides even a clue
that might point a government investigator toward evidence of criminal
conduct. 141 In fact, courts have recognized a claim of privilege based solely on
an assertion that the evidence would provide a "link in the chain" of
.
147
prosecutIOn. Individuals can invoke the privilege in response to a question presented on
the witness stand,143 but may also invoke the privilege at many stages in civil

135. FED. R. EVlD. 401 (defining relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action

more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence"). Of course at trial
there can bc many different things that bar the admission of evidence. but it must. at a
minimum. be relevant to the proceedings in order to be admissible.
136. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter. Fear of DiscovelY: Immigrant Workers and the
Fifth Amendment. 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 27. 59 (2008).
137. The privilege against self-incrimination derives from the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution. U.S. CaNsT. amend. V.
138. Kastigar v. United States. 406 U.S. 441. 444 (1972): see also United States v.
U.S. Coin & Currency. 401 U.S. 715. 718 (1971) (civil forfeiture proceedings): In re Gault,
387 U.S. I. 49 (1967) (delinquency proceedings); Bigby v. U.S. Immigration &
Naturalization Sen .. 21 F.3d 1059.1060-61 (11th Cir. 1994) (dcportation proceedings);
Gonzales v. McEuen. 435 F. Supp. 460. 470 (CD. Cal. 1977) (school disciplinary
proceedings ).
139. But. as in the criminal context. the privilege can only be asserted by individuals.
not by corporations. Fisher v. United States. 425 U.S. 391. 424-26 (1976): Hale v. Henkel.
201 U.S. 43. 69-70(1906).
140. Heidt. supra note 19. at 1065.
141. Id.: see also Martin I. Kaminsky. Preventing L'nfair L'se of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in Private Civil Litigation: A Critical AnaZvsis. 39 BROOK. L. REV. 121.
122 (1972): Marjorie S. White. Plaintiff as Deponent: Invoking the Fijih Amendment. 48 U.
CHI. L. REV. 158. 160 (1981).
142. Hoffman v. United States. 341 U.S. 479. 486 (1951). The privilege may be used
even if the invokers realize that they \\ould not likely be prosecuted for the conduct they
would be forced to reveal. United States v. Johnson. 488 F.2d 1206. 1209 ( 1st Cir. 1973):
United States v. Miranti. 253 F.2d 135.139 (2d Cir. 1958).
143. Capitol Prod. Corp. v. Hernon. 457 F.2d 541. 542 (8th Cir. 1972).
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cases, including responses to discovery requests. 144 The privilege must be
invoked in response to a specific question or request for discovery and allows
individuals to refuse to: submit answers to allegations in the comBlaint; 145
respond to interrogatories; 146 respond to requests for admissions; I 7 answer
questions at depositions; 148 or respond to requests to produce documents. 149
Both the employer and employee in an employment-related civil case
brought by an undocumented worker might have reason to claim the Fifth
Amendment privilege. For the employee, since it is unlawful to enter the
country without inspection, to present false documents upon entry, or to use
false documents to obtain employment, information sought through discovery
or questions asked at trial could lead to criminal liability. Under IRCA,
employers can be criminally liable for knowingly hiring undocumented
workers. ISO An employee could engage in discovery regarding the employer's
general practice of employee verification and the specifics of other employee
immigrant workers, the answers to which could lead to criminalliability.I5I

144. See. e.g.. SEC v. Thomas. 116 F.R.D. 230. 231-34 (D. Utah 1987): United States
v. Second Nat"! Bank of Nashua N.H .. 48 F.R.D. 268.271 (D.N.H. 1969).
145. De Antonio v. Solomon, 42 F.R.D. 320. 322 (D. Mass. 1967).
146. Gordon v. FDIC. 427 F.2d 578.580 (D.C. Cir. 1970): Backos v. United States. 82
F.R.D. 743. 744 (E.D. Mich. 1979): United States v. 47 Bottles. More or Less. Each
Containing 30 Capsules of Jenasol R.J. Formula '60: 26 F.R.D. 4. 5-6 (D.N.J. 1960): Paul
Harrigan & Sons. Inc. Y. Enter. Animal Oil Co .. 14 F.R.D. 333. 335 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
147. Gordon. 427 F.2d at 580-81: FDIC v. Logsdon. 18 F.R.D. 57. 58 (W.O. Ky.
1955): United States v. Fishman, 15 F.R.D. 151. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1953): Mayo v. Ford, 184
A.2d 38 (D.C. 1962): Simkins v. Simkins. 219 So. 2d 724. 725-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
148. Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys .. 608 F.2d 1084, 1084-87 (5th Cir. 1979). reh 'g
denied. 611 F.2d 1026(5th Cif. 1980): In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig.. 609 F.2d 867.
869-73 (7th Cif. 1979): In re Master Key Litig .. 507 F.2d 292. 292-94 (9th Cif. 1974): Justice
v. Laudermilch, 78 F.R.D. 201. 202-03 (M.D. Pa. 1978): In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig.. 347 F.
Supp. 1347. 1348 (E.D. Pa. 1972): Alioto v. Holtzman. 320 F. Supp. 256. 257 (E.D. Wis.
1970): Duffy v. Currier. 291 F. Supp. 810. 812. 814 (D. Minn. 1968): De Antonio Y.
Solomon. 41 F.R.D. 447. 449 (D. Ma~s. 1966): Lowe's of Roanoke. Inc. v. Jefferson
Standard Life Ins. Co .. 219 F. Supp. 181. 183-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1963): Nat'l Discount Corp. v.
Holzbaugh. 13 F.R.D. 236. 237 (E.D. Mich. 1952).
149. Henry v. Sneiders. 490 F.2d 315. 316-17(9th Cif. 1974). cert. denied. 419 U.S.
832 (1974): In re Turner. 309 F.2d 69. 70(2d Cif. 1962): De Antonio v. Solomon. 42 F.R.D.
320.321,323 (D. Mass. 1967).
150. 8 U.s.c. § I 324a(a)(l )(A) (Supp. V 2006) (making it illegal to knowingly hire an
illegal alien): see also id. § 1324a(a)(2) (stating an employer is criminally liable for
continuing employment of an illegal alien). IRCA includes an extensive employee
verification system designed to deny employment to undocumented workers. Id. §
1324a(b)( I). As part of the verification process. employers are required to complete forms
for each employee. Id. § 1324a(b)( I).
151. Eric Schnapper. Righting Wrongs Against Immigrant Workers. 39 TRIAL 46. 54
(2003) (explaining that if the employer asserted a defense under Hoffinan Plastic
Compounds. an employee "would be entitled to engage in discovery regarding the
employer's prior knowledge of his or her immigration status. Proof of an employer's general
practices and knowledge regarding other immigrant workers would also be relevant
evidence").
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What is the consequence of claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination?152 For many years, there was no consequence, as
the Supreme Court found it impermissible to burden the asserter of the
privilege in the civil context. 153 However, this changed in 1976 with the
Supreme Court's decision in Baxter v. Palmigiano, in which the Court
permitted a negative inference to be drawn from an individual's refusal to
testify. 154 Currently, courts have discretion to dismiss the action in its
entirety, 155 but this discretion is not unlimited and dismissal is not
automatic. 156 The court has to balance any prejudice to other civil litigants
against the potential harm to the party claiming the privilege if compelled to
choose between a civil action and protecting against prosecution. The balance
must be weighed to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege and should be
upheld unless defendants have substantial need for particular information and
there is no other less burdensome and effective means of obtaining it. 157 In
addition to dismissing the entire action, courts can dismiss certain claims,

Issues also might be raised under Rule II of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the
employer claims. as a defense. that the employee is undocumented. Under Rule I I. the
lawyer for the employer can only raise this defense if the assertion is based upon
"knowledge. information. and belicf." FED. R. CIV. P. II(b). There are instances where this
assertion could be in direct conf1ict to the employer's representation on the 1-9 form that .. to
the best of his/her knowledge" the plaintilT was not an undocumented alien. See Schnapper.
supra. at 54.
152. This discussion proceeds upon the assumption that the Fifth Amendment
privilege was not effectively resisted. In order to resist the assertion of the privilege, the
challenger must show that the response would not incriminate or the crime for which the
invoker's response incriminates is barred by the attachment of jeopardy. the running of the
statute of limitations. or past grants of immunity. See Heidt. supra note 19. at 1071-80
(detailing each of the ways in which an opponent can resist the invocation of the privilege).
153. See. e.g.. Lefkowitz v. Turley. 414 U.S. 70. 71-74. 83 (1973) (canceling of
government contracts): Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation. 392 U.S.
280. 282. 284-85 (1968) (government employment): Spevack v. Klein. 385 U.S. 51 L 514
(1967) (attorney discipline): Garrity v. New Jersey. 385 U.S. 493. 494-98 (1967) (police
employment).
154. 425 U.S. 308. 316 (1976): see also Hasbro. Inc. v. Serafino. 958 F. Supp. 19.2425 (D. Mass. 1997) (adverse inferences may be drawn from defendant's assertion of Fifth
Amendment privilege where there is other probative evidence in civil RICO suit): United
States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Fam .. 683 F. Supp. 141 L 1444 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
(adverse inference may be drawn from assertion of privilege in civil cases). But see Avirgan
v. Hull. 932 F.2d 1572. 1580 (11th Cif. 1991). cert. denied. 502 U.S. 1048 (1992)
(invocation of privilege does not give rise to inference sufficient to avoid summary
jUdgment).
155. See Hiley v. United States. 807 F.2d 623. 628 (7th Cif. 1986): Mount Vernon
Say. & Loan Ass'n y. Partridge Assoc .. 679 F. Supp. 522. 529 (D. Md. 1987): Stop & Shop
Co. y. Interstatc Cigar Co .. 110 F.R.D. 105. 108 (D. Mass. 1986).
156. Wansong v. Wansong. 478 N.E.2d 1270. 1272 (Mass. 1985).
157. SEC v. Graystone Nash. Inc .. 25 F.3d 187. 192 (3d Cif. 1994): United States v.
Parcels of Land. 903 F.2d 36. 44-45 (I st Cif. 1990): Black Panther Party y. Smith, 661 F.2d
1243. 1266 (D.C. Cif. 1981): Wehling v. CBS. 608 F.2d 1084. 1088 (5th Cif. 1980).
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postpone or stay proceedings until the criminal statute of limitations runs, or
preclude the use of certain evidence,
Given this discretion, it is difficult to predict the precise consequence of an
undocumented worker claiming the privilege,158 However, lawyers should
advise clients that pleading the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination might result in the dismissal of the action, or that certain claims
or evidence might be barred in the process of litigation, Ultimately, once
informed of the consequences, this is a decision for the client to make,159
One other possible privilege that could be raised in this scenario is the
attorney-client privilege, 160 The privilege is applicable only: in a fonnal legal
proceeding; in response to an attempt to compel testimony in the discovery or
trial stage; and if what is being compelled is testimony about infonnation
passing between lawyer and client. 161 The privilege will only protect otherwise
relevant infonnation from discovery when the opposin party asks the client
what she told her la\\'Yer about her immigration status, 16_ or the opposing party

9

158. Clients might be concerned that if they claim their Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination the employer will make assumptions about their status and report
them to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE). While this risk does
exist. employers also face the risk of incriminating themselves if they knew, or should have
known, that the employee lacked proper work authorization, See Schnapper. supra note 151.
at 54.
159. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a) states, "a lawyer shall abide by a
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4,
shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued:' MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007). Objectives are defined as those decisions that directly
affect the ultimate resolution of the case or the substantive rights of the client. See
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 30-31 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES]' The claim of a client's privilege against self-incrimination
afforded by the Fifth Amendment could impact the ultimate resolution of the case and affect
the client's substantive rights.
160. Dean Wigmore's classic statement of the privilege. as reformulated in a modern
legal ethics text. contains eight elements: I) where legal advice is sought: 2) from a
professional legal advisor in his capacity as such; 3) the communications relating to that
purpose: 4) made in confidence: 5) by the client 6) are at the client's instance permanently
protected: 7) from disclosure by himself or the lawyer: 8) except if the privilege is waived.
See GEOFFREY HAZARD. SUSAN KONIAK & ROGER CRAMTON. THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
LAWYERING 206 (3d ed. 1999). Compare Restatement section 68. which permits invocation
of the privilege where: "I. a communication: 2. [is] made between privileged persons: 3. in
confidence: 4. for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000).
161. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24. at 9-28.
162. As stated by Professors H.azard and Hodes. "[n]eilher the traditional nor the
modern formulation of the privilege directly protects against compelled disclosure the
substance of the underlying confidential communication: only the content of the
communication between client and lawyer is protected. Thus a client may be compelled to
testify about the underlying facts of an occurrence or transaction (unless able to refuse under
the Fifth Amendment. for example). but not whether those facts were related to the client's
lawyer." ld. at 9-26. This distinction between the communication and the facts underlying
the communication has long been established in the law. See Upjohn Co. v. United States,
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asks the lawyer directly. 163 In most instances. lawyers for the opposing party
will simply ask the client directly where they are from. whether or not they are
documented. and how they entered the United States. Thus. the attorney-client
privilege is unlikely to be invoked in this context to protect against disclosure.
If it were detennined to be applicable, there is one exception that bears
mention, the crime/fraud exception. Under this exception, the attorney-client
privilege does not protect communications in furtherance of a crime or
fraud. 164 In ascertaining the applicability of the exception, a distinction is made
between communications made in the course or furtherance of fraud, which are
not protected, and communications about a fraud after its completion, which
are protected. 165 In the context of an undocumented worker who seeks a lawyer
to help on an employment-related civil claim. the exception would be
inapplicable in most instances because the client would be seeking legal advice
after the completion of the crime or fraud. 166
In sum, if immigration status is relevant to the underlying proceedings, the
information will likely be discoverable and admissible at trial unless the client
claims a privilege. The most likely applicable privilege would be the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, while the attorney-client
privilege might be applicable in very limited instances. Clients should be
advised of the consequences of claiming a privilege and lawyers should then
proceed based upon their informed decision. If, on the other hand, immigration
status is not relevant to the underlying proceeding. the lawyer's ethical
obligations are much different.

B. Immigration Status Determined Not Relevant to Underlying Litigation
If immigration status is not relevant to the underlying proceedings, there
can be a tension between the protection afforded confidential information and
specific instances where a lawyer may be mandated to disclose otherwise
confidential information under the rules. The initial question is whether the
immigration status of an undocumented worker seeking employment-related

449 U.S. 383. 386. 395 (1981).
163. A la'wyer must assert the attorney-client privilege whenever it is not frivolous to
do so. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof'! Responsibility. Formal Op. 94-385
(1994). Once a court rules that the privilege does not apply and subsequently orders
disclosure. a lawyer is relieved of her ethical duty to claim the privilege. Once the ethical
constraint is lifted. disclosure becomes mandatory under Rule 1.6(b)(6). HAZARD & HODES.
supra note 24. at 9-33.
164. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 (2000).
165. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 9-41 to 9-42.
166. For a more detailed discussion of whether or not a lawyer is assisting the client in
a crime or fraud by representing them in an employment-related civil case as well as whether
any of these offenses constitute "continuing crimes,"' see supra Part II.
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civil assistance is confidential. 167 If the information is confidential, a lavvyer
must keep it confidential unless disclosure is mandated or permitted. There are
two rules that involve the lawyer's obli~ation to disclose information if the
client is engaged in a crime or fraud. 1 8 Rule 3.3(b) addresses a lavvyer's
obligation to disclose facts to the tribunal, while Rule 4.1 (b) addresses a
lawyer's obligation to disclose facts to a third party. This Part will initially
discuss the confidentiality provisions under Rule 1.6, then explain the
parameters of Rules 3.3(b) and 4.1(b) respectively, and, finally, examine how
lawyers balance confidentiality mandates with potential disclosure obligations
when representing an undocumented worker in employment-related litigation.
Pursuant to Rule 1.6, all information "relating to the representation,"
whether it comes from the client or another source, is confidential. 169 Even
information not itself protected, but that may lead to discove7c of protected
information by a third person, is included in the definition. 1 0 Rule 1.6(a)
creates a presumption of confidentiality that operates without the necessity of a
client request and includes information in the public domain. 171

167. See inFa notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
168. Rules 4.I(b) and 3.3(b) each involve a balancing of various interests. Rule 4.I(b)
involves the balance between two important values in the law of lawyering: maintaining
confidentiality of client information and ensuring that lawyers represent client interests only
within the bounds of the law and do not become participants in wrongdoing. MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.I(b) (2007). Rule 3.3(b) is a balance between duties to the client
and duties to the tribunal. Based on the language and interpretation of Rule 3.3(b). where
there is a danger that the tribunal will be misled, a lawyer may be required to forsake his
client's immediate and narrow interests in favor of the interest of the administration of
justice. Id. R. 3.3(b).
169. Id. R. 1.6 cm!. 3.
170. Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 4.
171. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 9-60. For a critique of the inclusion of
information in the public domain under the definition of contldentiality. see Allan W. Vestal.
Former Client Censorship a/Academic Scholarship. 43 SYRACUSF L. REV. 1247. 1247-48
(1992) (describing a former client who threatened to report the author to the disciplinary
authorities for publishing an article that contained public information about a case). For
cases involving the disclosure of infonnation generally known. see. for example. In re
Anonymous. 654 N.E.2d 1128. 1129 (Ind. 1995) (finding that lawyer violated Rule 1.6 by
disclosing information relating to representation of client. even though information "was
readily available from public sources and not confidential in nature"): Lawyer Disciplinary
Bd. v. McGraw. 461 S.E.2d 850.851 (W. Va. 1995) ("The ethical duty of contidentiality is
not nullified by the fact that the information is part of a public record or by the fact that
someone else is privy to it."): State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof! Conduct. Op.
2000-1 I (2000) ("[T]he lawyer is required to maintain the confidentiality of information
relating to representation even if the information is a matter of public record."). But cf In re
Sellers. 669 So. 2d 1204. 1206 (La. 1996) (tinding that lawyer violated Rule 4.1 by failing to
disclose existence of collateral mortgage to third party because "mortgage was filed in the
public record. disclosure of its existence could not be a contldential communication. and was
not prohibited by Rule 1.6"): In re Detention of Williams. 22 P.3d 283. 286 (Wash. Ct. App.
200 I) (stating that the fact that client gave social security records to lawyer did not render
such documents "confidential" under Rule 1.6 and therefore "undiscoverable"). To contrast
the public domain inclusion. see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §

Addendum 5 -038

392

STANFORD LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 61 :355

While this appears to be straightforward, the tenn "relating to the
representation:' as used in 1.6(a), raises interesting questions because this
analysis assumes that immigration status is not "relevant" to the litigation.
Thus, in order to fully understand the lawyer's confidentiality obligations, the
distinction between "relating to the representation" and "relevant to the
litigation" needs to be explored.
In this context, the two tenns are quite distinct and, based upon both the
plain meaning of the terms as well as how they are applied in this context,
"relating to the representation" should be construed as much broader than
"relevant to the litigation." In terms of the plain meaning, the representation of
a client entails all of the work that a lawyer does on behalf of a client to achieve
their identified goals, whereas litigation refers only to the scope of the action
that was filed in court. Thus, issues relating to the representation will inevitably
be broader than issues relating only to the litigation.
The import of this distinction becomes clear when applied to lawyers
representing undocumented workers. In order to be effective in representing
immigrant clients in employment-related litigation, lawyers need to know the
workers' status 172 since status impacts the array of remedies available to the
client. Once the lawyer knows a client's status, she can, if the client desires,
craft the case in a way that will make immigration status not relevant. 173 For
example, if the worker has a claim under the NLRA for wrongful discharge,
she can pursue all relief except back-pay and reinstatement. In this context, the
information must be considered related to the representation, for without it, the
lawyer can not effectively represent the client. However, once anned with the
information, the lawyer can make strategic decisions about ways to pursue the
litigation so that status is not relevant to the legal claims presented. Thus,
pursuant to Rule 1.6(a), as applied in this context, the tenn "relating to the
representation" is broader than "relevant to the litigation."
Assuming that status, and the related questions, are confidential, does Rule
1.6 pennit a lawyer to disclose this infonnation? Pursuant to Rule 1.6, in order
for lawyers to be permitted to disclose confidential client information, lawyers
either need express or implied authorization to do so, unless one of the
exceptions to the confidentiality rule applies. Both informed consent and
implied authorization are part of the very definition of confidentiality under
1.6(a).174 The rule penn its disclosure of client information when "impliedly

59 (2000). under which infonnation that is generally known is not confidential.
172. For these purposes. the tenn "status" includes the tact of lawful immigration
documentation as well as the manner of entry and of obtaining employment. Because
infonnation about lawful immigration documentation. manner of entry and of obtaining
employment all impact the legal relief a client may be entitled to. such infonnation should be
considered related to the proceedings.
173. See Schnapper. supra note 151. at 54 (explaining that plaintiffs should be able to
avoid discovery requests about immigration status by limiting the relief requested).
174. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24. at 9-6 to 9-7.
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authorized, , . to carry out the representation:' I 75 Comments to the rule state
that impliedly authorized disclosures depend upon the circumstances of the
particular case, but may include the admission of a fact that cannot properly be
denied, a disclosure that facilitates the satisfactory resolution of a matter, or the
disclosure of information to other lawyers in the firm. I 76
However, implied authorization does not include information that
adversely affects the material interests of the client,l77 privileged information
or information that would prejudice the client. 178 Given the grave risks that
accompany disclosure of status, entry or employment information, and the
potential privilege involved, attorneys representing undocumented workers in
employment-related litigation are highly unlikely to be impliedly authorized to
disclose this information.
Pursuant to Rule 1.6(a), ""lawyer[s] shall not reveal information relating to
the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent." 179
Informed consent is defined in the rules as an "agreement by a person to a
proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate
information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably
available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct." I 80 While there may
be some instances in which a client makes a strategic decision to disclose, I 8 I
the more common scenario will likely be a desire to keep the information
confi dential.
In the absence of implied authorization or infonned consent to disclose,
Rule 1.6 mandates that the information be kept confidential unless one of six
express exceptions applies. 182 In interpreting Rule 1.6 and its exceptions, the

175. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007).
176. Jd. R. 1.6 cmt. 5: see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LA WYERS § 61 (2000) (pennitting disclosures that advance the interests of clients).
177. ABA Comm. on Prof! Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 01-421 (2001).
178. ABA Comm. on Prof! Ethics and Grievances, Fonnal Op. 98-411 (1998).
179. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007).
180. fd. R. 1.0( e). This definition was added to the tenninology section of the rules in
2002 upon the recommendation of the Ethics 2000 Commission and replaced the prior term
which was "consent after consultation." HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 2A-6 to 2A-7.
ABA's House of Delegates accepted this recommendation. not as a substantive change. but
as a way to adopt a more frequently used and easily understood term. See ABA Report to the
House of Delegates. No. 40 l (Aug. 200 I). Model Rule 1.6. Reporter's Explanation of
Changes.
181. See inFa Part V for a discussion of those instances in which clients might want to
strategically disclose and the corresponding obligations of the lawyer in that context.
182. A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent
the lawyer reasonably bel ieves necessary: (I) to prevent reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily hann: (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services: (3)
to prevent. mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission of a
crime or fraud in furtherance of which the cJ ient has used the lawyer's services: (4) to secure
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rules provide that disclosures are to be limited in order to avoid divulging
information that ought to remain confidential. 183 And, the exceptions to the
. Iy permit,
. but d0 not reqUire,
. d'ISC Iosure. 184
ru Ie simp
In the absence of a court order, 185 none of the six exceptions permits the
disclosure of immigration status and related client actions. There is no potential
for death or substantial bodily hann; I 86 the issues do not involve the lawyer's
compliance with the rules of professional conduct; 187 and there is no dispute
between the lawyer and the client related to the representation. 188 Adopted by
the ABA House of Delegates in 2003, the remaining two exceptions involve

legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules: (5) to establish a claim or
defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to
establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct
in which the client was involved. or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning
the lawyer's representation ofthe client: or (6) to comply with other law or a court order.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6tb) (2007). Rule 1.6(b )(2) and (b )(3) were added in
2003 and are not yet in effect in many states. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 9-7 to 9-S.
IS3. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmL 14 (2007) (explaining the lawyer
may disclose information only .. to the extent"' the lawyer "reasonably believes necessary" to
carry out the purpose of the exception).
184. Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 15. However, some states have adopted versions of Rule 1.6 that
use the term "shall" as opposed to "may" when addressing the exception to the general rule
of confidentiality. See, e.g.. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2007) ('"A lawyer
shall reveal information about a client to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the client
from committing an act that would result in death or serious bodily harm."): WIS. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS R. 1.6 (2007) C'A lawyer shall reveal information relating
to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to
prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably
believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm or in substantial injury to the
tinancial interest or property of another."): N.M. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (8)
(2007) ("To prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm. a lawyer should reveal such
infonnation to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary."): PA. PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.6(b) (2007) ("A lawyer shall reveal such infonnation if necessary to comply with the
duties stated in Rule 3.3.").
IS5. If a court orders disclosure and all of the lawyer's challenges to that order have
failed. then an otherwise permissive disclosure option becomes mandatory. See HAZARD &
HODES. supra note 24, at 9-109.
IS6.
Rule 1.6(b) states. "A lawyer may reveal infonnation relating to the
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (I) to
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm .... " MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(I) (2007).
IS7.
Rule 1.6(b) statcs. "A lawyer may reveal information relating to the
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: ... (4) to
secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules ... :. Id. R. 1.6(b)(4).
ISS. A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent
the lawyer reao-;onably believes necessary: ... (5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of
the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client. to establish a defense to a
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was
involved. or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation ofthe client .
Id. R. 1.6(b)(5).
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disclosure to prevent a client from committing a crime or fraud resulting in
substantial injury to the financial interests of a third party,189 or to mitigate
damages that flow from such crime or fraud. 190 These exceptions appear
inapplicable to the undocumented-worker dilemma, because there is no
substantial injury to the financial interests of a third party. 191 Additionally, in
order for this exception to apply, the la\\yer has to be involved in the client's
crime or fraud. 192 It is unlikely that mere representation of an undocumented
worker in a civil-employment matter would rise to the level of involvement
contemplated by this exception.
Thus, pursuant to the Model Rules, assuming that immigration status
constitutes confidential infonnation under Rule 1.6 and that no exceptions
apply, the lawyer must not disclose this information unless another rule
mandates disclosure. Rules 3.3(b) and 4.1 (b) both have mandatory disclosure
provisions. Rule 3.3(b) states, '"A lawyer who represents a client in an
adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is
engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the

189. A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: ... (2) to prevent the client from committing a
crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial i'1jury to the financial interests
or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's
services.
Id. R. 1.6(b )(2). Scholars have noted that the scope of the rule is narrowed by two
limitations: it must be the client's crime or fraud that threatens another with financial ruin
and it only applies if the client has used or is using the lav,yer's services in furtherance of the
scheme. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 9-8.
190. A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: ... (3) to prevent. mitigate or rectif}.· substantial
injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or
has resulted from the cI ien!" s commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the
client has used the lawyer's services.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(3) (2007). For a description of the history
leading to the 2003 adoption of (b )(2) and (b )(3). see HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 989 to 9-97.
191. Arguably. the government is losing some tax dollars if undocumented workers
fail to pay taxes. but this incorrectly assumes that all undocumented workers fail to pay
taxes. and. even if some portion of workers do not. it would be hard to argue that this
shortfall is bringing the government to the brink of financial ruin. See Karen Brooks. The

Give-and-Take of /!legal Immigration Study: Their Taxes Lijt State. But Services Drain
Counties. DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 8. 2006. at I A (citing to a report that found that.
while illegal immigrants cost Texas $1.16 billion in services. they pay $1.58 billion in taxes
and fees every year for a profit of $420 million): Shikha Dalmia. Immigrants Contribute
!vlore to the Economy Than They Take--(Illegal Immigrants Pay). L.A. Bus. L May 22.
2006. at 51 (stating that eight million of the approximately twelve million illegal aliens in the
United States file personal income taxes): Eduardo Porter. Here IIIegal(v. Working Hard and
Paying Taxes. N.Y. TIMES, June 19.2006. at AI (explaining that many of the undocumented
workers in the United States who get regular pay checks pay taxes).
192. Both Rule 1.6(b)(2) and Rule 1.6(b)(3) require lawyer involvemcnt. Thus. if a
lawyer simply discovers a client's planned or ongoing fraud. she is not permitted to disclose
information despite a desire to do so. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 9-91.
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proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary,
disclosure to the tribunal.,,193 Rule 3.3(b) places upon lawyers an obligation to
disclose certain criminal or fraudulent conduct. 194 While this requirement
creates a tension between a lawyer's duty to her client and her duty to the
tribunal, it is the duty to the tribunal and the administration of justice that is
favored in the balance. 195 The obligation to disclose this information applies
even if the information would otherwise be protected by Rule 1.6. 196 Despite
the rule's broad reach, there are some limits to the rule's initial application.
First, the rule governs only the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client
in adjudicative, and ancillary, proceedings. 197 Furthermore, the lawyer must

193. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2007). In 1983. when the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct were first promulgated, there were four specific duties of
candor to the tribunal set out in Rule 3.3(a). RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI.
LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILlTY 643 (2005).
The second duty required a lawyer to disclose information when silence would be
tantamount to assisting a client's crime or fraud. Jd. Based upon the recommendations of the
Ethics 2000 Commission. Rule 3.3 was revised. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 29-5.
The duty to disclose information when silence would amount to assisting a client's crime or
fraud was eliminated and a more general duty was imposed under Rule 3.3(b). Jd.
For an explanation of the specific reasons for the changes made by the Ethics 2000
Commission, sec Margaret Colgatc Love. The Revised ABA .Hodel Rules of Professional
Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000. 15 GEO. 1. LEGAL ETIIICS 441. 465-66
(2002), which explains:
The Commission deleted paragraph (a)(2) of the present rule, and addressed the lawyer's
duty to disclose crime or fraud in connection with an adjudicative proceeding more generally
in a new paragraph (b) .... The new paragraph (b) provides that a lawyer who knows that
any person. including the lawyer's client. intends to engage. is engaging or has engaged in
criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding, shall take reasonable remedial
measures. including. if necessary. disclosure to the tribunal. A new comment identifies the
type of conduct sought to be reached under the rule: 'bribing. intimidating or otherwise
unlawfully communicating with a witness. juror. court official. or other participant in the
proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence or failing to
disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so.' New commentary
describes remedial measures short of disclosure. including remonstrating with the client,
consulting with the client about the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal. and withdrawal
from the representation.

194. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2007): see I-IAZARD & HODES.
supra note 24. at 29-6 ("Lawyers are not all-purpose ·truth police': the duties of candor are
therefore imposed only where the lawyer can be said to have contributed [even if
unwittingly] to the court's being led astray:').
195. According to Professors Hazard and Hodes. "In these situations. the conception of
lawyer as 'officer of the court' is given its maximum force." HAZARD & HODES. supra note
24. at 29-4.
196. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) (2007) ("The duties stated in
paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding. and apply even if
compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.").
197. Jd. R. 3.3 cmt. I ("This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing
a client in the proceedings of a tribunal. ... It also applies when the lawyer is representing a
client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal's adjudicative authority.
such as a deposition.").
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have knowledge of the criminal or fraudulent conduct, and the information
must be related to the proceeding. 198
Rule 4.1(b) states that "[i]n the course of representing a client a lawyer
shall not knowingly: . . . fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless
disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.,·199 A companion to Rule 4.1(a), which
prohibits a lawyer from lying, Rule 4.1 (b) requires a lawyer to correct material
misstatements or deliberate omissions of others under certain circumstances. 200
Designed to address a lawyer's silence in the face ofa client's ongoing crime or
fraud, Rule 4.1 (a) places an affirmative obligation upon the lawyer to disclose
information where the disclosure is necessary to avoid misleading a third
party.201 There are some specific substantive limits on Rule 4.1' s application.
First, the disclosure obligations do not apply unless the misstatement or
omission is material to the proceeding. 202 Second, the disclosure must be
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act. 203 Finally, the rule
applies only if disclosure is permitted under Rule 1.6 and is not allowed where
doing so would violate confidentiality obligations under Rule 1.6. 204

198. Id R. 3.3 cmt. 12.
199. ld R. 4.1. For a description of the changes made to Rule 4.1 by the Ethics 2000
Commission. see Love. supra note 193. at 466. which states:
"The Commission made no change in the text of Rule 4. I (,Truthfulness in Statements to
Others') but clarified the duty imposed by paragraph (b) (a lawyer may not knowingly 'fail to
disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client unkss disclosure would be prohibited by Rule 1.6'). This duty is
id.;ntitied in commentary as a 'specific application' of the general duty set forth in Rule
1.2(d), ... and it is most frequently invoked where a c1ienl's wrong-doing involves a lie or
misrepresentation to a third party. The commentary explains the remedial measures the
lawyer may be required to take to avoid assisting client crim.; or fraud, subject to the
lawyer's duty of confidentiality to the client under Rule 1.6.
200. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 37-3.
201. In some jurisdictions. Rule 4.I(b) may have broader application as some
jurisdictions have defined fraud and misrepresentation to include "mere nonfeasance:' a
"failure to disclose material facts even absent prior creation of the misapprehension:' Jd at
37-12.
202. Jd at 37-8.
203. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.I(b) (2007). For examples of cases in
which lawyers have either directly participated in a client's crime or fraud or advised the
client to commit a crime or fraud, see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. For
examples of cases in which lawyers are merely aware that the client has committed or is
committing a crime or fraud. see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
204. MODEL RULES OF PROF'] CONDUCT R. 4.1 (b) (2007). Rule 4.I(b) does not require
disclosure of conildential infonnation even to avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud. See
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof! Responsibility. Fonnal Op. 93-375 (1993) (opining that a
lawyer representing a client in a bank examination is under no duty to disclose weaknesses
in client's case or otherwise reveal confidential infonnation to third parties. unless the
lawyer becomes a party to the fraud).
This final limitation on Rule 4.1 is not without detractors. Professors Hazard and Hodes
argue that Rule 4.I(b) does not comport with the other model rules that address fraud and
misrepresentation. including Rules 1.2( d). 1.6(b). and 3.3(a). in that Rule 4.1 (b) appears to
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In analyzing the disclosure obligations under both Rule 3.3(b) and Rule
4.I(b), the applicable limitations can be grouped into three distinct categories:
the relationship between the criminal or fraudulent act and the pending case;
the relationship between the lawyer's actions and the client's alleged crime or
fraud; and the relationship between the mandatory-disclosure rules and the
confidentiality rules.
The categorization of these limitations gives rise to a series of questions
regarding the applicability of disclosure obligations under both rules. First, do
the alleged criminal or fraudulent acts have the requisite connection to the
pending action? Pursuant to Rule 3.3(b), only information "related to the
proceedings" must be disclosed to the tribunal. 205 The use of the term "related
to" under Rule 3.3(b) is very different from the use of the term "related to"
under Rule 1.6(a).206 The comments to Rule 3.3(b) help to define "related to
the proceedings" by specifically identifying "criminal or fraudulent conduct
that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process.',207 The comments
further define the term by identifYing the following conduct that would be
implicated by Rule 3.3(b): "bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully
communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participants in the
proceeding; unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence;
or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do

give automatic preference to the confidentiality provisions of Rule 1.6 and neglects the
complexity of the relationship between the confidentiality and justice obligations. HAZARD &
HODES. supra note 24. at 37-3 to 37-4. The authors argue for a saving interpretation of the
rules:
Silence assists client fraud in situations to which Rule 4.I(b) applies: the lawyer must
therefore speak up to avoid providing the assistance that is forbidden by Rule 1.2( d).
According to Rule 4. I(b). the lawyer may not speak ({prevented from doing so by Rule 1.6:
however. Rule 1.6 does not prevent her from speaking. because she is required by law-Rule
J.2(d)-to speak.
Id. at 37-14. Thus. the action would fall under the "other law" exception to Rule 1.6(b)(6)
and disclosure would be permitted. Id. at 37-15. The authors believe that a lawyer can
"maintain total confidentiality only when he has not yet drafted any offending papers and has
not advaneed his client's scheme by his silence." Id. In this situation ...the lawyer has
knowledge only of a possible future fraud and may not warn the potential victim under any
version of Rule 1.6:' Id.
Several jurisdictions have amended Rule 4.1 (b) to require disclosure of information
even if it is protected by Rule 1.6. See, e.g. THE MD. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 4.1 (2002): N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2006). See generally ANNOTATED
MODEL RULES. supra note 159. at 415: Morgan Cloud. Privileges Lost? Privileges
Retained? 69 TENN. L. REV. 65. 92 (2001) (asserting that many dilemmas created by
"contradictory and far from self-explanatory commands" of Rules 1.2, 1.6. 1.8. 1.16. 3.3.
and 4.1 could be "resolved by permitting disclosures to prevent or rectify harms suffered by
third parties because of crimes or frauds committed by the lawyers' clients").
205. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2007).
206. For an analysis of the term "relating to" under Rule 1.6(a). see supra notes 16973 and accompanying text.
207. MODEL RULES OF ?ROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 12 (2007).
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Rule 3.3(b) is concerned with the rules of the game and the mechanics
of trial, as opposed to the substance of the underlying c1aims. 209 When applied
to the undocumented-worker context, criminal or fraudulent acts that the
undocumented worker may have engaged in involving his or her entry or
employment in the United States do not "relate to the proceedings" nor
undermine the integrity of the adjudicative process as proscribed by Rule
3.3(b). Thus, the lawyer representing the undocumented worker would not have
an obligation to disclose to the tribunal.
Pursuant to Rule 4.1 (b), only "material facts" have to be disclosed to third
parties. 2 I 0 Given that the application of these rules arises in instances where
immigration status has been determined not to be relevant to the underlying
proceedings, it is extremely likely that the disclosure provisions of 4.1 (b) do
not apply. On the other hand, the term "material" arguably could be construed
more broadly than "relevant:' If this were the case, then the lawyer would have
to proceed to analyze the additional limitations imposed by Rules 3.3(b) and
4.I(b).
Second, are the lawyer's actions sufficiently related to the client's alleged
crime or fraud? Rule 4.1 (b) states that a lawyer shall disclose otherwise
confidential information when "necessary to avoid assisting" a crime or
fraud. 21 I Thus, the question raised under Rule 4.1 (b) is whether representing an
undocumented immigrant in employment litigation is "assisting" the client in a
crime or fraud. As analyzed in Part II, it is unlikely that mere representation of
an undocumented worker in an employment-related civil matter would amount
to assisting in the commission or furtherance of a crime. 212
Finally, each rule references its interrelation with Rule 1.6, meaning that a
lawyer must also interpret the application of confidentiality rules. Rule 3.3(c)
expressly states that the disclosure of information is required even if the
information would otherwise be protected by Rule 1.6, 2 I 3 while Rule 4.1 (b)
SO:,208

208. Id.
209. Rule 3.3(b) deals with other frauds outside of the area of evidentiary frauds. such as
bribes. intimidation or unlawful communications with a witness. juror. court official or other
participant in the proceeding. unlawfully [sicI destruction or concealment of documents or
other evidence or failure to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do
so.
ROTUNDA & DZlENKOWSKI. supra note 193. at 664.
210. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (b) (2007): see also HAZARD & HODES.
supra note 24. at 37-8 C[Rjepresentations that do not go to the heart of the matter may be
considered to be 'not material. '''). For an argument that lawyers should not be required to
correct immaterial falsehoods that have no bearing on the issues before the court, even if
made in the courtroom setting. see W. William Hodes. Two Cheers for Lying (About
Immaterial Matters). PROF. LAWYER. May 1994. at 4.
211. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (b) (2007).
212. See supra Part II.
213. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) (2007).
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states that the lawyer may resist disclosure of material information if it is
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. 214
In order to understand the contours of a lawyer's ethical obligations, it is
helpful to apply these rules to the same hypotheticals employed in Part I.
I. Hypothetical One: Client Enters with Proper Immigration

Documentation and Is Not Asked to Provide Work Authorization Papers
In the first hypothetical, assume a client enters with a lawful visa, but does
not obtain proper work authorization. The employer hires the employee without
asking for work-authorization papers and thereafter fails to pay the client for
work performed. Does a lawyer who represents this client in a wage-and-hour
claim have an obligation to disclose any information to the tribunal under Rule
3.3(b) or to a third party under Rule 4.I(b)? In this instance, the client has not
and working without valid workcommitted a crime; he entered Iaw fu
authorization papers is not itself a crime. 15 Further, since the employer did not
ask about the client's immigration status, it is unlikely that the client's actions
would be construed as fraudulent. 216 Under these facts, there is no obligation to
disclose under Rule 3.3(b), because the client has not engaged, is not currently
engaging, and does not intend to engage in criminal or fraudulent activity.
There is also no obligation to disclose under Rule 4.1 (b), because the obligation
to disclose exists only when such disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting in a
criminal or fraudulent act of the client. If the client has not engaged in a crime
or fraud, then there is no obligation to disclose.

II?,

2. Hypothetical Two: Client Enters Without Proper Documentation and Is Not
Asked to Provide Work Authorization Papers
In the second hypothetical, the client enters the country by evading
inspection. The employer hires the client without asking for papers and then
fails to pay the client for work performed. The lawyer agrees to represent the
client in a wage-and-hour case. In this situation does the lawyer have an
obligation to disclose the client's crime or fraud to third parties under Rule
4.I(b) or to the tribunal under Rule 3.3(b)?
In this example, the client did commit the crime of entry without

214. Id. R. 4.I(b).
215. The employer could be liable. both civilly and criminally. for not obtaining an 1-9
form and not ensuring that the employee was lawfully permitted to work. See, e.g.. 8 U.S.c.
§ I 324a(e)(4)(A) (2000) (subjecting to civil fines employers who hire. recruit or refer for a
fee. or employ aliens knowing the aliens are unauthorized aliens): id. § I 324a(t)(l)
(subjecting to criminal penalties employers who hire. recruit or refer for a fee. or employ
aliens knowing the aliens are unauthorized aliens).
216. For a response to the argument that holding oneself out for work is an implicit
representation of proper authorization to work and thus constitutes fraud. see supra note 56.
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inspection,217 which courts have found to be a noncontinuing crime, complete
upon entry.218 However, the employee did not commit a crime or engage in
fraud related to the employment because the employer did not ask for papers
from the employee. 219 Since the client has committed a crime, the next inquiry
is whether the crime is a "material fact" or "related to the proceedings." Since
both documented and undocumented workers are entitled to compensation for
hours worked but not compensated,220 information related to the client's entry
into the country would not be relevant to the wage-and-hour claims. 221 If status
is not relevant to the claim, the mode of entry or the method of obtaining a job
are unlikely to be considered "material facts" as required by Rule 4.1(b).
Further, the unlawful mode of entry into the country, in and of itself, does not
relate to the proceedings nor undermine the adjudicative process as required by
Rule 3.3(b). Thus, disclosure to a third party or to the tribunal would not be
mandated.

3. Hypothetical Three: Client Enters Lawfidly but Uses a False Social
Security Number to Obtain Employment
In the third hypothetical, the client enters lawfully, but uses a fraudulent
Social Security number to obtain employment and the employer thereafter fails
to pay him for hours worked. The analysis in this hypothetical is very similar to
hypothetical two. In this case, if the lawyer represents this client in a wage-andhour claim, does the lawyer have any disclosure obligations to third parties
under Rule 4.1 (b) or to the tribunal under Rule 3.3(b)? As described above, the

217. See 8 U.s.c. § 1325(a) (2000).
218. United States v. Rincon-Jimenez. 595 F.2d 1192. 1193-94 (9th Cir. 1979)
(finding that a violation of 8 U.s.c. § 1325 is consummated at the time of entering the
United States and is not considered a continuing offense).
219. The employer. on the other hand. may face criminal or civil liability. See supra
note 151 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g.. Gabu Than Chellen v. John Pickle Co .. 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247. 1276-78
(N.D. Okla. 2006): Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc .. 393 F. Supp. 2d 295. 320-25 (D.N.1.
2005): Martinez v. Mecca Farms. Inc .. 213 F.R.D. 601. 604-05 (S.D. Fla. 2002): Gomez v.
Falco. 792 N.Y.S.2d 769.769 (App. Diy. 2004).
221. Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady Farms. Inc .. 230 F.R.D. 499. 500-02 (W.O. Mich.
2005) (finding that immigration status is not relevant to damages for unpaid wages. nor to
standing. class certification. or credibility): Cortez v. Medina's Landscaping. No. 00 C 6320.
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1883 L at * 1-*3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30. 2002) (denying a motion to
compel discovery concerning the plaintiffs citizenship status in a case where unpaid wages
for work. but not back-pay. is at issue): Flores v. Amigon. 233 F. Supp. 2d 462 (LD.N.Y.
2002) (determining that immigration status is undiscoverable in a claim for unpaid wages
and overtime for time worked under the Fair Labor Standards Act): Zeng Liu v. Donna
Karan Inn Inc .. 207 F. Supp. 2d 191. 192-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying discovery of
plaintiffs immigration status on the grounds that it is not relevant to a claim for unpaid
wages for time worked): Llerena v. 302 W. 12th St. Condo .. 799 N.Y.S.2d 161 (Sup. Ct.
2004) (refusing to compel evidence relating to immigration status in a case involving tort
and state labor law remedies for unpaid wages for time worked).
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client in this case has committed a completed crime. It is a crime to use a false
Social Security number to obtain benefits,222 and the crime is completed when
the false representation is made. 223
The crime and/or fraud of using a false Social Security number to obtain
work is more closely related to the employment, but the ethical rules require
that it be a "material fact" or "related to the proceedings" in order for there to
be any disclosure obligations. Again, courts have found that both documented
and undocumented workers are entitled to compensation for hours worked. 224
Thus, status is unlikely to be considered a material fact, and even if it were
found to be a "material fact" pursuant to Rule 4.1 (b), there would still need to
be a connection between the lawyer's assistance on the case and the client's
crime or fraud for third-party disclosure to be required.
The question then becomes: Does the la\\')'er's representation in the wageand-hour case assist the client in the commission or furtherance of using a false
Social Security number? On the one hand, it could be argued that a suit for
wages assists in obtaining the benefits of the false representation. However, the
nexus between the use of fraudulent papers and legal assistance to recover
wages is quite tenuous, since the crime or fraud of using the false Social
Security number is completed when the number is used to obtain employment.
Further, the law currently permits undocumented workers, even if they use
false papers to obtain employment, to recover wages for completed work. Thus,
even if the lawyer's representation in this context is indirectly being used to
recover money that could not have been earned absent the crime or fraud,
lawyers still must balance this against their duties of loyalty, confidentiality,
and zealous service. 225 Thus, so long as the representation is within the bounds
of the law, it seems problematic to interpret the rules such that la\\'j'ers would
be required to consider the ways in which their representation might indirectly
encourage behavior that is offensive or illegal.
Finally, regardless of the analysis above, Rule 4.1 prohibits a lawyer from
disclosing material information to third parties if the information is otherwise
protected by Rule 1.6. As explained previously, none of the express exceptions
to Rule 1.6 are likely to apply in this context. 226 Thus, disclosure to a third
party under Rule 4.1 would be prohibited.
Similarly, disclosure to a tribunal, in most instances, would not be required
under Rule 3.3(b). In and of itself, the use of a fraudulent Social Security

222. 42 U.s.c. §§ 408(a)(7)-(8) (2000). A person can be fined. or imprisoned for not
more than five years. or both. for such offense. Jd. § 408(a).
223. United States v. Payne, 978 F.2d 1177. 1180 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that falsely
representing a Social Security number is not a continuing offense): United States v. Joseph,
765 F. Supp. 326. 330 (E.D. La. 1991) (finding that the crime of using a false Social Security
number with the intent to deceive is completed when the false representation is made).
224. See cases cited supra note 220.
225. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24 at 2-6 to 2-7.
226. See supra notes 182-92 and accompanying text.
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number to obtain a job may subject the client to criminal and civil liability, but
it does not relate to the proceedings nor undermine the integrity of the
adjudicative process as those terms are defined in Rule 3.3(b). If the client
decides to take steps related to the proceedings that would undermine the
adjudicative process, such as lying under oath or presenting false documents,
then the lawyer would have to follow the disclosure obligations set forth in
Rule 3 .3(b).
4. Hypothetical Four: Clients Enters Lawfully but Uses and Still Possesses
False Immigration Documents to Obtain Employment
In the final hypothetical, the client is committing an ongoing crime that is
related to the employment situation. The client enters lawfully, but thereafter
uses false immigration documents to obtain employment and still possesses the
documents. The employee seeks the lawyer's assistance for a discriminatory
termination. The lawyer agrees to represent the client after advising the client
that possession of false immigration documents is unlawful and explaining to
the client that she will not seek reinstatement or back-pay in the c1aim.227 Does
the lawyer have an obligation to disclose the information about false work
papers to a third party under Rule 4.1 (b) or to the tribunal under Rule 3.3(b)?
Possession of false immigration documents to obtain work is likely to be
considered a continuing crime. 228 Since these are cases in which immigration
status has been determined not to be relevant to the underlying proceedings, the
lawyer would be barred from disclosing it to third parties under Rule 4.I(b)
because it is not a "material" fact. 229 Even if it were determined that status was
related or material to the proceeding, Rule 4.1 still requires there to be a
relationship between the crime or fraud and the lawyer's actions. Specifically,
the lawyer shall disclose confidential information only when necessary to avoid
assisting in the commission or furtherance of the client's crime or fraud. So
long as the lawyer advises the client that possession of such documents is
illegal, does not seek reinstatement or back-pay, and seeks only compensatory
damages, it is difficult to construe the lawyer's representation of the client in a
claim for discriminatory termination as furthering the client's use of false
papers to obtain employment. Further, disclosure under Rule 4.l(b) to third
parties would be barred because the related information is confidential under
Rule 1.6 and no exceptions apply.

227. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text: see also 18 U.s.c. § 1546(a)
(Supp. V 2006).
229. If status is relevant. as it may be in some discriminatory-termination cases. or in
some aspects of a discriminatory-termination case (e.g .. damages). then status could be
required to be disclosed in discovery and at trial unless the employee asserts a privilege. See
supra Part "l.A.
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Pursuant to Rule 3 .3(b), is the use of false immigration documents to
obtain work "related to the proceedings"? As discussed above in hypothetical
three, the use of false immigration documents to obtain work might subject the
client to criminal and civil liability, but it does not, by itself, relate to the
proceedings nor undermine the integrity of the adjudicative process as those
terms are defined in Rule 3.3(b). If the client decided to make false statements
under oath or present false evidence, and the lawyer was unable to dissuade the
client, the lawyer would be required to comply with the disclosure requirements
set forth in 3 .3(b).
Thus, Rule 4.1 (b) does not appear to mandate disclosure to third parties in
any instance because of the Rule 1.6 limitations. Disclosure to a tribunal under
Rule 3.3(b) would only be mandated if status were determined to be "related to
the proceedings:' Given the meaning of "related to the proceedings" and the
fact that these issues will arise only where status is found not relevant to the
underlying claim, a mandated disclosure to the tribunal pursuant to Rule 3.3(b)
would seem to occur only if the client took some subsequent action in the
context of the proceedings that affected the integrity of the adjudicative
process, such as lying on the stand or presenting false evidence. However, if
counseled appropriately, disclosure to the tribunal under Rule 3.3(b) should not
be necessary.
Though the hypotheticals above focus on the ethical obligations of lawyers
representin~ employees, the ethical rules also impact lawyers representing
employers. 30 For a lawyer representing an employer, ethical issues are most
likely to arise when the lawyer inquires about the employee's immigration
status, either during discovery or at trial. In order to assess the ethical
limitation, the lawyer first needs to assess whether immigration status is
relevant to the underlying litigation. If the question of relevance has not been
decided by a court, or if a court has decided that status is relevant, inquiry into
the opposing party's immigration status would likely be permissible and
ethical. If, however, immigration status is not relevant to the underlying
litigation, several ethical rules might limit inquiry by the employer's attorney.
The first limitation stems from Rule 4.4(a) which states that "a lawyer shall
not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay,
or burden a third person.,,23! Where immigration status is not relevant, the
question is whether the employer has a "substantial purpose" to inquire. Given
the information's lack of substantive consequence to the litigation, the inquiry

230. In addition to ethical limitations. the employer may take action that raises the
specter of potential criminal liability. For example. if the employer signed an 1-9 form
verifying that the employee was documented. but either knew. or had reason to know. that
the employee lacked lawful status. the employer might subject himself to criminal liability
for knowingly hiring an undocumented worker. See 8 U.s.c. § 1324a(a) (2000) (SUbjecting
employers who violate IRCA to criminal prosecution).
231. MODEL RULES OF ?ROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2007).
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likely lacks "substantial purpose" and instead is likely being used to gain unfair
advantage in the litigation. Further, Rule 8.4(d) states that it is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice:,232 The comments help define the parameters of this
rule and state that "[a] lawyer who, in the course of representing a client,
knowingly manifests by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race,
sex, religion, national ongm, disability, age, sexual orientation or
socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial
to the administration of justice.,,233 When immigration status is not considered
relevant, intentional inquiry into such information may refiect bias or prejudice
based upon national origin. And, if the inquiry deters the employee from
proceeding with her claims, it could be construed as prejudicial to the
administration of justice.
A second, but somewhat related, limitation can be found in Rule 3.4(d),
which states that a lawyer shall not, "in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous
discovery request:,234 Again, if a court has determined that immigration status
is not relevant to the underlying litigation, inquiry by the employer's attorney
as to the employee's immigration status could be viewed as a frivolous
discovery request under Rule 3.4(d).
A third limitation involves the use of threats of criminal prosecution as a
way to gain advantage in a civil action. This could happen expressly if the
employer threatens to report the worker to police or immigration officials. It
could also arise implicitly through questions about immigration status in the
civil case. Under the old Model Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer
could not "present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal
charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.',235 While this
prohibition does not expressly exist in the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct,236 there are, nonetheless, limitations on the use of such a threat to

232. fd. R. 8.4(d).
233. Id. R. 8.4 cmt. 3. Further, while there is no explicit language in the rules
themselves about harassment. the preamble to the Model Rules states that "[a]lmvyer should
use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others:'
Id. pmbl. 5.
234. Id. R. 3.4(d).
235. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSlBtLITY DR 7-105(A) (1980). Some states have
retained the old Model Code approach. See, e.g.. CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(7)
(1986): D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (1990): ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.2(e) (1990): ME. BAR RULES R. 3.6(c) (1986): TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 4.04(b)( I) ( 1989).
236. See HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24, at 40-8 (explaining that the omission was
deliberate because its inclusion was viewed as redundant): CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS 718 (1986) (explaining that the drafters of the Model Rules deliberately
omitted DR 7- I05(A)"s language based upon the belief that "extortionate. fraudulent. or
otherwise abusive threats were covered by other, more general prohibitions in the Model
Rules and thus that there was no need to outlaw such threats specifically").
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advance a civil claim. 237 Based upon a Fonnal Opinion of the ABA Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, a threat to bring criminal charges to
advance a civil claim
would violate the Model Rules if the criminal wrongdoing were unrelated to
the client's civil claim, if the lawyer did not believe both the civil claim and
the potential criminal charges to be well-founded, or if the threat constituted
an attemp,t to exert or suggest improper influence over the criminal
process. 2,,8

In this context, since it has already been determined that immigration status
is not relevant to the underlying litigation, immigration status may not be
sufficiently related to the claim to insulate the lawyer from improper ethical
conduct. 239 Further, in the absence of a relationship between the threat and the
underlying claim, the actions of the employer's lawyer might be construed as
extortion, which is a disciplinary offense under Rule 8.4. 240 The Model Penal
Code defines extortion as obtaining the property of another through threats,
including threats to accuse another of a criminal offense.24I However, if the
employer has an honest belief that the charges are well founded, the actions
would not constitute extortion. 242 Thus, what the employer knew, or didn't
know, might impact the analysis. In most instances, the employer would be
inquiring about immigration status to gain an advantage in the litigation and
thus would know, or bel ieve, that the employee lacked legal status. If this were
the case, the employer's actions would not likely rise to the level of extortion.
However, if the employer threatens criminal prosecution, without any

237. For an exploration of when threatening eriminal action may be an ethics violation.
see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof! Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-383 (1994) (examining
whether a lawyer can use the threat of filing a disciplinal)' complaint or report against
opposing counsel to obtain advantage in a civil case): ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'!
Responsibility. Formal Op. 92-363 (1992) (examining when a threat to bring criminal
charges for the purposc of advancing a civil claim would violate the ethics rules).
238. ABA Comm, on Ethics and Prof'! Responsibility. Formal Op, 92-363 (1992).
239. For a discussion of the purpose behind the relatedness requirement. see id. C'A
relatedness requirement avoids exposure to the charge of compounding .... It also tends to
ensure that negotiations will be focused on the true value of the civil claim, which
presumably includes any criminal liability arising from the same facts or transaction. and
discourages exploitation of extraneous matters that have nothing to do with evaluating that
claim,").
240. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2007) Cit is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to: ... (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty.
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects: (c) engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud. deceit or misrepresentation,").
241. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4(2) (2001).
242. While the lawyer's actions might not rise to the level of extortion. if the lawyer
uses even a well-founded threat of criminal charges merely to harass a third person. the
lawyer's actions could violate Rule 4.4(a). which states. "[i]n representing a client a lawyer
shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass. delay. or
burden a third person:' MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2007): see also ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof'! Responsibility. Formal Op. 92-363 (1992).
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actual intent to proceed with such a claim, the lawyer's actions could violate
Rule 4.1, which imposes upon lawyers a duty to be truthful when dealing with
others. 243 And, even if the lawyer's actions do not amount to extortion because
they are based upon an honest belief that the charges are well founded, if his
purpose in making the threat is merely to harass a third person, his actions
could constitute a violation of Rule 4.4(a).244
In sum, disclosure obligations pursuant to the Model Rules will vary
depending upon whether immigration status is relevant to the underlying
proceedings. If status is relevant, the information will be disclosed during the
course of the litigation unless a privilege applies. Undocumented workers may
opt to claim their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as
opposed to risking disclosure of their status. 245 If status is not relevant to their
underlying claim, disclosure to a third party pursuant to Rule 4.I(b) is
prohibited since the information is confidential under Rule 1.6. Disclosure to a
tribunal pursuant to Rule 3.3(b) is limited to those instances in which status is
determined to be "related to the proceedings." Given that status is not relevant
to the proceedings, if the client does not utilize that information in a way that
undermines the integrity ofthe adjudicative process, then the lawyer will not be
obligated to disclose the information to a tribunal. Finally, the ethical rules also
may limit an employer's ability to inquire about an employee's immigration
status. If the inquiry lacks "substantial purpose" or is merely a "frivolous"
discovery request, the lawyer's actions may be impermissible. Further, a
lawyer's actions may be ethically improper if the inquiry amounts to an implied
threat of criminal prosecution and the criminal allegations are not related to the
civil case. Thus, lawyers for both the employer and employee should be
mindful of ethical Iimitations as they undertake representation in this context.
IV. STRATEGIC DEC1SIO;'\l TO DISCLOSE

In the absence of permissive or mandatory disclosure pursuant to the
ethical rules, lawyers might consider whether disclosure of immigration status
would be strategically beneficial to the case. In such instances, what can and
should lawyers do? To address this question, this Part will first examine the
overall decision-making paradigm set forth in the Model Rules and then ask
whether the disclosure of immigration status, pursuant to the rules, is a lawyer

243. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2007) ("In the eourse of representing a
elient a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a
third person .... .o).
244. Jd. R. 4.4(a) ("[A] lawyer shall not us[e] means that have no substantial purpose
other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person .... .o); see also ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prof! Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-363 (1992) C'A lawyer who uses even a
well-founded threat of criminal charges merely to harass a third person violates Rule 4.4 ..o).
245. For a description of the potential consequences to the plaintiff of elaiming the
Fifth Amendment privilege, see supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
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or client decision. After analyzing this paradigm, this Part will examine how
strategic disclosure decisions are affected by confidentiality rules. Finally, this
Part will address the lawyer's counseling and communication obligations.
In most instances, disclosure of immigration status exposes the client to
246
However, there may
grave risks without any comparable benefit in return.
be some limited instances in which disclosure could work to a client's
advantage. This advantage could play out in relation to the judge as well as the
opposing party. For example, disclosing status up front might give your
individual client more credibility before the judge: if the client is telling the
truth about status, he or she is probably telling the truth about the issues in the
pending litigation. Such disclosure would also serve to educate the judge and
others about undocumented workers and their pi ight. In terms of the opposing
party, if the client discloses early in the litigation, it shows that he or she is not
afraid of the disclosure and thus takes away much of the opposing party's
leverage in negotiations. 247 In terms of a trial strategy, a client's immigration
status could be used as part of a theory of the case or a storytelling device to
explain that even though this person is very vulnerable, he or she is seeking a
legal remedy because the harm done was so great. Finally, for lawyers working
closely with the immigrant day laborer community, disclosure could be used as
an organizing tool to show that some individuals stepped forward, pursued
relief even though they were afraid, and ultimately succeeded in court.
Assuming the lawyer believes that disclosure of immigration status might
be beneficial to the client's case, who gets to make the ultimate decision about
disclosure? Rule 1.2(a) states that "a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.,,248 As

246. See supra notes 9-1 I and accompanying text (describing some of the potential
dangers that could accompany disclosure of immigration status).
247. Some clients determine that money is more important to them than a deportation
order because they are willing to go back and forth across the border. In such instances. what
might be better for individual clients might not be better for the larger client community.
While the possibility of differing interests of individual clients and the larger community
raise interesting questions about the scope and nature of a lawyer's advice. such inquiry is
beyond the scope of this Article.
248. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007). For a discussion of the
historical development of ethical limitations on the allocation of decision-making authority.
see Judith L. Maute. Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 17 U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 1049. 1053-57 (1984). For a description of the
specific changes made to Rule 1.2(a) in 2002. see Love. supra note 193. explaining:
The Commission was concerned that the current formulation sends conflicting signals: on the
one hand it might be read to require consultation with the client before the lawyer takes any
action: and on the other it suggests that the lawyer is not obliged to abide by the client's
decisions with respect to the ·means.·
opposed to the ·objectives.· of the representation.
After considering and rejecting a number of alternative formulations. the Commission
decided to add a new sentence to clarify that '[a]lawycr may take such action on behalf of
the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.' and to leave the
resolution of disagreements with clients about means to be worked out within a framework

a,
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defined, the objectives of the representation are those decisions that directly
affect the ultimate resolution of the case or the substantive rights of the
client. 249 Means of the representation, on the other hand, refer to those
decisions that are procedural or tactical in nature. 250 The rule is designed to
allocate primary responsibility for decision making in these two categories,
with clients making those decisions that relate to "objectives" and lawyers
making those decisions that relate to "means," after consultation with the
client. 251 Despite the attempt to distinguish between "objectives" 252 and
"means;,253 the rule does not always provide a lawyer clear guidance on which

defined by the law of agency, the right of the client to discharge the lawyer, and the right of
the lawyer to withdraw from the representation ifthe lawyer has a fundamental disagreement
with the cI ient To emphasize the lawyer's obligation to consult a cross reference to Rule 1.4
('Communication') was added to the text

Id at 447.

249. See, e.g., Blanton v. Womancare Inc .. 696 P.2d 645.650-51 (Cal. 1985) (finding
that decisions that would impair substantive rights differ from procedural decisions "both in
the degree to which they atTect the client's interest. and in the degree to which they involve
matters of judgment which extend beyond technical competence"): Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm.
on Prof! Ethics. Informal Op. 97-37 (1997) (holding that the decision about whether to join
a third party in civil action is an issue relating to the objectives of representation and is
therefore a matter for the client to decide). One scholar has described the attorney-client
relationship as similar to a joint venture in which each venturer presumptively takes on
certain tasks. but without a sharp dividing line between their responsibilities. Maute. supra
note 248. at 1066-69.
250. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES. supra note 159. at 30-31.
251. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 5-13. For examples of cases distinguishing
between "objectives" and "means," see United States v. Beebe. 180 U.S. 343, 352 (1901)
(finding that decision whether to settle belongs to client rather than Ia\\)'er): Hawkeye-Sec.
Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co .. 260 F.2d 361. 363 (10th Cir. 1958) (finding that decision
whether to appeal belongs to client rather than lawyer). Failure to respect this allocation of
decision-making responsibility constitutes a breach of professional responsibility on the part
of the lawyer. See. e.g.. Silver v. State Bar. 528 P.2d 1157, 1161-62 (Cal. 1974) (lawyer
disciplined for dismissing appeal without client's consent and with a view to his own gain):
In re Stem. 406 A.2d 970. 972 (N.1. 1979) (lawyer disciplined for settling matter Over
client's objection); In re Paauwe, 654 P.2d 1117. 1120 (Or. 1982) (la\\)'er disciplined for
appealing case without client consent).
252. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007). This rule is subject to a few
limitations. such as the limitation that the objeetives must be lawful. HAZARD & HODES.
supra note 24. at 5-14. If however. proper specific objectives are identified by the client and
explained to the lawyer. a lawyer's failure to pursue them will constitute a violation of Rule
l.2(a). See, e.g.. People v. McCatTrey. 925 P.2d 269. 271 (Colo. 1996) (finding that lawyer's
delay in filing suit until statute of limitations lapsed violated Rule 1.2(a)): In re Hagedorn.
725 N.E.2d 397. 399-400 (Ind. 2000) (holding that lawyer hired to assist clients in adopting
a child failed to take steps to effectuate adoption. thereby violating Rules 1.1. 1.2(a), 1.3. and
1.4).
253. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.2(a) (2007) ("A lawyer may take such
action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.").
Thus. there may be circumstances in which the lawyer could make a decision that a
particular means or o~iective would be approved by the client. in the absence of an explicit
discussion. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 5-13 to 5-14. The choice of means is still
subject to mandatory "consultation" with the client as provided for in Rule 1.4. See MODEL
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decisions concern the objectives and which concern the means of the
representation. 254 As such, Rule 1.2(a) has been subject to criticism,255 and
various scholars have proposed alternative models of decision making. 256

RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2007).
254. See Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised .Hodel ofAttorney-Client Relationship: The
Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315. 324 (1987) ("'[T]hat which is often thought to
be an end might really be a means: that which is assumed to be just a means could be an end
to a particular client. "). This distinction \vill be difficult to adhere to where procedure begins
to blend into substance. For example, some tactical decisions are so crucial to the litigation
that they impact the objectives of the representation and clients will want to make the
decision. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24, at 5-14 to 5-14.1 r-lD]isagreement is especially
likely where the lines between an 'objective' and 'means' to achieving that objective are
most indistinct. In order to resolve certain commonly arising allocation questions of this sort
Rule 1.2(a) specifies important dccisions that are to remain under the exclusive control of the
client."). Given this blurring of the express delineation, Professors Hazard and Hodes have
suggested that "[tJhe more a decision marks a critical turning point in the representation,
whether for tacticaL strategic, economic, or even political and moral reasons. the more the
lawyer should defer to the client." Id. at 5-17.
255. See, e.g.. DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLiENTCENTERED ApPROACH 266-67 (1991) (criticizing courts and professional standards that
allocate decisions regarding the "ends" of the representation to clients and those concerning
the "means" to lawyers); DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE?
154 (1974) (suggesting a participatory model of client counseling in which clients are active
decision makers in addressing their problems and share control and decision-making
responsibility with the lawyer): Arnold I. SiegeL Abandoning the Agency .\Iodel of the
Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Sew Approach for Deciding Authority Disputes. 69 NEB. L.
REV. 473 (1990): Mark Spiegel. Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent
and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41. 43 (1979) (arguing that the distinction
which purportedly gives the lawyer control over procedural and tactical decisions and clients
control over the subject matter of the litigation is inappropriate).
256. BINDER ET AL .. supra note 255, at 268 (proposing that lawyers should defer to
clients "whenever a lawyer using 'such skilL prudence, and diligence as other members of
the profession commonly possess and exercise,' would or should know that a pending
decision is likely to have a substantial legal or nonlegal impact on a client"(quoting W.
PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 185-93 (1984))). In terms of the technical or
means-based decisions. Binder. Bergman and Price state that such issues are "generally for
[the lawyer] alone to decide, even though they may have a substantial impact." unless that
impact is "beyond that normal(v associated with the exercise of lmtyering skills and crafts."
Id. at 270 (emphasis added). Finally, the authors explain that "[i]n counseling clients,
lawyers should provide clients with a reasonable opportunity to identity and evaluate those
alternatives and consequences that similarly situated clients usually find pivotal or
pertinent." Id. at 275. ROSENTHAL supra note 255, at 154 (suggesting a participatory model
of client counseling in which clients are active decision makers in addressing their problems
and share control and decision-making responsibility with the lawyer): SiegeL supra note
255, at 515-27 (proposing the development of an informed consent doctrine that would
account for the interests of the client, lawyer. and the public).
Additionally, various authors have written about decision making between the lawyer
and client in specific contexts. See. e.g.. Thomas F. Geraghty & Will Rhee, Learning from
Tragedy: Representing Children in Discretionary Transfer Hearings, 33 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 595 (1988) (discussing decision making in the context of representing children): Ann
Southworth, Lawyer-Client Decisionmaking in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice: An
Empirical Study of Lawyers' Xorms, 9 GEO. 1. LEGAL ETHICS 1101. 1131-47 (1996)
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So where does the disclosure of immigration status fall on the spectrum
between objectives and means? Whether and when to disclose immigration
status does not necessarily fall squarely into either definition, but could be
categorized as either. 257 Assuming that one's client is an undocumented worker
who is seeking relief in which immigration status is not relevant, disclosure of
immigration status should not impact the ultimate resolution of the legal case
and might be construed as a procedural or tactical decision. In those cases in
which immigration status is relevant, disclosure could directly affect the
ultimate resolution of the case or the substantive rights of the client. 258
Regardless of whether status is relevant or not, disclosure may have many
collateral consequences. For example, the client may be at risk of criminal
prosecution, deportation, or being barred from reentry into the United States. 259
In terms of the litigation, while disclosure may not ultimately determine the
merits of the litigation, it could, in certain contexts, result in dismissal of the

(examining lawyer-client decision making in the context of poverty law and civil rights
practices); Rodney J. Uphoff & Peter B. Wood. The Allocation of Decision making Between

Defense Counsel and Criminal Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client
Decisionmaking. 47 U. KAN. L. REV. I (1998) (exploring the attorney-client decision-making
paradigm in the context of criminal defense); Tracy N. Zlock. The :Vative American Tribe as
a Client: An Ethical Analysis. 10 GEO. 1. LEGAL ETHICS 159 (1996) (addressing the problem
of allocation of decision-making authority when representing Native American tribes).
257. What it: for example. there is a disagreement between the lawyer and the client
regarding who gets to make this decision? Rule 1.2 does not specify an exact procedure for
resolving such a disagreement. The lack of specificity is due in part to the "varied nature of
the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in
question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons:' MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.2 cm!. 2 (2007). If. after consultation with the client. there is no mutually
agreeable solution. the lawyer could characterize the disagreement as fundamental and seek
permission to withdraw from the representation. Id. R. 1.16(b)( 4). The client could also
discharge the lawyer if unsatisfied with the service being provided. Id. R. 1.16(a)(3).
258. Of course there are other ethical rules that would impact whether or not a laVl-'Yer
can disclose or must disclose in this situation. For a detailed discussion of ethical limitations
when immigration status is relevant to the case. see supra Part 1I1.A.
259. See Rivera v. NIBCO. Inc .. 364 F.3d 1057. \064 (9th Cir. 2004). cert. denied.
544 U.S. 905 (2005) C'While documented workers face the possibility of retaliatory
discharge for an assertion of their labor and civil rights. undocumented workers confront the
harsher reality that. in addition to possible discharge. their employer will likely report them
to the INS and they will be subjected to deportation proceedings or criminal prosecution:').
For a description of potential criminal liability. see supra notes 31-37 and accompanying
text. Finally. a client who is found to have been in the United States unlawfully for a year or
more and who thereafter seeks re-admission into the United States will be barred from
admission for ten years. 8 U.s.c. § I I 82(a)(9)(B)(i)(JI) (2000).
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action. 260 And, if the immigrant fears disclosure, the decision to disclose by the
lawyer might force the client to voluntarily dismiss the action. Given the
potential impact upon the client and the potential impact on the resolution of
the case, the decision to disclose should be made by the client after consultation
with the lawyer. 261
This analysis assumes that the strategic decision to disclose is simply a
matter of who gets to decide. However, given that the information to be
disclosed is confidential information,262 the lawyer must grapple with the
interplay between the rules that govern who gets to decide and the
confidentiality rules. The rule of confidentiality is one ofthe fundamental rules
of professional conduct for lawyers. 263 This rule requires lawyers to keep all
information "relating to the representation" confidentiaL unless the information
falls within a small number of closely defined circumstances. 264 A strategic
decision to disclose immigration status does not fall within the exceptions to
the confidentiality rule 26) and should not trump a client's expectation of
confidentiality. Thus, in order to disclose for strategic purposes, the lawyer
must have the client's consent, either express or implied.
In trying to obtain client consent, lawyers should be guided by Rule 1.4,
which delineates communication obligations. 266 Rule 1.4(a) specifically

260. A general practice of pcrnlilting such discovery might deter litigation by documented
workers concerned that their immigration status could later change. or that litigation might
lead to revelation of immigration problems of relatives or friends. The specter of deportation
arouses considerable fear among some immigrant groups: the chilling effect of discovery
orders could deter legal action simply because the potential plaintiffs did not fully understand
the relationship between their immigration status and civil litigation.
Schnapper. supra note 151. at 54.
261. Such a position is not \vithout support. There are a series of cascs in which courts
have decided. in the context of an ongoing professional relationship. that the client's
judgment should prevail even in matters of tactics. procedure. or drafting of documents. See.
e.g.. State v. Ali. 407 S.E.2d 183. 189 (N.C. 1991) ("[W]hen counsel and a fully informed
criminal defendant client reach an absolute impasse as to such tactical decisions. the client's
wishes must control: this rule is in accord with the principal-agent nature of the attorneyclient relationship."): Olson v. Fraase. 421 N.W.2d 820. 829-30 (N.D. 1988) (explaining that
the lawyer had a duty to follow client's reasonable instructions to prepare documents to
create joint tenancy. despite honest belief that instructions were not in client's best interest):
Cultum v. Heritage House Realtors, Inc .. 694 P.2d 630 (Wash. 1985): Olfe v. Gordon. 286
N.W.2d 573 (Wis. 1980) (detennining that a lawyer may not ignore client's wish to obtain
certain type of collateral); Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof! Responsibility.
Infonnal Op. 97-48 (1997) (finding that a lawyer who thinks client is mistaken in wanting to
take particular legal action is obligated to either follO\\ client's instructions or withdraw
from representation).
262. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
263. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 9-6 ("As a matter of professional ethics and
discipline. lawyers are obligated-with only a few narrowly drawn exceptions-to preserve
their clients' confidences inviolate.").
264. See supra notes 176-78. 181-99 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 181-99 and accompanying text.
266. MODEL RULES OF PROF'l CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2007).
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identifies those decisions that clients need to be consulted on 267 and creates an
affirmative duty to discuss with clients decisions that require their informed
consent 268 as well as a duty to reasonably consult about the means by which
their objectives are to be accomplished. 269 "Reasonably" implies that the
lawyer's obligation to consult will vary depending upon the circumstances. 270
The lawyer will have to weigh the importance of the action and the feasibility
of consulting with the client prior to acting. 271
Assuming that the disclosure can happen only if the client agrees to waive
the confidentiality mandate, what is the attorney obligated to communicate to
the client to assist in the decision-making process? According to the Model
Rules, the client "should have sufficient information to participate intelligently
in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by
which they are to be pursued.,,272 In order to participate intelligently in
decision making, the rules contemplate that clients' decisions are "based upon
an understandin~ of the risks and benefits that may result from disclosure and
nondisclosure.,,_73 In particular, when a lawyer is aware of facts that may
jeopardize the client's objectives in seeking representation, the lawyer must

267. As originally promulgated. Rule 1.4(a) simply stated that "[a] lawyer shall keep a
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information." ROTUNDA & DZiENKOWSKI. supra note 193. at 117. In 2002. the
Rule was amended to identify tive specific requirements. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.4(a) (2007). Section (b) is designed to make operational the obligations implicit in Rule
1.2, which requires that the lawyer consult with clients about the means utilized to achieve
clients' objectives. HAZARD & HODES. supra note 24. at 7-7.
268. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 2 (2007).
269. Id. R. 1.4(a) states. "A la\vyer shall ... reasonably consult with the client about
the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished .... "
270. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24, at 7-5 (finding that the duty of the la\\yer to
communicate with the client under Rule 1.4 is qualified by the concept of reasonableness).
Thus. whether or not a lawyer has a duty to consult requires a context-sensitive analysis
ba<;ed on objective factors.
271. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 3 (2007). If the lawyer is
impliedly authorized to act in certain situations. the obligation to consult is alleviated.
COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT. REPORT TO THE ABA HOUSE OF
DELEGATES (2001) (explaining changes to Model Rule 1.2).
272. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 5 (2007).
273. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES. supra note 159. at 93; see. e.g.. Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Snyder. 793 A.2d SIS (Md. 2002) (finding that in failing to explain implications
of OWl case adequately to client and incorrectly advising her that she need not appear in
court for initial appearance which resulted in her arrest. attorney committed misconduct).
Accordingly. a Im\yer must explain the legal effect of entering an agreement or executing a
legal document. See, e.g.. In re Morse. 470 S.E.2d 232 (Ga. 1996) (disciplining attorney for
asking client to sign agreement settling worker's compensation claim without explaining its
legal effect); In re Ragland. 697 N.E.2d 44 (Ind. 1998) (finding attorney violated
professional conduct rules in failing to explain impact of settlement and indemnity
agreement); see also In re Flack. 33 P.3d 1281 (Kan. 2001) (finding that by failing to meet
individually with clients to explain estate plans. and relying on nonlawyer staff to explain
plans to clients. attorney violated Rule 1.4(b )).
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apprise the client of those facts and their legal implications in order for the
client to make an informed decision about alternatives.274 In order to be
effective. the lawyer should provide advice regarding the risks and benefits of a
certain action in language appropriate to the client's level of sophistication. 275
A lawyer who is relying upon client consent to justifY an action and has not
actual\y received that consent. or has not communicated sufficiently with the
client. may be subject to discipline. 276
In the context of waiving the confidentiality mandate and disclosing the
client's immigration status. the lawyer needs to explain the risks and benefits of
disclosing the information in a way that can be understood by the client. Given
the potential ramifications. it may be advisable to explain not only the legal
consequences related to the ongoing litigation, but also some of the nonlegal
consequences that could accompany disclosure. Once this information has been

274. See, e.g.. In re Sullivan. 727 A.2d 832 (Del. 1999) (finding improper the aets of a
lawyer who failed to tile a brief which resulted in dismissal of appeal and. more than a year
later. sent a letter to client informing her there were "no claims pending" in her ca~e): In re
Cable. 715 N.E.2d 396 (Ind. 1999) (finding that in failing to inform client that he was too
busy to handle appeal. lawyer neglected to explain matter to the extent reasonably necessary
to allow client to make informed decisions about representation): Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Cassidy. 766 A.2d 632 (Md. 2001) (finding misconduct by a lawyer who was
hired to draft and record deed but failed to tell client he had been suspended, which was vital
information because the law requires certifieation by a lawyer to record deed): In re Howe.
626 N.W.2d 650 (N.D. 2001) (tinding that attorney's eonduct in failing to explain to client
he was not following through with his commitment to reduce award to judgment resulted in
client's inability to make informed decision to secure alternate counsel to complete matter
before interest rate was locked and constituted misconduct).
275. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are rea'mnably
adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal
matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved. and whether the client or
other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally.
such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or
other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should
be assumed to have given informed consent.
MODEL RULES OF ?ROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0 cmt. 6 (2007): see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 62 (2000) ("When the question concerns the lawyer's duty
to the client. the clienfs consent is effective only if given on the basis of information and
consultation reasonably appropriate in the circumstances. ").
276. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24. at 9-65 C[I]f a lawyer who is relying on
client consent to justify disclosure of elient information has not actually received consent. or
has not communicated sufficiently with the client. the lawyer may be subjected to
discipline."): see also, e.g., In re Winkel. 577 N.W.2d 9, II (Wis. 1998) (finding that failure
to inform clients about risk of criminal prosecution if clients surrendered business assets to
bank and la,v firm without arranging to pay subcontractor bills amounted to failure to
explain matter to clients to extent reasonably necessary to permit them to make informed
decision): ABA Comm. on Prof] Ethics and Grievances. Formal Op. 02-425 (2002)
(explaining that for lawyer and client to agree to retainer provision calling for binding
arbitration of disputes regarding fees and malpractice claims. lawyer must fully apprise
client of advantages and disadvantages of arbitration, including informing client that
arbitration normally results in client's waiver of significant rights. such as right to jury trial.
broad discovery. and appeal).

*
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provided to a client, the client can then make an informed decision about
whether waiving confidentiality and disclosing immigration status is in his or
her best interest.
In sum, if a lawyer believes disclosure would be beneficial to a client's
case, the lawyer should utilize the decision-making paradigm set forth in Rule
1.2. The lawyer must also be mindful that immigration status is considered
confidential information and that the confidentiality mandates of Rule 1.6
apply. Thus, in the absence of exceptions permitting disclosure, the lawyer
generally must counsel the client and obtain the client's informed consent in
order to disclose an undocumented worker's status.
V. CONCLUSION

A legislative solution to the ongoing immigration debates may be reached
in the near future. However, until that time, undocumented workers will
continue to work, and some will inevitably confront legal issues related to their
labor and employment. In light of these realities, courts will continue to define
the scope of rights and remedies for undocumented workers post-Hoffman.
Lawyers confronting these issues will continue to wrestle with issues related to
the representation of undocumented workers and the disclosure of immigration
status in the course of representation.
This Article concludes that Rule 1.2(d), which prohibits a lawyer from
assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct, generally does not bar an
attorney from counseling or re~resenting an undocumented worker in
employment-related civil litigation. 77 What lawyers do with information about
immigration status in the course of litigation depends in part upon the relevance
of status to the underlying litigation and the client's choices surrounding
disclosure. If immigration status is not relevant to the underlying proceedings,
lawyers will not be obligated to disclose status. In those instances where
immigration status is relevant to the underlying proceedings, lawyers should
counsel their clients on the use of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination as a way to protect this information. Finally, strategic decisions
regarding disclosure of immigration status are decisions to be made by the
client after being counseled on the risks and benefits of disclosure. In light of
the potential harmful consequences of an unwitting disclosure, lawyers should
undertake representation of undocumented workers in labor and employment
litigation mindful of the ethical issues that will inevitably arise.

277. See supra Part II.
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The comparisons of the number of defendants convicted for immigration-related offenses are based
on case- by-case Information obtained by TRAC under the Freedom of Information Act f rom the
Executive Office for United States Attorneys. (See Table 1)
When m ont hly 20 10 co nvictions of th is type are compared with tho se of the sa m e peri od in t he
previous year, the number of convictions was up (22 .1 percent) . Con victions over the past year are
still much hig her than they were five years ago. Overall, the data show that convictions of this type
are up 124.7 percent from levels reported in 2005.
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Figure 1: Monthly trends in immigration convictions
The increase from the levels five years ago in immigration convictions for the se matters is shown
more clearly in Figure 1. The vertical bars in Figure 1 represent the number of immigration
convictio ns of this type recorded on a month - to-month baSis. Where a prosecution was initially filed
in U.S. Magistrate Court and then transferred to the U.S. District Court, the magistrate fil ing date was
used sin ce th is provides an earlier indicator of actual trends. The su pe ri mposed line on the ba rs plots
the six-m onth moving average so that natural fluctuations are smoothed out. The one and five-yea r
rates of change in Table 1 and in the sections that follow are all based upon this six "month m oving
average . To v iew tren ds year - by-year rather than month-by-month , see TRAC's annual repo rt series
for a broader pi cture .
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Justice Depart m ent sho w that
during Decem ber 2010 the
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Th e compa risons of the number of defendants charged are based on case-by-case inform ation
obtained by TRAC under the Freedom of Information Act from the Executive Office for United Stat es
Atto rn eys. ( See Table 1)
When monthly 20 10 prosecutions of this type are compared with tho se of the same pe riod in the
previ ous year, t he number of filings was down (-6.3 percent). Prosecution s over the past yea r are stil l
m uch hig her th an t hey were five years ago. Overail, the data show t hat prosecutions of th is ty pe are
up 3 1. 7 percen t from leve ls r eported in 2005.
The grow th in th ese cases is part ly related to increases in the matters filed in U.S . Magistrate Courts .
I f magistr ate cases are excl uded and only Federal District Court ca ses are co unted, the overall
inc rea se in prosecution s is 2.5 percent instead of 31. 7 percent. The evidence suggests t hat part of
the diffe rence m ay be the result of improvements in the recording of the magistrate case s by t he
Just ice Department .
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Figure 1: Monthly trends in prosecutions

The increase from t he levels five years ago in prosecutions for these matters is shown more clearly in
Figu r e 1. The vertica l ba r s in Figure 1 represent the number of prosecutions of this type r eco rd ed on
a mo ntri- to -month basi s. Where a prosecution was initially filed in U.S. Magistrate Court and the n
tr'ansferTed to th e U.S. Di strict Court, the magistrate filing date was used since this provides an
ea r lier indicator of act u al t rend s. The superimposed line on the ba r s plots th e six-month m ov ing
average so th at natura l fluctuations are smoothed out . The one and five-year rates of change in Table
1 an d in the sections th at follow are all based upon this six-month moving average . To vi ew tren ds
ye ar- by - year rather t han month-by-month, see TRAC's annual report series for a broader picture .
Ca ses were classified by prosecutors into more specific types.
The largest nu m ber of prosecutions of these matters in December 2010 was for "Immigrat ion" ,
accou nti ng for 48 percent of prosecutions. Prosecutions were also filed fo r "Drugs-Drug Tr afficki ng "
( 13% ), " With held by Gov t from TRAC (FOIA challen" (8.2%), "Weapons-Operation Triggerlock Major"
(4 .5%), "Other Cri m ina l Pro secutions" (3.9%) , "ASSimilated Crimes" ( 3.7%), "Drugs-Orga n ized Crime
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U.S. Magistrate Courts
Lead Charges
6476 defendants in cases for these matters were filed in U.S. Magistrate Courts.
less serious misdemeanor cases, including what are called "petty offenses," In
are sometimes filed in the magistrate courts before an indictment or information
cases, the matter starts in the magistrate courts and later moves to the district
subsequent proceedings take place.
courts in December the most frequently cited lead charge was Title 8 U.s,( Section
the "Entry of alien at improper time or place; etc.", This was the lead
32.8
filings in December.
prosecuted lead charges include: "08 USC 1326 - Reentry of deported alien"
841 - Drug Abuse Prevention & Control-Prohibited acts An (6%).

U.S. District Courts
4945 defendants in new cases for these matters were charged in the U.S. District
In addition during December there were an additional 2336 defendants whose cases moved
the magistrate courts to the U.S. district courts after an indictment or information was filed. The
which follow cover both sets of cases and therefore cover all matters filed in district court

Lead Charges
shows the top lead charges recorded in the prosecutions of matters filed in U.S, District Court
2010.
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and conspiracy" under Title 21 U.S.C Section 846.
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for
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of

the top ten lead charges, the one showing the sharpest decline in prosecutions
year ago-down 12.4 percent-was Bank robbery and inCidental crimes
113 ).
to five years ago, the most Significant decline in
for filings where the lead charge was" Bringing in and harboring certain aliens"
1324 ).
Judicial Districts
2010 the Justice Department said the government brought 2845.9 prosecutions for
in the United States.
there is great variation in the per capita number of prosecutions that are filed in each
federal judicial districts.
the largest number of prosecutions per
for these matters last month
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District Court recording the largest drop in the rate of
North Dakota. But over the past five years, Eastern District of
6.4 percent.

time, there are about 680 federal District Court judges working in the United States. The
with the
number of new crime cases of this type during December 2010 are
4.

Crane in the
District of Texas
with
in cases.
in the top ten ran kings one year
P. Kazen in the Southern District of Texas
Kazen appeared in the top ten

March

4) and five years ago
ranked
one year

With 87

and

2011
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